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Abstract
Privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has arguably become one of the most
radical policies of economic reforms in developing countries. Many scholars believe that
privatization has positive impacts on enterprise performance. These impacts could re-
sult from improving corporate governance, production and business operation, and labor
condition. However, implementation of privatization programs might not induce these ex-
pected outcomes in the developing world because of less domestic savings, underdeveloped
capital markets, ineffective and poor regulations, and less market competitiveness.
Vietnamese government has implemented an economic reform program known as “Doi
moi” (Renovation) with the aim of creating a “socialist-oriented market economy” since
1986. At the heart of the reform, the government has put effort to privatize SOEs in order
to reduce the size of state-owned sectors in the economy, and consequently, to improve
the economy performance. However, SOEs have played a significant role in the economy
after more than two decades of privatization implementation. According to the data of
Vietnam General Statistics Office, SOEs employed 59 percent and 47 percent of total
social capital and contributed 38 percent and 36 percent of GDP in 2001 and in 2005,
respectively. These figures have decreased to 38 percent of total social capital and 28
percent of GDP by 2015. Some obstacles that may limit the privatization progress in the
long term. Therefore, I try to investigate impacts of privatization on SOEs performance
and evaluate current privatization strategies and policies with the aim of suggesting some
valuable policy implications for accelerating privatization process in Vietnam.
This dissertation review many studies on privatization of SOEs in theory and prac-
tice. I first review privatization in theory and experiences of developed and developing
xix
countries and evaluate efficiency effects of privatization on SOEs performance. Then,
I investigate whether Vietnamese SOEs have benefited from the privatization programs
and how privatization should be conducted in Vietnam to yield superior enterprise per-
formance. In fact, there have been few empirical studies on impact of privatization on
SOEs performance in Vietnam. However, most of these studies are based on their own
surveys and applied methodologies that have some limitations. By using a difference-in-
differences (DID) framework to firm-level panel data over the 2004-2008 period, I confirm
that Vietnamese SOEs have significantly improved its performance in terms of profitabil-
ity and productivity after privatization. This finding raises an important question of what
are the main factors behind the improvement of privatized SOEs. In the next step, I thus
examine the link between ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm perfor-
mance in the post-privatization period by applying the method of two stage least squares
(2SLS) to Vietnamese listed firms during the period of 2003-2015 and analyzing four listed
firms which have different forms of ownership structure after privatization. The results
suggest that formulating concentrated ownership structure after privatization is an im-
portant feature in inducing major restructuring process, and consequently, in improving
enterprise performance. Based on the findings and arguments, I suggest some guidelines
on privatization plans, privatization implementation strategies, and a new privatization
driver to facilitate efficient privatization process in Vietnam.
The dissertation progresses as follows.
Chapter 1: An Overview of Efficiency Effect of Privatization in Developing
Countries
Chapter 1 is designed to provide fundamental background for the dissertation. This
chapter first briefly introduces privatization in theory and practice, including concepts,
principles, methods, advantages, and disadvantages of privatization. In addition, empiri-
cal studies on efficiency effect of privatization and lessons from some countries’ privatiza-
tion experiences such as that of the United Kingdom, South Korea, Latin America, and
transition countries are also reviewed. The chapter then presents an overview of Vietnam’s
privatization strategies and policies in order to document some major achievements and
xx
limitations of the privatization process. These findings are carefully referenced in drawing
policy implications aimed at facilitating efficient privatization process in Vietnam.
Chapter 2: Impact of Privatization on the Performance of State-owned
Enterprises in Vietnam
The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate the impact of privatization on the
performance of Vietnamese SOEs. In this regard, I apply a difference-in-differences (DID)
framework to firm-level panel data in the period of 2004-2012 to evaluate the impact of
privatization. In addition, in order to examine how the SOEs with different degrees of
privatization have been differentially affected, I adopt a continuous treatment intensity
based on the state-owned shares of SOEs sold to private investors. The results indicate
that privatization in Vietnam has had a significantly positive impact on SOEs performance
in terms of profitability and productivity. In particular, enterprises that have experienced
a greater degree of privatization and had more state-owned shares sold to private investors
could improve their performance more than those which experienced a lesser degree.
Chapter 3: Privatization, Ownership Structure, and Privatized State-owned
Enterprise Performance in Vietnam
Chapter 3 focuses on analyzing the link between ownership structure, corporate gover-
nance, and firm performance in the post-privatization period. Applying the method of two
stage least squares (2SLS) to control for the endogeneity of ownership, I attempt to eval-
uate the impact of different degrees of ownership concentration on the post-privatization
performance of Vietnamese listed firms which were completely privatized between 2003
and 2013. The estimated results show that fully-privatized SOEs with greater degree
of ownership concentration have performed better in terms of profitability and efficiency
than those with dispersed ownership structure in the post-privatization period of 2003-
2015. I then examine four Vietnamese listed firms which have different forms of ownership
structure after privatization to verify how their corporate governance and business opera-
tion have improved after changing its ownership structure. I find that privatization which
leads to concentrated ownership structure has generated effective corporate governance,
and consequently superior firm performance.
xxi
Chapter 4: Suggestions for Privatization Strategy in Vietnam
This chapter aims to suggest some guidelines on privatization plan, privatization im-
plementation strategy, and a new privatization driver in Vietnam. These guidelines are
based on my empirical findings on different countries’ privatization experiences including
Vietnam. The first section presents some recommendation on what Vietnamese govern-
ment should consider regarding their formulation of rational privatization plans, such as
enforcing complete privatization programs, using methods of privatization which can lead
to concentrated ownership structure, and attract potential private investors. Further-
more, the government should pursue an appropriate implementation strategy in order to
effectively conduct privatization plans. For instance, a swift and comprehensive (Big-
Bang) strategy of privatization should be applied for SOEs and partially-privatized SOEs
which are operating in non-strategic sectors and have more or less than 50 percent of
state-owned shares; evolutionary strategy is suggested for downsizing state ownership of
state economic groups (SEGs) and state general corporations (SGCs) operating in non-
natural monopoly sectors; and triggering strategy in line with creating more diversified
private owners is recommended for privatization of SOEs operating in natural monopoly
sectors. Creating a new privatization driver as presented in the last section is the most
important factors in order to implement privatization plans in more efficient ways.
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Chapter 1
An Overview of Efficiency Effect of
Privatization in Developing
Countries
Introduction
Privatization has been proposed as a solution to the inefficiency in public sectors dur-
ing the last two decades of the twentieth century. Privatization programs have been
introduced with the aim of relieving fiscal burden, reducing cost inefficiency in public
enterprises, generating market liberalization, and depolicization. According to OECD
(2001), total global privatization receipts were estimated about USD 936.6 billion in the
1990s. Governments around the world realize that privatization is an effective policy to
maximize economic efficiency as it reduces subsidies for loss-making public enterprises
and raises revenue from selling state assets. However, implementing privatization pro-
grams in some countries like the United Kingdom and South Korea has been much more
successful than in others such as Latin America and transition economies. In this contest,
the chapter seeks to explain the main reasons behind successful cases as well as failure
stories; and why privatization works in some countries by studying country experiences
from the past.
The chapter includes five main parts. The first part provides underlying information
of privatization in theory and practice, including principles, methods, advantages, and
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disadvantages of privatization. Next, a brief introduction of world’s privatization history
is presented. The literature review of privatization impact is the third part. The fourth
part is discussion on privatization experiences from the past. An overview of state-owned
enterprises privatization process in Vietnam is also another main part of this chapter.
The last part is conclusion and discussion.
1.1 Privatization in theory and practice
1.1.1 Concepts of privatization
The concepts of privatization are relatively different in terms of practical and theoretical
point of views. Theoreticians, like Boycko, Shleifer and Wishny (1996, p.310), define
privatization as ‘a combination of the reallocation of control rights over employment
from politicians to managers and the increase in cash flow ownership of managers and
private investors’. Others, like Domberger and Piggott (1986, p.146) (Domberger and
Piggott 1986), argue that privatization could be seen as ‘policies designed to improve the
operating efficiency of public sector enterprises through increased exposure to competitive
market forces’.
Narrowly, the term privatization is defined as ‘the transfer from the public to the
private sector of the ownership and/or control of productive assets, their allocation and
pricing, and the entitlement to the residual profit flows generated by them’ (Adam et al.,
1992, p.6). Similarly, De Walle (1989, p.601)(Van de Walle 1989) identifies privatization
as ‘transfer of ownership and control from the public to the private sector, with particular
reference to asset sales’. Other scholars, like Bos (1991)(Bos et al. 1991) Hemming and
Mansoor (1988)(Hemming and Mansoor 1988), and Rees (1988)(Rees 1988), interpret the
concept of privatization to be quite similar to that of the above scholars.
Researchers in the field, such as Galal (1991)(Galal 1991), Shirley (1990)(Shirley 1990),
Shirley and Nellis (1991)(Shirley and Nellis 1991), believe that the term privatization is a
synonym of the concept of public enterprise reform. It means the reform goals equate with
functional privatization. Prager (1992)(Prager 1992) also defines privatization in different
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concepts such as a change in ownership and control or only in patterns of control rather
than ownership, private ownership without any constraints to entry into the industry,
and the partial sale of state assets which does not imply attenuation of state control.
Shair (1997)(Shair 1997) clarifies two different concepts of privatization. “The first is
privatization as the transfer of ownership and/or control (whole or partial) from the
state to the private sector. This definition does not include SOEs reform programs and
deregulation/liberalization polices because these necessitate neither a change in control
and ownership nor a change in the source of supply for goods and services”. The second
is that “privatization equates with functional decentralization, as opposed to territorial
decentralization”. He uses the second definition to analysis the impact of privatization
on economic development.
In fact, there is no single definition of privatization. Many scholars have been revising
the concepts of privatization, which could serve the objectives of their studies. The
definition of Shair (1997) is quite relevant to my research objectives and Vietnamese
SOEs privatization process. In this regard, the term privatization refers to a process of
transferring partial and/or full state ownership of SOEs to private sectors.
1.1.2 Principles of privatization
There are, in practical sense, three potential benefits that makes privatization favored
by governments. The first benefit is improving economic performance by focusing on
cost efficiency at firm level. In other words, privatization is undertaken partly as a good
solution in order to relieve the fiscal burden rising from public enterprises because of too
much slack (moral hazard) and over investment. The study of Pirie (1988)(Pirie 1988)
states that public enterprises have operated inefficiently and privatization is in need of
improving its performance. As in Germany, Denmark, France, and Finland, privatization
has become widespread in order to raise revenue for the state to finance a fiscal deficit.
The view that ‘the state should not be in business’ points out in the following quotation:
Just as nationalization was at the heart of collectivist programme by which labour
sought to remodel British society, so privatization is at the centre of any programme of
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reclaiming territory for freedom. [. . . ] But, of course, the narrower economic arguments
for privatization were also overwhelming. The state should not be in business. State
ownership effectively removes – or at least radically reduces – the threat of bankruptcy
which is a discipline on privately owned firms. (Thatcher, 1993, pp. 676-7)(Thatcher
1993)
Regarding effective management, private sectors have stronger incentives to minimize
cost than public sectors. Cost inefficiency in public enterprises is subsidized by govern-
ments, which catch attentions of both scholars and policy makers. Since public enterprises
have better chances to access credit, they may easily distort market competition and free
trade. Public enterprises tend to invest less on cost-saving research and development
(R&D), which causes a dynamic inefficiency (Bos & Peters, 1991)(Bos et al. 1991). As a
result, this not only influences economic performance but also raises fiscal burden. It is
not necessary to criticize subsidies and distortions which are the results of political fail-
ures because they even can occur after privatization implementation. Public enterprises
would be more efficient under privatization process in compliance with better working
conditions and excessive quality (Ferguson, 1988)(Ferguson 1988).
Secondly, at market level, privatization was introduced as a solution to promote mar-
ket liberalization. The well-known Pareto-efficient outcomes lead to perfectly competitive
markets which can never be achieved in reality. Public enterprises often monopolize do-
mestic market, which causes imperfect information. As a result, exiting firms could not
improve their business performance; and new entry of efficient firms may be blocked
because of lacking relevant information. One of the necessary conditions for market liber-
alization is increasing size of private ownership in the economy, especially in some ‘natural
monopoly’ industries such as gas, electricity, water, telecommunication, and railway. For
instance, the privatization program in the UK was successful in rails, wires, and pipers.
Therefore, market liberalization is a key for firms to have free entry and for consumers to
benefit from competitive process.‘Market liberalization and privatization are best seen as
complementary policies’ (Robinson, 2003, pp. 50-11)(Robinson 2003).
At state level, depoliticization is the third benefit arising from privatization process.
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Political factors that are imbedded in almost all important decisions may negatively af-
fect public enterprises’ performance. In particular, lobbying appears as a consequence of
political ideology. Lobbying tends to be relatively high return activity in public enter-
prises. As an alternative view, enterprises in some industries are still necessarily owned
by governments in developing countries, even in developed countries.
Privatization often requires three fundamental conditions, including institutional en-
vironment, degree of competition, and the role and nature of current state intervention
in the economy, for successful privatization process. Creating good institutions has to
be considered for the management and supervision of the process. According to Guis-
lain (1992, p. 47)(Guislain 1992), perfect institutional arrangements cannot be achieved
in practice and it is necessary to clarify responsibilities of each concerned parties and
conflicts of interest.
In short, privatization cannot address all problems but it can open a greater market
competition for better firm performance. Privatization can increase the role of private
sectors in enhancing market competition and improving capital markets. In other words,
maximizing economic efficiency by transferring ownership from public to private sectors
is an important objective of privatization. Therefore, the relationship between economic
growth and size of private sectors can be expected to be positive rather than negative in
most countries.
1.1.3 Methods of privatization
Methods of privatization could be defined from different approaches. In abroad sense,
Feigenbaum and Henig (1994)(Feigenbaum and Henig 1994) distinguish among pragmatic
benefits, tactical gains, and systemic changes on the dynamics of privatization. Denation-
alization method is defined as the transfer of at least 51 percent of state-owned shares
of SOEs to private sectors. In addition it is more appropriate to define denationalization
as a complete process in which all assets and shares of public sectors must be trans-
ferred to private sectors. As a result, its management and operation are expected to be
more efficient after privatization. However, denationalization process suffers from some
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problems, such as timing and planning, instability and uncertainty of political economy,
and underdeveloped capital markets. In a narrow sense, Andrew Berg and Elliot Berg
(1997)(Berg and Berg 1997), for instance, categorized methods of privatization into direct
and indirect approaches. Direct approach includes four categories which are sales of assets
or shares, capitalization, management-employee buy-outs (MEBO), and mass (voucher)
privatization. Management contracts, lease contracts, and services contracts are indirect
privatization methods. According to Mako and Zhang (2003)(Mako and Zhang 2003),
they categorize sales methods of privatization based on sales process (open or closed)
and target buyers (trade sales, initial public offering, MEBO, and mixed sales), which
is relevant to privatization in Vietnam. In the context, this part mainly discusses some
key features of privatization methods which are categorized based on target buyers (See
Table1.1).
(i). Trade sales
Trade sales method refers to a process in which an SOE is sold directly to outsiders
for a positive price. This method has heavily been applied in Hungary and Mexico.
The method offers a great potential for raising fiscal budget resulting from higher sale
proceeds, compared with other methods. In addition, SOEs which are privatized by trade
sales can obtain technology and knowledge transfers from foreign investment and develop
strong management. The method does not have higher demands on legal framework or
market infrastructure. This is the reason why the method does not support to develop
capital markets after privatization implementation. Another disadvantage of trade sales
is time-consuming, which has experienced in non-transition and transition countries. For
example, it took over 10 years for the Thatcher government in the UK to sell about 20
companies and 6 years for Mexican government to privatize about 150 SOEs.
However, a major issue of the method is how to evaluate enterprises’ assets and lia-
bilities in order to define a precise sale price. It is more challenging in socialist economies
where market mechanisms are limited and monitoring systems are ineffective. Dealing
with any debt of public enterprises before these enterprises are privatized is another chal-
lenge. Governments should consider what are appropriate solutions, financial aids or
6
Table 1.1: Key Features of Main SOE Sales Alternatives
Alternative Advantages Disadvantages Main Applicability
Trade sale - Higher sales proceeds - Time consuming - Great majority of
control premium - No support for capital medium and large SOEs
- Strong management market development
- Possible foreign
investment/technology
- Fewer demands on legal
and market infrastruc-
ture
IPO - Develops capital Lower sales proceeds Large, well-known,
markets - Extensive preparations well-run SOEs
- Possible market - High costs - Strong legal/regulatory
supervision of enterprise - Time consuming protections for minority
- Highly transparent - High demands on legal shareholders in place
and market infrastruc-
ture
MBO/ - Speed - Non-transparent - Small SOEs
MEBO - Support from - Possible favoritism or dependent on
managers and workers corruption scientific and technical
- Public criticism skills of staff
- Unlikely to help
competitiveness
Mixed
sales
- Somewhat higher sale
proceedss
- More complex transac-
tion
- Medium/large SOEs
likely to attract strategic
- High costs (e.g., foreign investors)
- Strong management - Time consuming
- Opportunity for public - High demands on
to share in gains legal/market
- Public support infrastructure
- Develop capital markets
Source: Mako and Zhang (2003)
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subsidies, they wish to use in order to encourage the sale of privatization. The two main
solutions have been adopted in empirical cases. The first solution is ‘golden shares’ which
was applied by the UK government to protect electricity industry from 1990 to 1995. This
protection put a restraint on foreign investors to purchase capital shares. The second is
named ‘hard cores’, which had been used in France. The ‘hard cores’ method requires
no nationality discrimination and free capital markets in which foreign investments eas-
ily involve in privatization programs. ‘This technique has been criticized as rewarding
government supporter and creating a highly incestuous group of investors’ (Graham &
Prosser, 1991, pp. 154-60)(Prosser, Graham, and Galton 1991). However, regulations
after ‘hard cores’ privatization need to be addressed, particularly in law of competition
and consumer protection.
(ii). Initial public offering
Initial public offering (IPO) is a method of privatization in which process of setting
sales price is open to the public. IPO has been developed as a major method of privati-
zation in Canada, Russia, Czech Republic, and some transition countries of Central and
Eastern Europe since 1990s. Developing capital markets is a major advantage of IPO.
The method is quickly applied, compared with others. A huge number of state enterprises
can be privatized through financial intermediaries and free distribution. As a result, sec-
ondary capital markets are developed to ensure that distribution of state-owned shares is
more equitable and transparent. In other words, the method is often more transparent
than others and creates higher possible market of supervision on enterprises.
However, there are two main disadvantages of IPO. The first difficulty is that it de-
pends on degree of market forces and liberalization. The status of domestic saving and
capital market freedom in the economy is another major requirement for successful pri-
vatization implementation. Increasing investment funds by selling state assets to citizens
is an important channel for quick privatization. In addition, how to define relative sales
price is another difficulty of the method. In this case, governments should use alterna-
tive methods to obtain higher returns. According to the World Bank (1988), there are
four necessary conditions before feasibility of public offering including sizable enterprise,
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availability of financial management information, discernible liquidity, and development
of equity markets. In fact, these conditions in some cases cannot be achieved at the
same time. For example, African countries have small capital markets and are relatively
weak in mobilization of investment (Campbell White & Bhatia, 1998, p. 10)(Bhatia and
Campbell-White 1998). Nellis (2002)(Nellis 2002) also argues that the World Bank should
pay attention to improve institutional development, especially prudential regulations in
both financial and capital markets.
(iii). Management/employee buy-out
Management/employee buy-out (MBO/MEBO) offers state-owned shares of public en-
terprises for its insiders at positive prices. The method is often used for large-sized SOEs
having more than 250 employees. Many transition economies such as Romania, Croatia,
Slovenia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Macedonia, and Albania used MBO/MEBO technique
as the primary method of privatization. The method could speed up privatization pro-
cess, resulting from having supports of managers/workers. It is appropriate to apply the
method in transition economies where there is lack of property rights and weak insider
control system. Sales price in these economies have basically offered to insiders of pub-
lic enterprises for whatever they were able to pay (OECD, 2009). Despite the fact that
precise sale price is directly set through negotiation between employees and the special
operation forces (SOF), benefits are unequally distributed between managements and
employees. Another issue of the method in organizing private sales is non-transparency
and non-objectiveness of sales process. Market consistent prices based on independent
evaluation of experts in privatization with more competition are necessary defined. In
addition, MBO/MEBO methods also face potential risks after privatization such as inef-
ficiency management, larger costs due to maintain excessive employment, and insufficient
investments.
(iv). Mixed sale
Mixed sales method combines these above methods, which can obtain their advantages
as mentioned earlier. Many countries, especially Central Europe, adopted mixed sales as
the standard method for successful SOEs privatization. However, the method also raises
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a situation in which sales transactions are more complex and costly, compared with other
sales methods.
In summary, each method of privatization has its own advantages and disadvantages
which should be considered before privatization implementation. The method is selected
based on the nature of enterprises, capital markets, and main objectives set for privati-
zation. Maximizing net value of proceeds (after subtracting cost of privatization) which
is considered by most governments is one of the top objectives set for privatization. For
instance, while the Commonwealth of Australia considers “how the privatization method
may impact on the ongoing viability of the entity and/or industry”, the Korean govern-
ment is more likely to consider the “long-term development strategy of the privatized
company” (OECD, 2009).
1.1.4 Pros and cons of privatization
As in theoretical and practical senses, privatization is an efficient technique to promote
economic growth, market liberalization, and depolitization. On the other hand, this also
raises a number of concerned issues such as natural monopoly, public interest losses,
potential dividends, increasing inequality, reducing economies of scale, and employment
losses.
Advantages of privatization
(1) Downsizing
During the 1970s, most of large state enterprises ran a dozen of business since gov-
ernments would like to gain greater revenues through business diversification. However,
those businesses which are not in core-businesses of enterprises were performed generally
poor and inefficient performance. Governments had to face serious problematic issues aris-
ing from “conglomerate” corporation. Moreover, privatization will enforce to restructure
these corporations, which should focus on its core functions and give non-core business to
others who carry out it better.
(2) Fiscal relief
Governments around the world often face with large fiscal deficit. Therefore, privatiz-
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ing SOEs can be a way to gain revenues to offset fiscal burden. Governments can add more
revenues from taxes if privatized SOEs operate more efficiently and create more profits.
Furthermore, in the case of privatizing loss-making SOEs, fiscal deficit will reduce as a
result of elimination of subsidies.
(3) Improved efficiency
In empirical approaches, private enterprises have more incentives to reduce costs and
improve its efficiency while state enterprises tend to have poor performance and to be
inefficiency. Private enterprises are more interested in making its higher profits than
public ones. As a result, product markets will be more competitive and prices will be
more adequate with consumer choices. Thus, privatization process is considered as a
method to achieve higher economic efficiency.
(4) Depoliticization
By transferring ownership from public to private sectors, government bureaucrats will
be depoliticized, and privatized SOEs will run its business more efficiently. Basically,
private firms have strong motivates to promote or recruit employees based on their per-
formance. Private firms are not affected by any particular political relations while making
decisions in SOEs is commonly influenced by political ideologies.
(5) Wider ownership
Privatization is an effective way to widespread ownership to the public. Through
different methods of privatization as mentioned earlier, every citizen in both developing
and developed countries have chances to involve in privatization process as they may hold
shares of privatized firms. Spreading wider ownership leads to improvement of economic
efficiency.
Disadvantages of Privatization
(1) Natural monopoly
Natural monopoly is one of the serious problems that can be generated from privatiza-
tion process if governments sell its ownership shares of firms operating in natural monopoly
industries such as gas, railways, electricity, to one or few investors. Competitive pressures
are not generated; consequently, market failures are created. In some cases, having public
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monopoly might be better than having private monopoly because governments are more
likely to protect consumers.
(2) Public interest
Profitability is not a primary objective of public industries such as education, health
care, and public transportation. Nationalizing these industries is the first sight of public
interest even though the quality of services is relatively poor and unprofitable. Privatiza-
tion of those industries may lose public interest.
(3)Potential dividends
Governments may lose potential dividends if profitable SOEs are privatized. In other
words, governments gain more revenue from operating wealthy state enterprises than
privatizing them.
(4) Increasing inequality
Increasing inequality in wealth distribution is another disadvantage of privatization.
Most population who are able to purchase state assets are quite wealthy. This makes
redistribution of wealth is increasingly unequal. The gap between the poor and the rich
has become larger and larger.
(5)Economies of scale
Privatization causes losing economies of scale since large-sized SOEs normally partition
into small-sized ones. Small-sized privatized SOEs are not able to take advantages of
economies of scale, especially in public transportation industries.
(6) Employment losses
In short term, privatization may lead to reduce employment. In fact, newly privatized
SOEs are more motivation to be efficient and profitable by reducing their costs. Cutting
quantity of employment is a common way of reducing costs in the short-run. However,
it is potential to create more jobs in the future when they appropriately enhance their
business operation.
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1.1.5 A history and evaluation of privatization in the world
Throughout history, public and private ownership have still exited simultaneously in the
market. Governments must determine how appropriate their roles are in the market in
order to achieve efficiency of resources allocation. Sobel (1999) states that the state
ownership, in the ancient Near East, was more common in production markets than in
commercial market where private sector was developed. Transferring from the state sector
to the private sector, labeled as ‘privatization’, demonstrates the failures of the nation-
alization after the Great Depression of 1930s and the two World Wars. Since the 1980s,
privatization has considered as a key program for industrial restructuring and economic
reforms. The trends of privatization can be divided into three periods as described in the
following Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Brief History of Privatization
Period Privatization programs
1950s The Churchill government’s denationalization of the British steel
industry, the first privatization
1961 The Federal Republic of Germany’s Adenauer Government
launched the first large-scale
1977 Small British Petroleum, Other Sales
1979-1983 First Thatcher Government
Nov-84 The Turning Point: British Telecom
1986-1988 The French Chirac Government
NTT 1987-1988 Privatization Spreads To Asia
1991-1997 Transition in Central, Eastern Europe
1994-2000 Golden Age of EU Privatizations
1990s Latin America Embraces, then Halts Privatization
2000-2009 Privatization Drops, then Bounces Back
2000s Opportunistic EU Privatizations, As Markets Allow
Since 2002 China Adopts Its Own Brand Of Privatization
Since 2006 Emerging Markets Take the Privatization Lead
2009-2011 GFC Nationalizations, Then Sales Mostly US
Source: William Megginson (2011)
The 1st phase (before 1970s)
William L. A. M. and Jeffrey M.’s discussion (2003, pp. 25-26) shows that ‘the organi-
zation of economic activity and the ownership of the means of production and trade have
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moved throughout history from the state sector to the private sector and back at many
times and in many ways. However, privatization as the term is used today really begins
with the Great Depression of the 1930s and the two World Wars’ (ibid:26). The Great
Depression demonstrates the failure of capitalism which is to require massive government
intervention in the economic matters. The devastation of the two world wars led to in-
crease government actions for recovering economies. In addition, some major industries,
such as railroad, coal, iron and steel, had quickly nationalized with the motivation of full
employment and high growth rate.
Almost 20 years after the Great Depression, there were controversies about inefficient
resources allocation of state ownership. Privatization was embraced as a technique to
address state ownership failures. The first privatization was introduced in the British steel
industry under the Churchill government’s denationalization during the early 1950s. The
first large-scale privatization program was launched by the Federal Republic of Germany’s
Adenauer Government, ideologically motivated ‘denationalization’ program of the post-
war era in 1961 (William L. M. and Jeffry M. N., 2003, pp.31:5).
The 2nd phase (from 1980s to 1990s)
The second phase is associated with the Margaret Thatcher’s privatization program in
the UK in 1979. Yotopoulos (1989) argues that the Pinochet government in Chile is the
first government that had initiated a large-scale privatization program, before the UK’s
privatization program. However, most people have assumed that the Margaret Thatcher’s
privatization theory has been the most important program of modern privatization since
the 1980s. As following, privatization has become a dominant measurement for industrial
restructuring in many countries during this period and up to present. The number of
privatized transactions per country per year, on average, increased from three in the
1980s to five in the 1990s (World Bank, 1995). Although privatization activities have
been increasing, the state ownership has still dominated in many developing countries
and in some major sectors. According to the World Bank indicator statistics (Kikeri,
2005), privatization trends during the period from 1980s to 1990s could be summarized
in the following main movements:
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- While privatization transactions were reduced in the late 1990s and slowly recovered
after 1997, the average value of transactions gradually increased thanks to privatization
of a number of large-sized SOEs. The goals of implementing privatization in develop-
ing countries were to improve productivity of privatized public enterprises, to enhance
investment capital accessibility, and to reduce fiscal burden.
- Regarding regional trends, the highest number of privatization transactions was in
Eastern Europe, followed by Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, most of
privatized SOEs in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central Asia are small- and
medium-size, compared with other regions.
- In developing countries, 50 percent of total privatization activities came from foreign
investment in which Latin America, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia contributed
by 56 percent, 23 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. In East Asia and Pacific region,
China was the major recipient of foreign investment in privatization proceeds, followed
by Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
- In terms of sectoral trends, privatization processes were highly concentrated in bank-
ing, telecommunication, and power industries.
- Mass or voucher privatization is a common technique for transferring a huge number
of SOEs in the Eastern Europe region.
The 3rd phase (from 2000s up to now)
This phase could be divided into two periods, from 2000 to 2008 and after the global
financial crisis until now. According to the World Bank statistic indicators, OECD report
(2009), and the Privatization Barometer reports (2011-2014), the phase is highlighted as
the below trends:
* Before the global financial crisis:
- SOEs privatization have become one of the largest economic activities of OECD
countries. Germany, France, and Italy contributed almost 50 percent of total privatization
proceeds.
- Using initial public offerings (IPOs) for partial privatizations has been as a common
method since 2000 and took off in 2007. East Asia is the region taking lead in privatization
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revenue thanks to IPOs, followed by Europe and Central Asia. Chinese IPOs dominated
in the East Asia region.
- Regarding regional highlight trends, privatization revenue steeply fell in the Middle
East and North Africa and increased in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. South
Asia was relatively stable in privatization process.
- Finance and infrastructure industries were highlighted sectors, which accounted for
almost 70 percent of total privatization values. The finance transaction value, including
banking, real estate, and insurance, sharply increased from USD25 billion in the 2000-
2005 period to USD61 billion in 2007. The transaction value of infrastructure in 2007
reached to USD28.4 billion. Telecommunication and electricity were the two leaders in
privatization, compared with other infrastructure industries.
* From the post-crisis period until present:
- As a result of the global financial crisis, a number of privatization activities have
immediately dropped and capital inflows quickly declined in developing countries in the
post-crisis period of 2009-2011. The years 2012-2014 represented the beginning period of
increasing privatization activities. This trend appears to continue in the next few years.
- After more than two decades of privatization, SOEs continue to play an important
role in many sectors and many economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the
Middle East and North Africa.
- The EU’s privatization has significantly recovered since 2013 in both total number
and value of privatization transactions. Continuing the trend of previous period, China
has been the leading privatizer in South Asia, followed by Hong Kong, the United King-
dom, Greece, Australia, Turkey, and the United States (PB report, 2014).
- Share issue privatization (SIP) tends to be a common method, for instance accounted
for almost 80 percent of total divestment in the period of 2013-2014, compared with
auctions, targeted stake sales, and share repurchases.
Generally, privatization programs continue to be a principal issue for economic devel-
opment and global finance in the long-term. This wave will be more room to continue
deepening and spreading in emerging economies (see Appendixes).
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1.2 Literature review on effects of privatization
Impact evaluation of privatization has drawn attention of many scholars and policy mak-
ers around the world. Some of scholars examine the effect of privatization on fiscal and
macroeconomic performance, market competitiveness, and market liberalization. Regard-
ing the relationship between economic growth and privatization, the estimation results
are contradictory among empirical researches. While Plane (1997) and Barnett (2000)
point out that this relationship is significantly positive in developing countries over the
1984-1992 period, Cook and Uchida (2003) show a robust result of the negative effect of
privatization on economic growth. For capturing different methodological approaches in
their studies, it is likely to rule out a possibility of having positive or negative impact on
economic growth. In terms of fiscal burden relief, examining fiscal impact of privatization
is relatively difficult because it seems to have a link between the net value of proceeds
and fiscal burden. In many cases, fiscal burden has been significantly reduced due to the
big net revenue from state asset sales. The state budget is saved thanks to an increasing
privatization proceeds which can be substituted for other sources of domestic financing
(David et al., (2000)). However, the Pinheiro and Schneider (1995) study concludes that
privatization programs have not improved the fiscal balance in Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
and Brazil because the privatization returns received quite late and were too small.
Other scholars investigate to measure the magnitude of firm-level effects of privatiza-
tion on enterprise performance. Shirley and Walsh (2001) review 52 empirical studies on
the link between privatization and enterprise performance in both developing and devel-
oped countries during the 1971-1999 period. They find that public enterprise performance
has been far worse off than private and privatized enterprises in the majority of their re-
viewed studies. The other 15 studies conclude that there is no significant or ambiguous
relationship between enterprises ownership structure and its performance.
Other comprehensive surveys of this field are undertaken by Megginson and Netter
(2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002), and Megginson (2005). They demonstrate that priva-
tization has a significantly positive impact on enterprise performance in most of empirical
studies. In addition, D’Souza and Megginson (1999) focus on evaluating post-privatization
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performance of enterprises. The results also illustrate that there is a significant improve-
ment of performance of newly privatized enterprises, particularly in terms of profitability,
dividend payments, and operating efficiency.
Given the large collection of published studies on impacts of privatization, I mainly
focus on reviewing empirical studies related to the impact evaluation of privatization
on SOEs performance. Therefore, the chapter is documented to review two research
domains of privatization which are impact evaluation of privatization and effectiveness
of privatization methods (see Table 1.8 and Table 1.11). These domains are the basic
frameworks to serve my research objectives presented in the next chapters.
1.2.1 Impact evaluation of privatization
Profitability, productivity, and governance efficiency
In fact, governance efficiency and financial profitability are the two major outcomes of
privatization. Most of empirical literatures suggest that privatization have a significantly
positive impact on productivity, profitability, and governance efficiency (see Table 1.3).
In terms of productivity and profitability, Cook and Kirkpatrick (2003:216) conclude
that privatization, on average, has led to an improvement in financial profitability and
economic performance in developing countries by comparing firm performance before and
after privatization. Notably, Pohl, Anderson, Claessens, and Djankov (1997) use a sam-
ple of 6,300 private enterprises and SOEs from 7 Eastern European countries during the
period of 1992-1995. Their estimated results reveal that a privatized SOE will increase
its productivity for 3 5 times more after 4-year privatization compared with a SOE coun-
terpart. By using the sample of 92 countries, LaPorta, Silanes, Shleifer (2000a) conclude
that privatized firms have increased its productivity and investment, and reduced its
prices. Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000) point out that ownership changes and compe-
tition influence productivity of privatized firms in Mongolia. Angelucci, Estrin, Konings,
and Zolkiewski (2001) also prove the existance of the effect in Romania, Bulraria, and
Ploland. By studying effect of privatization on revenue performance and cost reduction,
Frydman et al. (1999) conclude that privatization has a significantly positive impact on
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revenue performance of SOEs which were privatized to outsiders, including foreign own-
ers. However, cost reduction does not reflect in the case of privatized firms in Hungary,
the Czech Republic, and Poland. Additionally, in a study on the sample of 23 comparable
international airlines from 1973 to 1983, Ehrlich et al. (1994) argue that the effects of
privatization on higher productivity growth and lower cost is statistically significant in
the long-run but are ambiguous in the short-run. Earle and Telegdy (2002) find that
privatization leads to higher labor productivity growth in Romania.
Table 1.3: Summary of studies of firm-level impact of privatization in developing countries
Mean before
privatization
Mean after
privatization
Share of firms
with improved
performance (%)
Profitability (net income/sales) 0.05 0.11 63
Efficiency (real sales/employee) 1.92 1.17 80
Output (real sales) 0.97 1.22 76
Leverage (total dept/total assets) 0.55 0.5 63
Dividends (cash dividends/sales) 0.03 0.05 76
Source: Davis et al. (2000, Table 8), based on Megginson et al. (1994); Boubakri and Cosset (1998);
D’Souza and Megginson (1999); Megginson and Netter (1999)
There are some studies exhibiting the opposite findings compared to those mentioned
above. According to Wallsten (2001), privatization on telecommunication industry has
negative correlation with mainline penetration and does not create many benefits from
this. He argues that privatization in this industry should combine with a separate regula-
tory framework in order to enhance labor efficiency as defined by employees per mainline
and to improve connection capacity. Villalonga (2000) estimates enterprises efficiency,
measured by rate of return on assets, of 24 enterprises from different industries in Spain.
She finds that privatization program has not improved its efficiency since it might be
influenced by political factors in Spain.
Regarding governance efficiency, there are few empirical researches on the effect of
privatization on governance efficiency. For example, recent studies by Ramamurti (2000)
and Dharwadkar (2000) emphasize the important role of privatization on the governance
improvement in emerging countries where both economic institutions and capital markets
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are well developed. Frydman et al. (1999) and Villalonga (2000) argue that privatization
to foreign owners, who have more incentives to improve management, leads to improve
governance efficiency as well as enterprise efficiency. The positive and significant relation-
ship between post-privatization performance and ownership concentration is found in the
study of Boubakri et al. (2005). Megginson et al. (1994) discuss that management and
governance structures are the major changes for improving enterprise performance after
privatization programs.
1.2.2 Effectiveness of privatization methods
As outlined earlier, each privatization method has different pros and cons. Therefore,
choosing privatization methods depends not only on privatization objectives but also on
social and economic backgrounds of each country. A few studies on effectiveness of dif-
ferent privatization methods has been carried out in comparison with the numerous well-
documented performance outcomes after privatization process (see Table1.3). Notably,
the researches of Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2000) and Bortolotti, Fantini and
Siniscalco (1999) provide the most helpful results for selection of privatization methods.
The former is to examine the choice between mass privatization and assets sale with the
sample of 1,992 privatized firms; 767 and 1,223 of which are using share offerings and
direct sales, respectively. Their results show that capital markets and political factors
have significantly influenced selection of privatization methods and share issue privatiza-
tion (SIPs) is more likely to be used in under-developed capital markets. Privatization
has more tendencies to occur through SIPs in the country having greater the selling gov-
ernment’s deficit and conservative. The empirical evidences on impact of privatization
confirm that the impacts are different across countries and industries. It depends on
which methodology approaches and data set were used.
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1.3 Efficiency effects of privatization: Experiences
from the past
1.3.1 United Kingdom
The UK’s privatization has known as a successful case in transferring state ownership from
public to private sectors since 1979. According to Price Waterhouse (1989a; 1989b), the
major objectives of privatization from most of governments include (1) raising revenue
for the state, (2) promoting economic efficiency, (3) reducing government interference
in the economy, (4) promoting wider share ownership, (5) providing the opportunity to
introduce competition, and (6) subjecting SOEs to market discipline. These objectives
were utilized under the Thatcher’s scheme with the aim of not only transferring state
ownership to private but also restructuring and liberalizing the national capital market.
After more than 20 years of privatization, the Thatcher’s administration has created a
competitive market based on regulations for competition in order to prevent monopoly
power rising from privatization of natural monopoly industries. However, Helm (2001)
argues that it is not sufficient to create competition by introducing general competition
law. The government should promulgate much more regulations which can be adopted to
utilize the benefit from privatization proceeds.
The Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative administrations (1979-1990) had successfully
operated to privatize a majority natural monopoly industries including telecommunication
(1984), gas (1986), airways (1987), water and sewerage services (1989), electricity (1990)
and railways (1993-1996) (refer to Table 1.4). The UK is known as the first country offers
state-owned shares to the public. As a result, the government was successful in privatizing
more than 90 percent of the total number of SOEs. The UK’s practice of privatization
has been spread out around the world.
Major achievements of privatization
Privatization in the UK has generated significant achievements as below:
- The government has changed its roles from a market provider to a market supervisor.
In particular, the government had no longer control over firms and provided opportunities
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Table 1.4: UK Privatization via Public Offer of Shares, 1979-1996
No Industry Date of
offer
%
Sold
Num Industry Date of
offer
%
Sold
1 British Petroleum 1979.10. 5.2 20 South West Water 1989.12. 97.4
1983.9. 7.2 21 Thames Water 1989.12. 97.4
1987.11. 36.8 22 Welsh Water 1989.12. 98.4
2 British Aerospace 1981.2. 51.6 23 Wessex Water 1989.12. 98.4
1985.5. 59 24 Yorkshire Water 1989.12. 97.8
3 Cable&Wireless 1981.1. 49.4 25 Eastern Electricity 1990.12. 97.6
1983 .12 22.3 26 East Midlands Elec-
tricity
1990.12. 97.5
1985.12. 31.1 27 London Electricity 1990.12. 97.5
4 Britoil 1982
.11.
51 28 Manweb 1990.12. 97.5
1985.8. 49 29 Midlands Electricity 1990.12. 97.7
5 Amersham Interna-
tional Associated
1982.2. 100 30 Northern Electric 1990.12. 97.5
6 British Port Holdings 1983.2. 51.5 31 Norweb 1990.12. 98.4
7 Enterprise Oil 1984.7. 100 33 Soughern Electric 1990.12. 97.5
8 Jaguar 1984.8. 100 34 South Wesern Elec-
tricity
1990.12. 97.5
9 British Telecommuni-
cation
1984.12. 50.2 35 Yorkshire Electricity 1990.12. 97.5
1991.12. 25.9 36 Regional Electricity 1990.12.
1993.7. 20.7 37 National Power 1991.3. 60.9
10 British Gas 1986.12. 96.6 37 National Power 1995.3. 38.3
11 British Airways 1987.2. 97.5 38 PowerGen 1991.3. 59.5
12 Rolls-Royce 1987.5. 96.7 38 PowerGen 1995.3. 36.6
13 BAA 1987.7. 95.6 39 National Power-
PowerGen
1991.3.
14 British Steel 1988.12. 100 40 National Power-
PowerGen
1995.3.
15 Anglian Water 1989.12. 98.4 41 Scottish Hydro-
Electric
1991.6. 96.6
16 Northumbrian Water 1989.12. 98.4 42 Scottish Power 1991.6. 96.6
17 North West Water 1989.12. 98.4 43 Scottish Hydro-
Electric/power
1991.6.
18 Severn Trent 1989.12. 98.4 44 Northern Ireland Elec-
tricity
1993.6. 96.5
19 Southern Water 1989.12. 98.4 45 Railtrack 1996.5. 98
1989.12. 98.4 46 British Energy 1996.7. 87.8
Source: Curwen and Hartley (1997) and Price Waterhouse (1990)
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for them to make commercial decisions such as recruitment, investment, price, and envi-
ronmental criteria. In most cases, the UK’s government transferred at least 51 percent
of state-owned shares to private sectors. For example, 51 percent of state-owned capital
of the British Telecommunication was sold to private investors in 1984. The remaining
ownership shares held by the government was less than 21 percent in 1993.
- The capital market has developed as a crucial result of privatization. The UK has
privatized state enterprises by flotation mechanism to attract retail shareholders. This
method can be used to expand participation in the capital market. The market, in
turn, has to be improved to achieve better returns from selling state-owned assets. As
mentioned earlier, the public flotation method is quite costly and complexity compared
with trade sales. The method has been used to be adopted for privatizing large-sized state
enterprises. However, the UK has also used it for privatizing small-sized ones by offering
state-owned shares to limited retail investors, instead of the whole public like the sale of
Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) Technology in 1996. Those transactions provided good
opportunities to develop the stock exchange market in particular and the capital market
in general.
- The institutional market has gradually improved stemming from the effort of boosting
privatization programs, especially financial institutions. The London’s market has become
one of the largest foreign exchange markets. Together with the markets in Tokyo and New
York, the London’s market has attracted a huge international investment capital resulting
from high standards of regulations. It is the most liquid and accessible market.
- The domestic shareholders have had a significant increase. The UK’s privatization
process has been expanded to retail shareholders in the 1980s, increasing from 3 million to
around 10 million shareholders. This contribution has, generally, also influenced the stock
exchange which pushed the UK’s capital market to become more liquidity and strength.
Lessons from experiences
The following four valuable experiences from more than 20 years of the UK’s privati-
zation should be considered for implementation of privatization in developing countries.
Firstly, governments should well prepare necessarily initial conditions for successful pri-
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vatization programs. These are restructuring core business activities; establishing regu-
lations to avoid monopoly power and to protect consumers; and developing innovative
techniques for privatization proceed such as the Retail Price Index X (RPI-X) method or
“book building” techniques.
Secondly, governments should introduce special incentives to encourage small retail
investors to involve in privatization programs. For example, investors have opportunities
to extend payment period of buying ownership shares or to reach better pricing informa-
tion. Moreover, it is necessary to conduct typical mechanisms to attract greater public
involvements in buying state ownership of firms.
Thirdly, generating a comprehensive regulation for privatization is another lesson from
the UK’s privatization. The UK developed the legal structures for improving management
techniques and business performance of private firms.
Lastly, external advisers are an important factor to ensure that governments can obtain
more benefits from privatization proceeds. The UK’s government has used not only
internal staffs but also external consultation experts in sales of its ownership. Combining
government officers who deeply understand the process and external experts who provide
independent sales advice are advisable.
1.3.2 South Korea
As in many other developing countries, public enterprises have played a crucial part in
the Korean economy since the postwar. The Korean government introduced a major
reform in 1983 to improve public enterprise performance, particularly by giving greater
autonomy to managers and providing incentives for better public enterprise performance.
The history of privatization in Korea can be divided into six phases as described in Table
1.5. The first phase (1968-1973) focused on privatizing most of the public enterprises in
manufacturing industries. In the second phase (1978-1983), the government enforced to
privatize many financial public institutes. The third phase of privatization aimed to reduce
the state ownership of public enterprises. The fourth phase (1993-1997) was embarked
by continuing to privatize 58 public enterprises, excepting the ones are in infrastructure
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industries. In the fifth (1998-2002) and the six phases (2008-2014), privatization was
extensively implemented as a part of the Korean economic restructuring program.
The history of privatization was most highlighted in 1994 when the KimYoung-Sam’s
administration launched the first movement towards privatization of large-sized public
enterprises, especially four major public enterprises namely Pohang Steel Co. (POSCO),
Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction (Doosan H&C), Korea Tabacco and Ginseng
(KT&G), and Korea Telecom (KT). The government put a lot of effort in privatization of
these enterprises with the aim of achieving more efficient outcomes, although they were
already profitable. One of the most important actions to boost the speed of privatization
process is the Special Act on Privatization enacted in 1997, right after the Asia financial
crises. The Special Act on Privatization aims for further reduction in the state ownership
of privatized enterprises. As a result, the ‘Big Four’ were fully privatized in May 2002
under the Kim Dae-Jung’s administration. However, Nam IlChong (2012) argues that
the Kim Dae-Jung’s administration did not consider that changing various regulations or
policies might influence the fundamental change in industrial structure, particularly in
energy industries. Restructuring industries such as the natural gas was incomplete and
inconsistent with its original restructure plans. The above are the major shortcomings of
privatization under the Kim Dae-Jung’s administration.
Since the government had sold most of the large-sized public enterprises through pub-
lic offering, excepting Korea Heavy Industries & Construction (KHIC), the privatization
process has attracted many foreign investors who led to the success of privatization. How-
ever, in the study of Lim (2003), he points out two remaining issues of full privatization
of large-sized public enterprises in Korea. The first issue is the possibility of ‘chaebol’
existing in Korea. Some large-sized public enterprises were not privatized to diverse pri-
vate investors. For instance, KHIC was sold to a chaebol group and the largest shares
of KT were sold to SK Telecom which has been the third largest chaebol in Korea since
2003. Chaebols always have possibility to takeover others and might become monopolies
to dominate the market. This is one of the issues that the government has to address for
further privatization process. The second issue is that politicians and government officials
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always attempt to influence newly privatized firms. They prefer partial privatization of
public enterprises or try to maintain some special power by using ‘golden shares’. This
phenomenon which often limit for further privatization proceeds has commonly happened
in most of the developing countries.
Achievements of privatization
Generally, there are four major outcomes from the Korean privatization. Firstly, the
reform of public enterprises has been relatively successful. The highlight of this reform
is that government intervention on public enterprises was sharply reduced resulting from
the implementation of the 1997 Act on the Management Structure Improvement and
Privatization of Public Enterprises. Reducing ‘parachute appointment’; streamlining the
budget planning, procurement, and audit procedure; and clarifying managerial objectives
of public enterprises are basic outcomes of the Act (Lim, 2003). In other words, the
government aimed to give greater autonomy to managers and provided incentives on the
basis of enterprise performance evaluation.
Secondly, the government earned additional revenue from privatization proceeds to
finance the fiscal deficit as in many other countries. The value of privatization process
during the 1998-2002 period, for instance, was about USD 15 billion, which was significant
contribution to overcome the economic crisis in 1997.
Thirdly, private sectors have been promoted in the economy through early privatization
of commercial banks. The Korean government tried to privatize commercial banks at
the early stage of privatization process in order to enhance market competition and to
improve efficiency of financial markets in the first phase. As a result, the development of
financial markets has become a critical condition for further privatizing public enterprises
successfully in the next phases.
Lastly, privatization has not only reinforced the development of private sectors but
also improved the efficiency of capital and product markets. Privatization is a part of the
comprehensive reform of public enterprises in Korea. It leads to an increase in the level
of market liberalization which is a priority objective of privatization in most of the cases.
Lessons from Experiences
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Table 1.5: History of Privatization of Korean Public Enterprises
Phase What has been done Main objective and evalu-
ation
1st Phase * Privatization of 11 SOEs * Birth of private companies
(’68 73) Korea Machinery/ Korea Transportation => market economy
Korea Shipping/Korea Ship-building * Successful privatization
Incheon Heavy Manufacturing
Korea Steel / Korea Airline
Korea Mining Refinery
Korea Saltern / Commercial Bank
Korea Fishery Development
2nd Phase * Privatization of 7 SOEs * Financial market promotion
(’78 83) Daehan(Korea) Reinsurance * Since government’s
Daehan(Korea) Oil intervention did not stop,
Daehan(Korea) Dredging Corp. the objective of the
Hanil Bank / Jae Il(First) Bank privatization was not fulfilled
Seoul Trust Bank / Choheung Bank
3rd Phase * Privatization of Korea Stock Exchange * Maintains government
(’87) * Reducing government share in SOEs influence even up to now
KEPCO (Korea electricity Corp.) * Redistribution policy: Sale
POSCO (Pohang Steel Corp.) of government share to individ-
uals rather than companies
4th Phase * Privatization: Daehan(Korea) Tungsten * Original target: privatization
(’93 ’97) Kookmin Bank / Housing Bank and other
7 subsidiaries of SOEs
of 58 SOEs except some
infrastructure-related SOEs
* Reduce government share of 22 SOEs such as telecom, electricity etc.
* Only partially successful
(Conglomerate’s dominance
was an issue.)
5th Phase
(’98 ’02)
* Privatization of 8 SOEs (original plan
was 12 SOEs)
* Extensive privatization plan
to reduce public sector after
the economic crisis (’97)
* Privatization of 67 subsidiaries of SOEs
(original plan was 77)
* 4 network industries are not
privatized yet. (Electricity,
Gas, Railroad, Heating)
* Restructuring and downsizing
6th Phase * Privatization of many subsidiaries still under progress
(’08 ’10) * Privatization of functions
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2008.8.11 (Park (2009), modified)1
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Although privatization programs have generally provided some significant achieve-
ments to the Korean economy, the government has still been facing some remaining issues
as outlined. Based on that, lessons drawing from Korean experiences include:
- Political commitment is the most important factor for the success of privatization
programs in Korea. Governments should put more effort in implementing privatization
strategies with a strong political determination.
- Generating regulations to improve internal and external environment is the most
essential role of governments. Particularly, a wide change in industrial policies is required
to privatize natural monopoly industries. Governments should make sure that those
regulations will bring markets work more efficient. In addition, a broad deregulation is
necessary for governments to reduce their political interference in SOEs privatization.
- Establishing a comprehensive evaluation system of enterprise performance is a critical
lesson from Korean privatization. The system should be independently to evaluate man-
agerial efficiency and to link reward with enterprise performance. However, a successful
evaluation system requires essential prerequisites which are political will, adequate skills
of staffs for supervising and evaluating performance, and timely and reliable informa-
tion. Independent evaluation is a crucial feature of the system. For example, the Korean
government recruited a number of Korean experts to participate in the performance eval-
uation system. Members of the evaluation team are replaced every two years in order
to eliminate potential corruptions. The government documents a plan to privatize public
enterprises based on results of performance evaluation, especially large-sized ones in an
efficient way.
- Minimizing political interference, especially in internal operations, is an essential
requirement for successful public enterprise reforms. Political leadership should introduce
a comprehensive privatization master plan to enhance markets operate more efficient and
profitable.
- Creating competition of product markets and efficiency of capital markets is another
crucial condition. Privatization cannot be conducted successfully with the absence of
these markets. Even if this condition is not sufficient to guarantee that privatized firms
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will improve its performance, offering its ownership shares on stock markets might help
to improve its performance.
- Widely enhancing public supports is a necessary factor to push the speed of privati-
zation process quickly. An appropriate way is to publicize all problems of SOEs based on
evaluation of audit office and benefits of privatization through public media.
1.3.3 Transition economies
Privatization in transition economies is expected to gain better economic efficiency and to
successfully transfer into market-based economies. Privatization has become an important
part of economic reforms in most transition countries where the governments put much
effort into SOEs privatization in order to complete the transition process. Privatization
programs are different across countries and depend on bureaucrats because the level of
centralization is relatively high in most transition countries.
Privatization scheme has varied across countries. For example, Russia focuses on mass
privatization method combining voucher with auction sales to insiders and outsiders (Blasi
et al., (1997)). Belarus and Ukraine initiated a similar Russia’s model with the aim of
diversifying ownership structures by widely spreading vouchers to citizens in association
with eventual inside controllers (Filatotchev et al., (2000)). While the Slovak Republic and
the Czech Republic pursued to distribute vouchers to citizens with an equal-access chance,
Hungary focused on sales assets of SOEs to foreign investors (Carlin & Aghion, 1996).
Direct sales have only employed in Estonia among the former Soviet Union, whereas the
Central Europe countries often prefer to transfer state-owned shares to outsiders through
direct sales or voucher methods (EBRD, 1998).
Depending on bureaucrats is a shortcoming of privatization processes in most transi-
tion economies. Bureaucrats usually do not like to initiate privatization programs since
they might lose their control over SOEs rather than gain from privatization. With a high
level of centralization, the speed of privatization process has been slower than expected
level such as in Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For example,
Romania privatized 527 SOEs, only four of which are large-sized, from 1991 to mid-1994
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when the privatization law was adopted.
A dispersed ownership structure is another outcome of privatization programs in tran-
sition countries. Russia privatized about 13,000 medium- and large-sized SOEs which
account for 76 percent of total industrial employment in Russia though voucher method
to insiders and outsiders, including foreign investors (Russian Economic Trends, 1995:40).
According to Takla (1994), the Russian voucher privatization provided much larger scale of
inside control compared with that of the Czech’s scheme. From a review of privatization
in transition economies, it appears that the success of the Czech Republic’s privatiza-
tion has become a good model not only for the Eastern European economies but also
for emerging economies. Thus, the next part introduces the Czech’s privatization as a
valuable experience for transition countries like Vietnam.
The Czech Republic
The Czech’s privatization programs were first introduced in the early 1990s. More
than 1,000 SOEs were announced to be eligible for privatization in November 1991. The
Ministry of Privatization received approximately 15,000 proposals, including “direct sales,
tender offers, restitution, auctions, and voucher coupons” (Hazlett 1995, 33). After 5-year
privatization, over 80 percent of state assets were transferred to private owners.
The Czech’s government designed privatization programs into two phases so-called
‘small-scale’ and ‘large-scale’ privatization. The first phase, referred as small-scale pri-
vatization, occurred from early 1990 until late 1993. There were approximately 22,000
small-sized SOEs were privatized through offering in public auction. The large-scale pri-
vatization phase has transferred a large proportion of state assets under voucher scheme.
This phase conducted 1,302 privatized SOEs which were mostly medium- and large-sized
SOEs by 1997.
From the Czech privatization experiences, policy makers should study voucher priva-
tization and corporate governance for successful privatization implementation. Regard-
ing voucher privatization, the Czech government has adopted a variety of privatization
schemes including coupons in order to attract widespread population participating in
the program and to equalize involvement opportunity to new investors. In fact, coupon
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scheme requires two challenging conditions. Firstly, governments have to develop financial
markets through improving relevant legislation. Secondly, they have to generate overnight
capital markets though coupon scheme. In addition, the Czech Republic has considered
case-by-case sale methods in order to cover an increase of transformation costs.
For corporate governance in the Czech’s privatization, the National Property Funds
(NPF) is in charge of privatization programs. Institutional innovations associated with
privatization were conducted by the National Property Funds for adopting the coupon
scheme. As a result, 426 Investment Privatization Funds (IPF) were created and 72
percent of coupon-underwriting investors were sold as investment funds during the phase
of mass privatization (Mejstr´ık, 2003). During the period of 1990-2002, the institutional
environment has been reshaped as a result of number of legislative reforms. In September
2002, the government issued an Act of amended business code and security for further
improving the institutional environment. The capital market has been developed and
supervised by the Securities Exchange Commission since April 1998. Furthermore, the
government made a specific approval rule for direct sales and the National Property Funds
is responsible for decision making if there are many different proposals.
Beside the success story, the Czech’s privatization bears some weaknesses. Firstly, at
the beginning privatization phase, the government introduced mass privatization when
the legislation framework related to privatization process was inadequate and the capital
market performed very poor. The speed of voucher privatization thus was relatively slower
than originally expected. The possibility of SOEs reform via coupon privatization was
limited. Secondly, lack of SOEs performance evaluation designed for privatization led
to lose benefits of privatization. Without valuable economic information, it was difficult
to estimate the market values of privatized SOEs in the early phase of the transforming
the Czech’s economy. Furthermore, since the government sole over 50 percent of state
property to the citizens via coupon scheme without well preparing initial conditions, the
inequality in the Czech Republic did not reduced and the social inequality even rose
(La´szlo´ To¨ro¨k, 2011).
Lessons from Experiences
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- Providing incentives to attract great insiders actively involving in privatization is
required for speeding up the process. For instance, Russia and the Czech Republic rapidly
privatized a number of SOEs, resulting from giving incentives for its insiders.
- Establishing performance evaluation mechanism is a necessary initial condition for
both public offers and sale assets.
- Attracting foreign investors to privatization programs should be considered with the
aim of improving corporate governance and enterprise performance.
- Designing a strategic plan for privatization should be careful in line with national
economic reforms. The plan aims to enhance public supports and social competition.
‘Privatization efforts everywhere now rely heavily on existing mangers to formulate a
plan’ (Manasian, 1991, p. 17).
- Voucher privatization may be adopted in order to privatize a huge number of pub-
lic enterprises in a short time. However, governments have to well prepare necessary
prerequisites for this method as mentioned earlier.
1.4 An overview of State-owned enterprises equitiza-
tion process in Vietnam
1.4.1 The process of SOEs equitization in Vietnam
Vietnam has initiated an economic reform program known as ‘Doi moi’ (Renovation) since
the mid-1980s. The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as a part of the Renovation,
started in 1992. The reform mainly focuses on ‘equitization’ (co phan hoa) programs
in which the government aims to reduce its ownership of SOEs. Since the economic
transition (1986), Vietnamese policy makers have preferred to use the term ‘equitization’
rather than the term ‘privatization’. They believe that equitization is a neutral expression
for the Socialism while privatization is a term related to the Capitalism. The concept of
equitization in Vietnam is slightly different from the common concept of privatization.
The equitization in Vietnam is a process that transfers the whole or partial state ownership
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of SOEs to private investors with the aim of improving SOEs performance. In other words,
privatization in Vietnam can be either a complete or an incomplete process.
The SOEs equitization process in Vietnam can be divided into four phases which are
the pilot phase (1992-1996), the expansion phase of the pilot program (1997-2000), the
acceleration phase (2001-2007), and the continuing phase (2008 upon now) (see Table
1.6).
The first phase (from 1992 to 1996)
In the early 1990s, most of SOEs in Vietnam performed in very poor and inefficient
ways. Consequently, the economy experienced low growth rate and sluggish development.
Vietnamese government initiated privatization programs, officially called ‘equitization’,
to address this problem by issuing the Decision 202-CT dated on June 08th, 1992 on pilot
program of SOEs equitization process. The Decision regulates a careful pilot equitization
scheme, in which only small- and medium-sized and non-strategic SOEs were equitized
and employees of these enterprises had priority rights to purchase their state-owned shares
in a preferential duration.
Vietnamese government started to launch the equitization program very carefully for
fear that a socialist scheme might collapse like what had happened in the Soviet Union and
Eastern and Central European countries. Therefore, only 5 SOEs were equitized during
the period of 1992-1996 (Truong et al, 2006). Table 1.7 shows the government hold
roundly 30 percent of total ownership shares of four equitized SOEs. The government has
remained its influence on those firms as a dominant/significant shareholder. In addition,
a large portion of ownership shares belongs to insiders of those firms.
The second phase (from 1997 to 1999)
The second phase is an expansion of the pilot program with the issuance of the Decree
28/CP dated on May 7th, 1996 and the Decree 44/CP dated on June 29th, 1998 on the
transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies. These Decrees provide a comprehen-
sive framework for extending the equitization process at the national level. However, the
general principle of the pilot scheme in which only small- and medium-sized and non-
strategic SOEs are selected for equitization is kept in the Decrees. Therefore, the speed
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Table 1.6: History of the SOEs equitization process in Vietnam
Phase Main policy documents Main objectives Main results
1st Phase
(1992-
1996)
- Decision 202-CT dated on June
8th , 1992: ”Implementing ex-
periments to convert State En-
terprises into shareholding Com-
panies”
- Pilot program: only small-
medium size and non-strategic
SOEs were equitized and the em-
ployees of these enterprises have
the priority right to purchase the
state shares at the preferential
duration.
- 05 small-scale
equitized SOEs in
shoes, transporta-
tion, machine, and
food-processing
industries.
2nd
Phase
(1997-
2000)
- Decree 28/CP dated May 7th ,
1996: ”Standardizing SOE equi-
tization’s procedure”
- Expansion of the pilot program:
only small-medium size and non-
strategic SOEs were equitized
- 18 equitized SOEs
as late as in early
1998
- Decree 44/CP dated June 29th
, 1998: ”Encouraging equitized
firms and laborers with more
promotions and benefits”
- 287 equitized
SOEs in 1999
3rd
Phase
(2001-
2007)
- Decree 64/2002/ND-CP dated
on June 19th , 2002: ”Promulgat-
ing policies on transferring SOEs
to equitized enterprises”
- Acceleration of the program:
Change the way of equitization
of SOEs from direct sales to pub-
lic offerings, mainly through the
initial public offerings (IPOs)
- 3,756 equitized
SOEs
- Decree 187/2004/ND-CP dated
on November 16th , 2004:
”Transferring state owned enter-
prises to equitized SOEs”
- Decree 109/2007/ND-CP dated
on June 6th, 2007: ”Transform-
ing of 100% state charter capital
enterprises into equitized ones”.
(The updated legal document)
4th
Phase
(2008-
2015)
- Decree 59/2011/ND-CP dated
on July 18th 2011: ”About trans-
forming 100% state capital into
joint-stock company”
- Continuing the program: Intro-
ducing the revision of evaluation
methods for equitization and the
method to set the price of shares
for offering strategic investors
- 319 equitized
SOEs, 35 of which
are state-owned
corporations and
01 economic group
(namely the
- Decision 929/QD−TTg dated
on July 17th, 2012: Approval of
Scheme ”Restructuring of State-
owned Enterprises, focusing on
Economic groups and State-
owned Corporation period 2011-
2015”
Vietnam National
Textile and Gar-
ment Group)
- Resolution 15/NQ−CP dated
on March 6th, 2014: ”Solution
for speeding up equitization and
withdrawal of state capital from
enterprises”
Source: Author’s synthesis
34
Table 1.7: Capital and ownership structure of the first five equitized firms during the pilot
period
Firm name Capital Ownership structure (%)
(billion VND*) State Employees Outsiders
Transportation Service Co. 6,200 18.0 77.0 5.0
Refrigeration&Electrical Engineering Co. 16,000 30.0 50.0 20.0
Hiep An Shoes Co. 4,793 30.0 35.2 34.8
Animal Food Processing Co. 7,912 30.0 50.0 20.0
Longan Export Product Processing Co. 3,540 30.2 48.6 21.2
* VND stands for Vietnamese Dong, the currency of Vietnam. The USD/VND exchange rate over the
period relevant in the context of this article was around 15,000 VND per USD.
Source: Chu (2002)
of equitization process in this period was relatively slow. The number of equitized SOEs
was 18 out of 25 SOEs which were assigned to be equitized in early 1998 (Truong et al.,
2006). In 1999, the process started to expand, according to the Decree 44/CP issuance.
As a result, 287 SOEs were equitized in this year.
The third phase (from 2000 to 2007)
The period of 2002-2007 is known as a period of equitization acceleration. According
to the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development (NSCERD),
it takes about 500 days to complete an equitization program, which is mainly due to com-
plicated procedures of equitization and limitations of privatization methods. Therefore,
Vietnamese government issued the Decree 64/2002/ND-CP and the Decree 187/2004/ND-
CP with the aim of speeding up the process. The later Decree allows adopting the method
of public offerings, mainly initial public offerings (IPOs), rather than trade sales. IPOs
has become a dominant method of equitization during the 2005-2007 period. Further-
more, the speed of equitization process was accelerated after the promulgation of the
Enterprise Law (the first version in 2000 and the unified version in 2005) and the Com-
petition Law in 2005, and the Investment Law in 20052. These laws have paved the way
for wide involvement of private investors in the equitization process. Additionally, the
government established two state enterprises, namely the Debt and Assets Trading Cor-
poration (DATC) in 2003 and the State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) in 2005,
2According to the Investment Law, foreign investors are allowed to buy up to 49 percent of state
ownership of non-financial firms
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for supporting and streamlining the process of equitization. While DATC is designed to
be in charge of resolving inter-SOE debt obligations to trade debt tranches and to en-
hance the equitization process, SCIC plays a fundamental role to accelerate the process
of ownership transformation (see Appendix: Box 1 and Box 2). SCIC, for instance, as
the owner representative of the state holding less than 100 percent of total charter capital
of firms, is assigned to partially or wholly sell state-owned shares of those firms through
public offerings or trade sales. As a result, the process was accelerated, ;for instance,
2,796 SOEs with 100% of state-owned capital were equitized from 2001 to 2005. There
are, on average, more than 500 newly equitized SOEs per year (See Figure 1.1). Notably,
813 SOEs with 100% state charter capital were equitized in the year 2005.
Indeed, the process was successful in transforming SOEs into joint-stock companies
in this phase. According to the Ministry of Finance, the number of equitized SOEs was
3,756 by December, 2007. However, most of them were relatively small- and medium-
sized, only 7 firms are large-sized and have more than 5 or less than 50 million dollars
charter capital such as Vietcombank, BaoViet, SABECO, VietInsurance, PVFCCO, and
HABECO. Furthermore, strategic SOEs have not designed yet to be equitized through
public offerings since the government was afraid of oversupply in the equity market. The
higher speed of equitization in the period resulted from the opening of two stock mar-
kets, namely the Hanoi Securities Trading Center (HaSTC) and the Hochiminh Securities
Exchange (HOSE), where IPOs has operated successful.
The fourth phase (from 2008 -2015)
This phase was remarked by the issuance of the Decree 109/2007/ND-CP (the replaced
version of the Decree 187). The new Decree introduces the revision of evaluation methods
for equitization and the method to set price of shares for offering strategic investors. The
process was expected to speed up after the Decree 109 took effect. However, the security
market experienced a bubble and downturn in 2007 because of capitalization proportion
and an increase in number of listed firms on the stock markets. Additionally, the global
financial crisis has caused the Vietnamese economy to experience high inflation rate and
interest rate. Most investors were afraid to invest through stock markets. As a result, the
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Figure 1.1: Number of equitized SOEs with 100% state charter capital
Source: The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
speed of equitization process was slow during the 2008-2010 period.
Although Vietnamese government has put more effort to push the process of equitiza-
tion with the aim of recovering the economy, the speed has still been quite slow until now.
There were 176 equitized SOEs between 2011 and 2013, 99 of which (including 19 general
corporations) were partially privatized. The equitization process has been pushed after
the issuance of the Decision No 339/QD-TTg dated on February 19th, 2013 approving
“the master plan on the economy restructuring for the period of 2013-2020”. The master
plan is expected to accelerate equitization progress and to diversify forms of ownership
structure of SOEs. According to NSCERD, the number of equitized SOEs was 143 enter-
prises in 2014 (doubling of the number in the year 2013), 01 of which is an economic group
(namely the Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group) and 16 of which are general
corporations. However, the plan was not completed because of equitization limitations
which are introduced in the next part. Currently, the Prime Minister has approved the
project of restructuring 20 out of 20 state economic groups and state-owned corporations
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Figure 1.2: Number of equitized SOEs and number of SOEs
Source: The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
which are controlled by the Prime Minister. Ministries and line ministries have approved
70 projects of restructuring state-owned corporations.
In summary, after more than 20-year implementation of the equitization process, the
number of SOEs with 100% of charter capital owned by the state sharply reduced from
over 12000 in 1990 to 5655, 1309, and less than 800 in 2001, 2011, and 2016, respectively.
According to the report of Corporate Finance Department, the Ministry of Finance, there
were 4,103 equitized SOEs by June, 2014. However, most of these equitized SOEs are
small and medium size. The government still hold remarkable portion of total charter
capital of those firms. According to the Vietnam Enterprise Census, about 30 percent of
total numbers of equitized SOEs had over 50 percent of state-owned shares in 2014. In
fact, the government has still been as a dominant player in some strategic industries such
as natural gas, railroads, and telecommunication.
* Achievements from the equitization process
The equitization process has provided remarkable opportunities for SOEs to improve
its performance in post-privatization period, consequently increasing degree of market
competitiveness. The following part presents some major achievements from the equiti-
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zation process.
(1) The role of private sectors in the economy has been gradually enhanced, especially
an increase in number of private firms. After more than 20 years of SOEs equitization,
the number of SOEs with 100 percent of charter capital owned by the state has markedly
declined. The equitization has become as an important policy to enhance restructuring
process of SOEs, consequently pushing the economic reform.
(2) The government has gained significant revenue to finance the fiscal deficit. Accord-
ing to the report of MOF (2011), after two years of the promulgation of the equitization
master plan, the support fund of acquisitions and business development achieved VND
55,000 billion from selling state shares (VND 36,000 billion) and dividend yield of state
shares in equitized SOEs (VND 12,000 billion). In addition, enterprises have mobilized
an appropriate capital from the equitization proceeds. For instance, the total mobilized
capital from equitization proceeds was over VND 47,000 billion (about USD 23 million)
in the period of 2001-2010.
(3) The equitization process has made significant contributions to improve human
capital not only for enterprises but also for the economy. Most of equitized SOEs have
been restructured to improve its operation performance. They have mobilized capital
from equitization proceeds to strengthen their human resources. Employment capacity
and skills of equitized SOEs have been enhanced as a result of an increasing number of
technical training programs. Furthermore, employment allocation has been more efficient
after implementation of equitization programs.
(4) Capital and stock markets have been relatively developed. Many equitized SOEs
have been listed on stock markets. The information about listed companies’ performance
have become much transparent and declared. As a result, the markets have attracted
many domestic and foreign investors.
(5) The equitization process has been remarkably improved performance equitized
SOEs. The annual reports on equitization progress conducted by the Ministry of Plan-
ning and Investment point out that equitized SOEs have significantly increased its profit,
revenue, and efficiency. In particular, more than 90 percent of equitized SOEs have been
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Figure 1.3: The number of SOE with 100% of charter capital owned by the state
Source: The Ministry of Finance (MOF)
profitable. They contributed to the state budget about 24.9 percent higher than their
contributions before being equitized. Labor income and dividend yield, on average, were
increased by 12 percent and 17.11 percent, respectively. According to the survey of the
Enterprise Innovation Unit, the performance of equitized SOEs has been improved as a
result of positive effects of equitization on both working capacity (96 percent of inter-
viewed enterprises reported) and managerial efforts (88 percent of interviewed enterprises
reported).
* Shortcomings of the equitization process
Beside the above outlined achievements, the equitization process in Vietnam has ex-
perienced several following shortcomings that should be considered by the government.
(1) The speed of equitization process has been quite slow. For instance, about one
third of total number of SOEs that was designed for equitization completely conducted its
equitization programs in the period of 2007-2010. Furthermore, only a small percentage
of state capital was sold to private investors. The percentage of state-owned shares of
equitized SOEs in the categories 1-24% and 25-50% are almost unchanged during the
2009-2012 period (see Figure 1.5).
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Figure 1.4: Remaining state control over fully and partially privatized SOEs
Source: Vu (2012)
(2) The government has still hold a remarkable proportion of charter capital of equi-
tized SOEs (See Figure 1.4). In fact, most of the successful cases of equitization are selling
a part of state-owned shares of SOEs to private investors. It is common that partially-
equitized SOEs in which the state has still been as a dominant shareholder can also hold
significant ownership shares of other newly equitized SOEs. In other words, these newly
equitized SOEs have still been influenced by the government. It is difficult to conduct
any significant change in their management structure, business operation scheme, and
technology after equitization. As a result, their productivity and efficiency have not been
improved.
(3) The equitization policies and regulations do not pave the way for many outside
investors to involve the process, especially for strategic investors. The regulations related
to fully-privatized SOEs have not been formulated sufficiently. Most of the cases were
equitized through MBO or EBO methods. Insiders of equitized SOEs hold around 30
percent of its total issued ownership shares. For instance, 46.5 percent of 2,242 equitized
enterprises by the end of 2004 belonged to insiders (including employees and managers);
and 38.1 percent and 15.4 percent of that belong to the state and outside investors,
respectively (Nguyen, 2005). Additionally, IPOs method has limitations because of lacking
necessary regulations and developed capital markets. Many equitized SOEs, for instance,
in water supply, sewerage, and pharmaceuticals, have not been listed on stock markets
after IPOs.
(4) There is no such institution which is in charge of supervising the operation of SOEs
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after completing its equitization program. Therefore, some equitized SOEs change its
business activities into another activities which might not contribute to increase the degree
of industrial competitiveness. Some equitized SOEs used its land for other objectives
which are not included in its equitization plan.
(5) Determining actual value of state assets of SOEs is another limitation of the
equitization process. Evaluating process of state assets is less transparent and inefficient.
State assets of equitized SOEs are likely to be determined at lower value compared with its
actual value because of group benefits. There is an unofficial agreement between owner’s
representatives of SOE and buyers that setting its sale price lower than its actual value.
The benefit from this deal will go to a group of people who have a power over the firm.
(6) The equitization program has not included SOEs operating in strategic industries.
These enterprises are more likely to take strong influence on production markets and tend
to be ‘natural monopolies’. This is one of the reasons why the Vietnam’s economy has
not successfully transferred to the market economy. Furthermore, the government has
remained their controls over state economic groups and state-owned corporations which
were designed for equitization process.
(7) The equitization process has not attracted potential investors who have sufficient
capital and prospective capacity for firm’s restructuring. Lacking regulatory frameworks,
less portion of equitized shares, less transparency, and poor corporate governance and
performance are the reasons why potential investors have not been attracted to involve
in equitization programs.
1.4.2 The equitization policies and strategies in Vietnam
Vietnam has launched the equitization program since 1992. Most of equitized SOEs have
been transformed into joint-stock companies in which the government holds a dominant
portion of its charter capital. Furthermore, SOEs which were selected for equitization
were small and medium size, and operated in non-strategic business sectors. Therefore,
the equitization in Vietnam is referred as a partial privatization process.
As mentioned in the previous part, Vietnamese government started to launch a careful
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Figure 1.5: The composition of firms with state capital
Source: Enterprises Surveys, GSO
Figure 1.6: Implementation process of an equitization project in Vietnam
Source: The Ministry of Finance, legal documents on equitization, Deloitte
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Figure 1.7: Equitization progress in the period 2007-2015
Source: The Ministry of Finance
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equitization program with the aim of holding its controlling role in some strategic indus-
tries such as oil and gas, electricity, and telecommunication. The government has changed
the way of equitization of SOEs from direct sales to public offerings, mainly through IPOs
since 2005, which is described as Figure 1.6. IPOs has become a major method in order
to speed up the process of equitization. However, the speed has been slowed down since
2009 partly because of the global financial crisis. The Decision No 929/QD-TTg dated
on July 17th, 2012 introduces one of the most important strategies of SOEs reform. The
main strategy of equitization in the 2011-2015 period focuses on restructuring SEGs and
SGCs. The government remains to hold more than 51 percent of their charter capital.
Selling maximum 49 percent of state-owned capital of an SOE does not attract many
investors, especially strategic investors who are more likely to be interested in having
a controlling role on the enterprises. This has made application of IPOs to SEGs and
SOCs in Vietnam unsuccessful; in this regards, the case of the Vietnam Motors Industry
Corporation (Vinamotor) is a prime example.
The recent equitization progress is described in Figure 1.7. In March 2014, the Resolu-
tion No 15/NQ-CP was, notably, the most important regulation to speed up the process of
equitization and to withdraw the state-owned capital from enterprises operating outside
of its core business lines. The Resolution provides some specific guidelines and solutions
for the equitization process. SCIC is assigned to take into consideration of investments
outside core business lines and to acquire these investments which do not complete the
planned capital withdrawal.
Business areas of SOEs have gradually been narrowed since the State-owned Enter-
prises Law took effect in 1995. According to the Decision No 14/2011/QD-TTg, the
state continues to hold 100 percent of charter capital of enterprises which are operating
in public utilities, power transmission, aviation and railway and more than 50 percent of
charter capital of enterprises in energy, mining, telecoms, infrastructure, cement and steel
production, sanitation and water supply, and banking and insurance. The newly updated
Decision (namely the Decision No 37/2014/QD-TTg dated on June 18th, 2014) docu-
ments that equitized SOEs having more than 50 percent of charter capital that belongs
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to the state will be classified into three groups for further equitization process. First,
enterprise operating in urban water supply and sewerage, urban lighting, environmental
sanitation, natural resource exploration, seed plantation and basic chemical production,
rubber growing and processing, and railway and international seaway transport will re-
main from 50 percent to 65 percent of charter capital under the state’s control. The
second group consists of enterprises having from 65 percent to below 75 percent of charter
capital that belongs to the state and operating in petroleum and natural gas processing,
electricity distribution, aviation, cigarette production, banking and finance, managing
forest plantation, food and petroleum market, businesses in stabilizing the medicine and
improving people’s lives in remote areas. The third group includes enterprises having
from 75 percent or more of the charter capital owned by the state and operating in busi-
ness sectors including the management; exploitation and maintenance of airports and
terminals, domestic road, waterway systems, and national seaports; telecommunications
infrastructure; petroleum and natural gas; and mineral. The government continues to
maintain 100 percent of charter capital of enterprises operating in 16 sectors, including
national defense and security, explosive material and poisonous chemical supply, national
electricity transmission, nuclear electricity, railway operation, post services, maritime, lot-
tery, publishing, money printing and casting, irrigational work management, plantation of
protective forest, and policy lending and business sector that requires strategic know-how
(Vietnam news, 2014)3.
As for the equitization process, the Prime Minister first decided which business sectors
to be equitized in each term period. Then, the national program of SOEs reform is
conducted and approved by the Prime Minister. The process of equitization includes
three stages which are formulating equitization plan, implementing equitization plan, and
finalizing procedure steps for SOEs conversion into joint stock companies. Figure 1.8
shows the different steps of conducting a SOE equitization program. The first step is
establishment of an equitization steering committee for each SOE. The proposed plan of
SOEs equitization has to be reviewed by the committee. The second step is to submit
3http://vietnamnews.vn/economy/256634/soes-classified-into-three-groups-for-equitisation.html (Ac-
cessed on Jun 10th, 2015)
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the proposal to ministries or line ministries who take owner’s responsibility for the firm.
Generally, they will approve the proposal without any important change. If the proposal
is inconsistent with the SOEs equitization master plan, they will request the equitization
steering committee to revise it until it is accepted by the authorized members. The
National Steering Committee for Enterprises Reform and Development (NSCERD) takes
responsibility for inspecting and supervising the implementation process.
According to the report of the MOF, 143 SOEs were equitized SOEs in 2014, which
are two times higher than the number of equitized SOEs in 2013, and 43 SOEs were
equitized by May 2015. The equitization progress of SEGs and SGCs has been enhanced,
particularly EVN, VietnamAirlines, Viettel, Vinatex, VNPT, and Vinachem, that have
adopted IPOs method. In the year 2015, the government approved the equitization project
of 20 SEGs and SGCs. The government has put more efforts to complete the equitization
plans of 432 SOEs (246 of which will be equitized in 2015) in the 2014-2015 period as
documented in the Resolution No 15/NQ-CP. Figure 1.9 shows the current equitization
target of two big state general corporations (90 and 91) and financial public institutes.
As for financial public institutes, for instance, the government will remain as a dominant
shareholder who keeps less than 65 percent of charter capital of the Baoviet Insurance
and commercial joint stock banks, excepting VietinBank.
There are three major strategies of equitization process that will be implemented in
the next few years. Firstly, most of SOEs with 100 percent of charter capital owned by
the state will transfer the right of representative ownership to SCIC for initiating eq-
uitization proceeds efficiently. Secondly, selling package of state shares will be widely
used in equitization proceeds. In fact, SCIC is the only organization that has a right
to use this scheme for selling wholly state-owned shares of SOEs. The scheme will be
documented legally for applying in the equitization process. The scheme can be done
via public offering, competitive bidding, and negotiation. Thirdly, the government will
enhance transparency of equitization and disclose financial information of equitized SOEs.
The schedule of equitization process will be widely announced to the public in order to
attract more potential investors and increase the level of transparency. Furthermore, im-
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Figure 1.8: The documentary process of SOE equitization in Vietnam
Note: NSCERD stands for the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and
Development
Source: Author
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Figure 1.9: Current strategy of SOEs’ equitization in Vietnam
Source: The Ministry of Finance
proving regulations related to equitization and developing capital markets are necessary
conditions for the success of equitization process. It is expected to attract more investors,
especially strategic foreign investors, to involve the process. In the long-term, the equi-
tization process will target on large-sized SOEs and state economic groups in which the
government should fully transfer to private owners. Full privatization of SGCs such as
Vinamoto, Cienco5, and Cienco6, will be speeded up in the near future. In short, the
equitization continues to be considered as the principal implication for SOEs restructuring
and economic performance.
1.5 Conclusion
Privatization programs are different across countries and industries. It basically depends
on the socio-economic background of each economy and the characteristics of each in-
dustry. Furthermore, impacts of privatization on economic performance are also different
49
in terms of directions and magnitudes. By reviewing practical experiences around the
world, one can argue that a success privatization program generally needs a strong po-
litical commitment, a comprehensive regulation for supporting privatization, competitive
incentives for widely public involvement, and an effective performance evaluation system.
These factors are also necessary to improve economic performance and market efficiency.
At firm point of views, enterprises can achieve better performance through privatization
process resulting from restructuring management system, enhancing business operation
scheme, and upgrading technology and R&D.
In Vietnam, SOEs have played a significant role in the economy after more than two
decades of the equitization process. Recently, the government has even put more effort
to accelerate the equitization process. It can hardly leverage the system to promote the
process in the future because of three main reasons. Firstly, a number of policies issued in
the 2011-2015 period have not been appropriate enough to privatize state economic groups
and state general corporations. The equitization policies need to be widely open and more
comprehensive. Secondly, unwillingness of the leaders of SEGs and SGCs have restrained
themselves from implementation of equitization programs. Thirdly, undeveloped capital
markets and less transparent information are major obstacles to attract many potential
investors who have strong capacities to improve performance of SOEs after equitization.
Furthermore, lack of comprehensive legislations for accelerating the equitization is an-
other obstacle to conduct SOEs restructuring. Therefore, the next chapters contribute
a significant evaluation on the impact of privatization on Vietnamese SOEs performance
and provide valuable policy implications for implementation of privatization programs in
a more efficient way.
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Chapter 2
Impact of Privatization on the
Performance of State-owned
Enterprises in Vietnam
Abstract
The main purpose of this chapter is to estimate the impact of privatization on Vietnamese
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) performance. In this regard, I apply a difference-in-
differences (DID) framework to firm-level panel data in the period of 2004-2012 to eval-
uate the impact of privatization. In addition, in order to examine how the SOEs with
different degrees of privatization were differentially affected, I adopt a continuous treat-
ment intensity based on the state-owned shares of SOEs sold to private investors. The
results indicate that privatization in Vietnam has had a significantly positive impact on
SOEs performance in terms of profitability and productivity. In particular, enterprises
that experienced a greater degree of privatization and had more state-owned shares sold
to private investors could improve their performance more than those which experienced
a lesser degree.
2.1 Introduction
Vietnamese government has implemented an economic reform program known as “Doi
moi” (Renovation) with the aim of creating a “socialist-oriented market economy” since
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1986. At the heart of the reform, the government has put more effort to privatize SOEs
in order to reduce the size of state-owned sectors in the economy. This privatization
program is expected to improve managerial efficiency, human resources, and enterprise
performance. As a result, the economy is more efficient and the market is more com-
petitive, which are indicated by other countries’ experiences (e.g. the United Kingdom
and South Korea) and empirical studies (e.g. Due, 1993; Pinheiro and Giambiagi, 1994;
Abdullahm Al-Obaidan, 2002).
In Vietnam, most empirical studies show that SOEs have performed better after being
privatized. However, this finding is less likely reliable because the results are estimated
by their own surveys which might induce perceived evaluations; and by the techniques
which could not overcome weakness of impact evaluation methodology, especially selection
bias. For example, Dang (2000), Cao (2003), Vu (2006), and Sjo¨holm (2007) applied
comparative and qualitative methods which simply compare SOEs performance before
and after privatization. Few quantitative studies by Webster and Amin (1998), Truong et
al.(2006), Vo (2012), and Pham (2013) apply DID framework or firm-fixed effect model
to study the performance improvement of Vietnamese privatized SOEs. Although these
methodologies are relatively robust, they could not verify the common trend assumption
of DID method because of short-time study period, and overcome all possible forms of
selection bias.
With the aim of addressing limitations of the existing literature, I apply a DID frame-
work to firm-level panel data in the period of 2004-2012 to estimate the impact of priva-
tization. This method helps to eliminate possibilities of selection bias, for example well
performed SOEs were first privatized or SOEs were selected for privatization based on
some criteria which are not reflected in enterprise performance. My empirical results show
that the profitability and productivity of privatized SOEs were significantly improved as
a result of privatization programs. By using a continuous treatment intensity based on
the state-owned shares of SOEs sold to private investors, I find that the greater the degree
of privatization, the better the performance of privatized SOEs.
The chapter is designed into five sections. Following the brief introduction, section
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2 is a literature review of empirical studies on impact of privatization on SOEs perfor-
mance. Section 3 introduces data description, research methodology, and measurement
of total factor productivity and value added at firm level. In section 4, I will discuss the
empirical estimates of privatization impacts on Vietnamese SOEs performance through
DID framework to firm-level panel data. And the last section is conclusion.
2.2 A literature review
Most empirical literatures generally state that privatization has significantly positive im-
pact on enterprise performance. In particular, Shirley and Walsh (2001) conduct the
most comprehensive surveys of 52 empirical studies on the link between privatization and
enterprise performance in both developing and developed countries during the 1971-1999
period. The majority studies, 32 of those, find that private and privatized enterprises
have performed better than that of public counterparts. 15 studies of that conclude types
of ownership have no significance or ambiguous relation with enterprise performance. The
rest (5 studies) state that performance of private enterprises is better than that of public
enterprises. Another synthesis literature reviews by Megginson at al. (2001), Djankov and
Murrell (2002), and Megginson (2005) show that there is a significant positive impact of
privatization on enterprise performance in the majority of reviewed studies. D’Souza and
Megginson (1999) also report a significant improvement of newly-privatized enterprise’s
performance, particularly in profitability, dividend payments, and operating efficiency.
Notably, empirical results show that impact magnitude of privatization depends on
methods of privatization to outsiders or insiders, and on effect of periods which is long-
time or short-time. For example, Pohl et al. (1997) point out that a SOE increases its
productivity by 3-5 times more after 4-year privatization compared with its counterpart in
Eastern European countries. The study of Ehrlich et al. (1994) concludes that the long-
run effects of privatization on higher productivity growth and lower cost is significant,
but the effects are ambiguous in the short-run. Another study of Frydman et al. (1999)
concludes that privatization has significant positive effect on enterprise performance if
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SOEs are privatized to outsiders, especially to foreign investors. In particular, annual
growth rate of a SOE could increase by 18 percentage points or 12 percentage points
if its state ownership were sold to a domestic financial company or a foreign investor,
respectively. In addition, a SOE could add its productivity growth by 9 percentage points
after transferring its state ownership to an outsider. Furthermore, Earle and Telegdy
(2002) find that privatization leads to higher labor productivity growth of Romanian
firms.
In fact, impacts of privatization on SOEs performance are controversial. According to
Wallsten (2001), privatization on telecommunication industry has a negative correlation
with mainline penetration and does not create many benefits. He argues that privatiza-
tion in this industry should combine with a separate regulatory framework in order to
raise labor efficiency (measured by employees per mainline) and to improve connection
capacity. Villalonga (2000) estimates enterprise efficiency (measured by return on assets)
of 24 firms from different industries in Spain. She finds that the privatization program has
not improved the firms’ efficiency because they might be influenced by political factors
in Spain. These contradicting findings come from specification of business industries or
political background of a country which may have an influence on the impact of privati-
zation.
In Vietnam, most of empirical studies use comparative and qualitative methodologies
which basically compare SOEs performance before and after privatization in terms of
profitability (measured by net profit or net sales) and efficiency (measured by net sales to
profit per employee). For example, Fredrik Sjo¨holm (2007) argues that the privatization
has not addressed the efficiency problem since most of the Vietnamese privatized SOEs
have no major change in its management and human resources. The SOEs performance
improvement is not a result of privatization because the government tried to make them
to be profitable before privatization. According to the Mekong Project Development
Facility (MPDF, 1998), privatization program seems to have positive effects on firm’s
efficiency in the 1990s. Other studies (Cao (2003), Cuong.et al. (2006), Vu (2006),)
also contribute to the literature that privatization has positive impacts on enterprise
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performance in Vietnam. However, their conclusions seem to be less reliable because of
various weaknesses of comparative methodology and perceived evaluations.
Few quantitative studies find that the privatization process in Vietnam could create
positive outcomes in terms of financial performance (measured by profit on sales ratio,
return on assets, and value-added) and employment (measured by number of workers and
wages). In fact, their estimates are likely biased because of weak methodology, data collec-
tion through firm’s manager interviews, and short time period of the data. For instance,
Truong et al., (2006) applies the methodology conducted by Meggison et al. (1994).
They first compare the operating and financial performance of 121 privatized SOEs and
84 SOEs before and after privatization. Then, they use a DID method to examine the
impact of privatization. Their estimates show that privatized SOEs can increase its in-
come before tax on assets (IBTA), income before tax on sales (IBTS), and income tax on
equity (IBTE) about 1.72 percent, 1.19 percent, and 3.9 percent, respectively. The finan-
cial leverage (measured by total debts to total assets ratio) of privatized SOEs are almost
unchanged. This seems to be a valuable study on the impact of privatization process in
Vietnam. A recent study of Vo et al. (2012) examines the relationship between owner-
ship structure and enterprise performance based on their own interviews with managers
of 22 SOEs and 21 privatized SOEs. The paper documents that private ownership has
positive impact on enterprise performance while state ownership has negative impact on
its performance. In addition, a positive impact on enterprise performance is a result of a
change of SOEs internal environment after privatization. In the year 2012, Pham (2013)
randomly selected 43 listed firms, which are on the process of undergoing privatization
on the stock markets (HOSE located in Hochiminh city and HASTC located in Hanoi),
to examine the financial performance of privatized SOEs before and after privatization.
The author concludes that former SOEs have increased, on average, its profit margins and
return on assets from 7.15 percent up to 8.55 percent and from 9.8 percent to 11.7 per-
cent, respectively, during 3-year privatization. The performance improvement is a result
of increase in net sales and reduction of administrative expenses.
In short, most of the empirical studies have sought to examine the performance im-
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provement of Vietnamese privatized SOEs by comparing its performance before and after
privatization. They show that privatization has a positive impact on the SOEs perfor-
mance. However, it is likely that their estimates are biased because of three main weak-
nesses. Firstly, common trend in pre-treatment period which is an underlying assumption
of DID method was not conducted. Secondly, they did not distinguish the value of residual
state ownership of partially-privatized SOEs1. This is because a partially-privatized SOE
in which dominant shareholder comes from the state has performed differently compared
with a partially-privatized SOE in which dominant ownership belongs to private sectors.
And the third is the possibility of selection bias. I, therefore, apply a DID framework
to firm-level panel data in order to eliminate these limitations. The study aims to con-
tribute a robust and significant evidence to impact evaluation of privatization on SOEs
performance in Vietnam.
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Description of sample selection
The main data set for the study is sourced from the Vietnam Enterprise Census (VEC)
conducted annually since 2000 by the Vietnam General Statistic Office (GSO). The VEC
provides comprehensive information on demographic data of Vietnamese enterprises. I
construct a balanced panel data of enterprises with five or more employees. I choose the
year 2005 as a time cut-point to partition the firms into control and treatment groups
because of two main reasons. Firstly, Vietnamese government has implemented two im-
portant laws which are the Unified Enterprise Law (the first version in 1999) and the
Competition Law since 2005. These laws have paved the way for a wide involvement
of private investors, especially foreigners, in the privatization process. Secondly, a large
number of SOEs which are sufficient for adopting DID framework were privatized in 2005.
Furthermore, the study only deals with the period of 2004-2008 with the aim of avoid-
1In the study, I define ‘partially-privatized SOEs’ as privatized SOEs which have still remained state
ownership and ‘fully-privatized SOEs’ as privatized SOEs of which all state-owned shares sold to private
investors.
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ing potential effects of macroeconomic issues which happened before 2004 and after 2008
on enterprise performance. For instance, the capital markets had not been developed in
Vietnam before 2004 because the stock markets and securities joint stock companies were
supported by the government. The global financial crisis has affected business environ-
ment since 2009. As a consequence, the stock markets have fallen and the total capital
motivated through the market declined approximately by 75 percent. The commercial
banks started to increase their lending rates. In addition, after the global financial crisis,
the government supported firms with financial assistance and subsidies which had not
been equally distributed between the public and private sectors. These issues have likely
influenced enterprise performance.
The sample consists of 789 SOEs: 300 of those, as a control group, which were selected
for privatization but not yet privatized during the post-privatization period of 2006-2008;
and the rest, as a treatment group including 416 partially- and 73 fully-privatized SOEs,
which sold wholly or partially its state-owned shares to private investors in 2005.
2.3.2 Description of data
I use firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) and value added (VA) per labor as proxies
for productivity. The formulas for calculating firm-level TFP and VA are introduced in
the next section. Annual profit margin and return on assets (ROA) are as proxies for
profitability. Financial and non-financial indicators of enterprises are used as control fac-
tors which may reduce residual variance. Control variables are financial leverage, annual
sales growth, tangibility, and firm size. It reveals that privatized firms with higher degree
of market powers are more profitable because they have ability to raise the market prices
of their goods and services. Thus, I use the Herfindahl Index to control the degree of
market competition which might affect enterprise performance after privatization. The
following Table 2.1 presents measurement of all variables. The sample data descriptive
statistics is summarized in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.1: Measurement of Firm performance and Explanatory variables
Firm Performance Measurement
1. Profitability
Profit margin Total accounting profit before income tax to Gross profit from
sale of merchandise and services
ROA Total accounting profit before income tax to total assets
2. Productivity
Log(VA labor) Log of Value added per labor
Log(TFP) Log of Total Factor Productivity estimated by Levinsohn &
Petrin’s method
Explanatory vari-
ables
Measurement
Sales growth Log of net sales of merchandise and services at constant price
Firm size Log of total assets
Financial leverage Total Debt to Total Equity
Tangibility Fixed assets to total assets
HHI The Herfindahl Index is calculated based on the Vietnam
Standard Industrial Classification (VSIC) 4-digit industry
level codes
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.Dev Min Max
Profit margin ratio 3904 0.017 0.690 -39.519 11.652
ROA ratio 3883 0.034 0.097 -1.161 2.287
Annual Value added per labor Mil.VND 3798 24.384 158.824 -7995.17 2044.60
TFP Index 3619 3.272 3.512 0.006 83.966
TreatIntensity Unit 3925 0.385 0.352 0.00 1.00
Total Debt Mil.VND 3906 56359 239242 -2293.91 4634418
Total Equity Mil.VND 3921 19769 101384 -206765 2830378
Annual sales Mil.VND 3945 108874 1044797 0.694 38600000
Total assets Mil.VND 3923 75895 315037 244 6170292
Tangibility ratio 3915 0.325 0.232 0.000 0.999
Number of labor Person 3837 374.690 651.800 5 8993
The Herfindahl Index Index 3945 0.777 0.108 0.003 0.985
Note: The data values are converted at constant prices using the GDP deflator of three major
industries including agriculture, industries, and services.
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2.3.3 Measurement of Productivity
* Measurement of Value Added
As the definition of VA, it is computed by subtracting intermediate inputs from gross
outputs. However, the data of production costs are not available in the VEC. Thus, I
calculate VA based on the factor income approach (the other is based on the production
approach). According to the guideline of the General Statistical Office of Vietnam, VA is
measured by following formula.
VA= Labor Compensation + Capital Rental Payment
In which:
Labor Compensation = Salary, bonuses and other allowance + Social Insurance paid
replacing salary + Other incomes, which is not counted as production cost
Capital Rental Payment = Depreciation of Fixed Assets + Net Operating Surplus
Net Operating surplus is defined as total profit of enterprise during a year before
paying tax. These data are available in the VEC.
* Measurement of Total Factor Productivity
I explore the technique of Olley& Pakes (1996) and Levinshon & Petrin (2003) which
can correct the simultaneity problem between productivity and inputs to estimate firm-
level TFP. Many scholars applied this technique for estimating firm-level TFP because of
its appropriate methodology. Levinshon and Petrin use intermediate inputs, while Olley
and Pakes use investment values, as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. The
former argues that ‘the investment proxy might fail to adequately address the simultaneity
problem’ (Levinshon and Petrin, 2003, p.3). The main reason is that the monotonicity
condition does not hold in the Olley& Pakes technique. The estimation of algorithm
equation is only applied for firms having positive investments. In fact, firms can report
negative or zero investment value in a number of cases. As a result, the estimates may
lose its efficiency. Intermediate inputs including materials and energy are commonly
reported positive value. Thus, intermediate inputs can be used as an appropriate proxy
for capturing unobserved productivity shocks. I use firm-level TFP estimated by the
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Levinshon & Petrin technique as a proxy for firm productivity.
Basically, the Levinshon & Petrin technique starts from a basic Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function with three main components which are total capital (K), total number
of labor (L), and intermediates (M). Since the data of production costs is not available
in the VEC, I use value added as physical output of firm to estimate firm-level TFP of
Vietnamese enterprises. Other inputs of production function are total capital (K) repre-
sented by total assets at the end of the year; total number of labor (L) measured by total
full-time employees getting paid by firms at the end of the year; and intermediates (M)
calculated by subtracting value added from real sales.
2.3.4 Model specification
The study employs an empirical model with the aim of addressing two main hypotheses:
the privatization process in Vietnam has had a positive impact on SOEs performance
in term of profitability and productivity; and the impact of privatization on Vietnamese
SOEs performance depends on the degree of privatization. These hypotheses document a
fundamental argument for my further studies in the next chapter.
The regression model for impact evaluation of privatization program based on DID
framework to firm-level panel data in the 2004-2008 period is presented as the following
equation:
Log(EP )it = β0 + β1TreatIntensityi ∗ Aftert +
∑6
k=1 αkX ikt +
∑5
l=1 δlRegionil +
+
∑5
m=1 γmSectorim + εt + uit
Where (EP )it is enterprise performance such as profit margin, return on assets, value
added per labor, and total factor productivity at each firm i and in year t. TreatIntensityi
indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of SOEs sold to private investors
is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE is fully privatized, less than 1
and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized, and 0 means that SOE have not
been privatized yet. Aftert, as dummy variable, indicates the post-privatization period
of 2006-2008. X ikt are control variables including Fixed asset to total assets ratio, Debt
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to equity ratio, Log(Net sales), Log(Total assets), and the Herfindahl Index. Regionil is a
dummy variable denoting for the six economic regions of Vietnam. Sectorim is a dummy
variable that denotes for the main business sector of each firm. And εt are control time-
fixed effects.
Falsification tests are conducted to verify the common trends between control and
treatment groups over the pre-treatment period of 2004-2005. The firm-fixed effect will be
applied to estimate the parameters in the main equation. The study deals with robustness
and consistency checks.
2.4 Empirical results
This section presents the estimated impacts of privatization on Vietnamese SOEs per-
formance in the 2004-2008 period. Table 2.3 summarizes the estimated results of the
main equation by using different measures of enterprise performance. Panel A of Table
2.3 presents the impact of privatization on SOEs performance in all business industries.
The coefficients of TreatIntensity*After in Panel A indicate that the privatization pro-
gram has a significantly positive impact on SOEs performance in both profitability and
productivity. Particularly, a SOE could increase its ROA, labor productivity growth,
and TFP growth by 3.6 percent, 0.457 percentage points, and 0.312 percentage points,
respectively, if it is fully privatized. As mentioned earlier, using a continuous treatment
intensity helps to distinguish the impact on firm performance with different degree of
privatization. For instance, selling 10 percent of state-owned shares of a SOE to private
investors can increase, on average, its profitability and productivity growth approximately
by 0.36 percent and 0.04 percentage points, respectively.
In order to examine different impacts of privatization that have varied among indus-
tries, I restrict the sample to two industries in which most of the SOEs were privatized,
particularly processing and manufacturing, and retail and wholesale industries. Panel B
and C of Table 3 show the estimated impacts of privatization on enterprise performance
in these industries. The impact of privatization on ROA and productivity are relatively
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Table 2.3: Estimates of privatization impact on SOEs performance in Vietnam
Dependent variable Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All business industries
TreatIntensity*After 0.068 0.036*** 0.457*** 0.312***
(0.068) (0.008) (0.076) (0.068)
N 3836 3838 3602 3602
adj.R-sq 0.008 0.050 0.117 0.057
Panel B: Processing and manufacturing industry
TreatIntensity*After 0.017 0.066*** 0.352** 0.266**
(0.030) (0.020) (0.138) (0.131)
N 1109 1109 1035 1035
adj.R-sq 0.065 0.089 0.093 0.050
Panel C: Retail and wholesale industry
TreatIntensity*After 0.079** 0.041*** 0.406** 0.357***
(0.033) (0.008) (0.166) (0.134)
N 937 937 879 879
adj.R-sq 0.022 0.115 0.223 0.097
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares
of SOEs sold to private investor is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that
SOE is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially
privatized, and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. After is dummy variable
indicates the post-privatization period of 2006-2008. All models apply a Difference-in-
Differences framework to firm-level panel data controlled by regions-business sectors-years
fixed effects. Control variables are Fixed asset to total assets ratio, Debt to equity ratio,
Log(Net sales), Log(Total assets), and the Herfindahl Index. All values are converted at
constant price using the GDP deflator of three major sectors (Agriculture, Industry, and
Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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similar across industries. In Column 1 of Panel C, the coefficient of TreatIntensity*After
is statistically significant, which shows a partially-privatized SOE in this industry could
increase its profit margin by 0.79 percent by selling 10 percent of its state-owned shares
to private investors. Furthermore, ROA of processing and manufacturing SOEs have im-
proved twice as much as its counterparts did in other industries. In other words, they
could manage their assets more efficiently to obtain higher returns than those in other
sectors.
However, the impact on profit margin of enterprises connected with retail and whole-
sale industries is significantly different from that of other enterprises operating in other
industries. In Column 1 of Panel C, the coefficient of TreatIntensity ∗ After is statisti-
cally significant, which shows a partially-privatized SOE in retail and wholesale industry
could increase its profit margin by 0.79 percent by selling 10 percent of its state-owned
shares to private investors. One of the possible reasons is that privatized firms in retail
and wholesale industries can more easily raise the price of products compared to those
in manufacturing industries after privatization. In fact, Vietnamese government has pro-
vided some supports or incentives for firms operating in retail and wholesale sectors to
enhance the competitiveness of the sectors. For instance, the government has built new
traditional markets and supper markets, provided investment incentives, supported on
marketing and trade exhibition, and promoted international trade fair. According to
Vietnam’s WTO commitments, retail and wholesale industries have to welcome for all
foreign firms, even those with 100 percent of foreign capital, to operate in Vietnam since
January, 2015. Additionally, most of the products which are imported from 10 ASEAN
countries will be exempt from import tax after 2018. The government has not allowed
foreign direct investment (FDI) firms to trade some kinds of imported products with the
aim of protecting domestic products. Therefore, retail and wholesale firms can increase
its profits more easily compared with those in other industries. Another possible reason
is that the government provides corporate income tax allowances and exemption to man-
ufacturing firms, especially for those producing and assembling support products (spare
parts and components). This can be a potential motivation for manufacturing firms did
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not report the real value of their profit. The difference in governance structure of firms in
retail & wholesale and manufacturing industries could be a possible explanation for the
different impacts of privatization on profit margin.
Although all possibilities of selection bias, which are addressed by Barberis et al.(1996)
and Earle & Enstrin (1997), are not controlled in the study because of lacking appropriate
instrumental variables, I am able to exclude some of them directly. I first verify the
common trends assumption of DID method in the pre-treatment period. The coefficients
of TreatIntensity*After are statistically insignificant at 10 percent level, indicating there is
statistically no pre-treatment differences between two groups (see Table 2.4 in Appendix).
The methodology thus controls one of possible bias stemming from non-random selection
of SOEs for privatization (e.g., well performed SOEs were in fact selected for the earlier
privatization). To eliminate another possibility of selection bias (e.g., if SOEs are selected
for privatization because of some criteria which are not reflected in enterprise performance
in the pre-privatization period), I use late privatizers, as a comparison group, which
remained 100 percent of state-owned ownership, but not yet privatized during the period
of 2004-2008. Eventually, the selection criteria for privatization remained the same in
Vietnam during the period of 2004-2012. Furthermore, I estimate the main equation by
dropping one year before and one year right after the time cut-point to exclude initial
level of performance. The results are statistically consistent across different performance
measures (see Table 2.9 in Appendix).
2.5 Conclusion
The privatization program in Vietnam is expected to improve SOEs performance, which
can facilitate the economic growth and development. The empirical results indicate that
the privatization program in Vietnam has a significantly positive impact on SOEs perfor-
mance in terms of profitability and productivity. By using continuous treatment intensity
based on the state-owned shares sold to private investors, the study documents that fully-
privatized SOEs have performed relatively better in ROA, labor productivity, and TFP
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than partially-privatized SOEs.
In this chapter, I mainly focus on examining the effect of privatization on SOEs per-
formance in Vietnam. However, it is important to explore what are possible benefits of
the privatization process for improving SOEs performance and in what ways privatization
should be conducted to achieve better enterprise performance. The next chapter will show
the explanation for these such questions.
72
References
Barnett, S. A. (2000). Evidence on the fiscal and macroeconomic impact of privatiza-
tion.
Berg, A. and E. Berg (1997). Methods of privatization. Journal of International Affairs ,
357–390.
Bhatia, A. and O. Campbell-White (1998). Privatization in africa. Washington, DC:
International Bank for Reconstruction, 10.
Bos, D. et al. (1991). Privatization: a theoretical treatment. OUP Catalogue.
Cook, P. and Y. Uchida (2003). Privatisation and economic growth in developing coun-
tries. The Journal of Development Studies 39 (6), 121–154.
Domberger, S. and J. Piggott (1986). Privatization policies and public enterprise: A
survey. Economic Record 62 (2), 145–162.
Feigenbaum, H. B. and J. R. Henig (1994). The political underpinnings of privatization:
A typology. World Politics 46 (02), 185–208.
Ferguson, M. W. (1988). Palate development. Development 103 (Supplement), 41–60.
Galal, A. (1991). Public enterprise reform. World Bank Discussion Paper 119.
Guislain, P. (1992). Divestiture of state enterprises”. World Bank Technical Paper 186.
Hemming, R. and A. M. Mansoor (1988). Privatization and public enterprises, Vol-
ume 56. International Monetary Fund.
Kikeri, S. and A. F. Kolo (2005). Privatization: trends and recent developments.
73
Mako, W. P. and C. Zhang (2003). Management of china’s state-owned enterprises
portfolio: lessons from international experience. World Bank Office, Beijing , 12–13.
Nellis, J. (2002). The world bank, privatization and enterprise reform in transition
economies: a retrospective analysis.
Pirie, M. (1988). Privatization. Ashgate Publishing Company.
Plane, P. (1997). Privatization and economic growth: an empirical investigation from
a sample of developing market economies. Applied Economics 29 (2), 161–178.
Prager, J. (1992). Is privatization a panacea for ldcs? market failure versus public
sector failure. The Journal of Developing Areas 26 (3), 301–322.
Prosser, C. L., G. Graham, and V. Galton (1991). Hormonal regulation of temperature
acclimation in catfish hepatocytes. Journal of Comparative Physiology B: Biochem-
ical, Systemic, and Environmental Physiology 161 (1), 117–124.
Rees, R. (1988). Inefficiency, public enterprise and privatisation. European Economic
Review 32 (2-3), 422–431.
Robinson, C. (2003). Privatization: analysing the benefits. Chapter 3, 41–59.
Shair, O. J. A. (1997). Privatization and Development. Springer.
Shirley, M. (1990). The reform of state-owned enterprises. Washington, D.C: World
Bank, Policy and Research series Second Pringting(4), 301–322.
Shirley, M. and J. Nellis (1991). Public enterprise reform. The lessons of experience.
World Bank, Economic development Institute, Washington. DC .
Sobel, R. S. (1999). Theory and evidence on the political economy of the minimum
wage. Journal of Political Economy 107 (4), 761–785.
Thatcher, M. (1993). The Downing Street Years. Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers.
Van de Walle, N. (1989). Privatization in developing countries: a review of the issues.
World Development 17 (5), 601–615.
Yotopoulos, P. A. (1989). The (rip) tide of privatization: Lessons from chile. World
development 17 (5), 683–702.
74
Appendix 2
Appendix 2.1: The technique of Levinshon&Petrin (2003)
The technique of Levinshon&Petrin (2003) starts from a basic Cobb–Douglas production
function, that is
Yit = AitK
βk
it L
βl
itM
βm
it (1)
where:
Yit represents physical output of firm i in period t
Kit, Lit, andMit are inputs of capital, labor, and materials, respectively
Ait is the Hicksian neutral efficiency level of firm i in period t
Taking natural logs of equation (1), we obtain a linear production function.
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + εit (2)
where lower-case letters refer to natural logarithmic transformation of variables and
Ln(Ait) = β0+εit in which β0 measures the mean efficiency level across firms and over time
and εit is time- and producer-specific deviation from that mean. εit can be decomposed
into an observable and unobservable components as below:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + vit + e
q
it (3)
where ωit = β0 + vit represents firm-level productivity and e
q
it is an independent and
identically distributed component.
We first estimate the equation (3). Then, estimated firm-level TFP can be calculated
by the following equation (4). The value of TFP can be obtained as the exponential of
ωˆit i.e. θˆit = exp(ωˆit).
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ωˆit = vˆit + βˆ0 = yit − βˆkkit − βˆllit − βˆmmit (4)
Levinshon and Petrin use intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productiv-
ity to estimate the coefficients of production variable factors such capital, labor, and
materials. Hence, intermediate inputs can be shown to depend on capital and pro-
ductivity, i.e mit = mt(kit, ωit). This function meet the monotonicity condition since
intermediate inputs (materials in this case) strictly increase in ωit. Therefore, this func-
tion can be inverted to present unobserved productivity, i.e ωit = ϕt(kit,mit) where
ϕt(kit,mit) = m
−1
t (kit, ωit), as a function of observables. Using this expression, equa-
tion (3) can be rewritten as
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit + βmmit + ϕt(kit,mit) + e
q
it (5)
The coefficients in (4) can be estimated in two stages. The first step is to estimate
the following equation to obtain the coefficient on labor by using no-intercept OLS.
yit = βllit + φt(kit,mit) + e
q
it (6)
where φt(kit,mit) = β0 +βkkit+βmmit+ϕt(kit,mit) is approximated by a higher-order
polynomial in kit and mit (including a constant term).
The second step is to recover the coefficient on capitals and materials. In this step, it
is necessary to assume that productivity follows a first-order Markov process or ωit+1 =
E(ωit+1|ωit) + δit+1, where δit+1 is not correlated with productivity, materials, and capital
in period t+1. In other words, firms will continue to operate its business in order to archive
their productivity level above the lower bound, i.e. χit+1 = 1 if ωit+1 ≥ ωit+1, where χit+1
represents a variable of survival indicator. Therefore, the following expectation equation
expresses survival condition of the firm.
E[yit+1 − βllit+1|kit+1, χit+1 = 1] = β0 + βkkit+1 + βmmit+1 + E(ωit+1|ωit, χit+1 = 1) (7)
The expectation of E(ωit+1|ωit, χit+1) follows the law of motion of productivity shocks,
thus E(ωit+1|ωit, χit+1) = f(Pit, φit − βkkit − βmmit) where Pit = Pr(χit+1 = 1) is the
survival probability of firm i in the next period. Therefore, the estimation equation in
the second step can be derived as bellows:
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yit+1 − βllit+1 = β0 + βkkit+1 + βmmit+1 + E(ωit+|ωit, χit+1) + δit+1 + eqit
= β0 + βkkit+1 + βmmit+1 + f(Pit, φit − βkkit − βmmit) + δit+1 + eqit (8)
Considering equation (8), the coefficient on labor and the survival probability can be esti-
mated from equation (6) in the first step. Then, the coefficients on capital and materials
can be estimated from the final estimating equation (9) by using non-linear least squares.
The bootstrapping method is applied to calculate standard errors.
yit+1 − βllit+1 = β0 + βkkit+1 + βmmit+1 + f(Pˆit, φˆit − βˆkkit − βˆmmit) + δit+1 + eqit (9)
Finally, estimated firm-level TFP can be calculated by equation (4)
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Table 2.4: Placebo Test for the pre-treatment period
Dependent variable Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All business industries
TreatIntensity*Phase -0.062 -0.009 0.073 -0.039
(0.048) (0.011) (0.102) (0.094)
N 1521 1521 1422 1422
adj.R-sq 0.311 0.017 0.052 0.017
Panel B: Processing and manufacturing industry
TreatIntensity*Phase 0.020 0.015 0.096 0.055
(0.031) (0.018) (0.205) (0.197)
N 441 441 409 409
adj.R-sq 0.092 0.012 0.086 0.06
Panel C: Retail and wholesale industry
TreatIntensity*Phase 0.011 0.002 0.191 0.002
(0.015) (0.006) (0.209) (0.174)
N 373 373 347 347
adj.R-sq 0.054 0.010 0.095 0.031
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of
SOEs sold to private investors is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE
is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. Phase is dummy variable indicates
the period of 2004-2005. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences framework to
the firm-level panel data controlled by regions-business sectors-years fixed effects. Con-
trol variables are Fixed asset to total assets ratio, Debt to equity ratio, Log(Net sales),
Log(Total assets), and the Herfindahl Index. All values are converted at constant price
using GDP deflator of three major sectors (Agriculture, Industry, and Services). Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Placebo Test for pre-treatment period
Dependent variable
Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Phase -0.004 -0.005 0.015 0.018
(0.014) (0.005) (0.034) (0.034)
TreatIntensity*Phase -0.003 -0.008 -0.129 -0.055
(0.021) (0.012) (0.096) (0.093)
Debt to equity ratio -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Annual sales growth -0.005 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Log(Total assets) -0.012 0.007 0.655***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.103)
Log(Number of labor) 0.017 -0.002 -0.864***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.064)
Log(Fixed invest-
ment)
-0.006
(0.004)
Tangibility -0.142 -0.068*
(0.105) (0.035)
HHI 0.020 -0.036 -0.461 -0.251
(0.054) (0.033) (0.294) (0.277)
Constant 0.198 -0.000 0.658 0.585***
(0.213) (0.166) (1.201) (0.160)
Observations 574 1484 1422 1422
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.014 0.226 0.014
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of
SOEs sold to private investor is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE
is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. Phase is dummy variable indicates the
period of 2004-2005. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences framework to the
firm-level panel data controlled by regions-business sectors-years fixed effects. All values
are converted at constant price using GDP deflator of three major sectors (Agriculture,
Industry, and Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level; *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: The impact of privatization on SOEs performance in Vietnam
Dependent variable
Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 0.030* 0.008** 0.076* 0.107**
(0.017) (0.004) (0.046) (0.046)
TreatIntensity*After 0.058** 0.039*** 0.342*** 0.378***
(0.023) (0.008) (0.088) (0.089)
Debt to Equity 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log(Net sales) 0.003 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Log(Total Assets) -0.017 -0.002 0.508***
(0.018) (0.008) (0.058)
Log(labor) -0.005 0.002 -0.773***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.052)
Log(Fixed invest-
ment)
0.000
(0.002)
Tangibility -0.068** -0.061***
(0.033) (0.022)
Lag1.Log(VA/labor) -0.122***
(0.025)
Lag1.Log(TFP) -0.124***
(0.029)
HHI -0.019 0.009 0.345 0.345
(0.045) (0.023) (0.274) (0.280)
Constant 0.214 -0.003 2.126*** 1.132***
(0.167) (0.063) (0.626) (0.117)
Observations 1294 3734 2690 2690
adj. R-sq 0.051 0.053 0.261 0.067
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of
SOEs sold to private investor is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE
is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. After is dummy variable indicates
the post privatization period 2006-2008. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences
framework to the firm-level panel data controlled by regions-business sectors-years fixed
effects. All values are converted at constant price using GDP deflator of three sectors
(Agriculture, Industry, and Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
firm-level; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: The impact of privatization on processing and manufacturing SOEs perfor-
mance in Vietnam
Dependent variable
Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 0.021 0.025 0.152 0.186*
(0.025) (0.022) (0.103) (0.104)
TreatIntensity*After 0.064* 0.085*** 0.230 0.261
(0.037) (0.032) (0.172) (0.176)
Debt to Equity 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log(Net sales) 0.005* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Log(Total Assets) 0.013 -0.004 0.620***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.151)
Log(labor) -0.037** -0.008 -0.822***
(0.018) (0.011) (0.085)
Log(Fixed invest-
ment)
0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Tangibility 0.005 -0.090*
(0.067) (0.052)
Lag1.Log(VA/labor) -0.168***
(0.043)
Lag1.Log(TFP) -0.191***
(0.048)
HHI 0.114 -0.010 -0.041 -0.024
(0.205) (0.216) (0.330) (0.332)
Constant 0.042 0.101 1.370 0.992***
(0.271) (0.266) (1.467) (0.062)
Observations 491 491 767 767
adj. R-sq 0.103 0.145 0.244 0.089
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of
SOEs sold to private investor is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE
is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. After is dummy variable indicates
the post privatization period 2006-2008. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences
framework to the firm-level panel data controlled by regions-years fixed effects. All values
are converted at constant price using GDP deflator of three sectors (Agriculture, Industry,
and Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: The impact of privatization on retail and wholesale SOEs performance in
Vietnam
Dependent variable
Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After -0.029 0.000 0.054 0.010
(0.028) (0.006) (0.080) (0.077)
TreatIntensity*After 0.076** 0.040*** 0.333** 0.443**
(0.033) (0.008) (0.133) (0.186)
Debt to Equity 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log(Net sales) 0.019 0.009***
(0.014) (0.004)
Log(Total Assets) 0.014 -0.004 0.544***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.084)
Log(labor) -0.001 0.005* -0.719***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.069)
Tangibility -0.073 -0.016
(0.045) (0.015)
Lag1.Log(TFP) -0.140**
(0.063)
HHI -0.058 0.081 1.735* 0.686*
(0.149) (0.063) (0.935) (0.391)
Constant -0.304 -0.073 0.852 0.723***
(0.192) (0.057) (1.049) (0.054)
Observations 913 913 879 655
adj. R-sq 0.022 0.113 0.407 0.087
Notes: Treatment intensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of
SOEs sold to private investor is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE
is fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. After is dummy variable indicates
the post privatization period 2006-2008. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences
framework to the firm-level panel data controlled by regions-years fixed effects. All values
are converted at constant price using GDP deflator of three sectors (Agriculture, Industry,
and Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Robustness checks
Dependent variable Profit margin ROA Log(VA/labor) Log(TFP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All business industries
TreatIntensity*After 0.076 0.035*** 0.493*** 0.293***
(0.105) (0.011) (0.095) (0.086)
N 2309 2309 2178 2178
adj.R-sq 0.010 0.043 0.166 0.077
Panel B: Processing and manufacturing industry
TreatIntensity*After 0.005 0.074*** 0.465*** 0.352**
(0.050) (0.028) (0.177) (0.174)
N 667 667 634 634
adj.R-sq 0.084 0.073 0.126 0.079
Panel C: Retail and wholesale industry
TreatIntensity*After 0.106** 0.057*** 0.454** 0.306*
(0.050) (0.011) (0.195) (0.166)
N 562 562 534 534
adj.R-sq 0.023 0.144 0.342 0.144
Notes: TreatIntensity indicates that a continuous measure of state-owned shares of SOEs
sold to private investors is measured from 0 to 1. This equals to 1 means that SOE is
fully privatized, less than 1 and greater than 0 means that SOE is partially privatized,
and 0 means that SOE has not been privatized yet. After is dummy variable indicates the
post privatization period of 2006-2008. All models are applied Difference-in-Differences
framework to the firm-level panel data controlled by regions-business sectors-years fixed
effects. Control variables are Fixed asset to total assets ratio, Debt to equity ratio,
Log(Net sales), Log(Total assets), and the Herfindahl Index. All values are converted
at constant price using GDP deflator of three major sectors (Agriculture, Industry, and
Services). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level; * p < 0.10, ** p
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.1: Trend comparison of average profit margin
Source: Author
Figure 2.2: Trend comparison of average return on assets
Source: Author
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Figure 2.3: Trend comparision of labor productivity growth
Source: Author
Figure 2.4: Trend comparison of total factor productivity growth
Source: Author
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Chapter 3
Privatization, Ownership Structure,
and Privatized State-owned
Enterprises Performance in Vietnam
Abstract
This chapter focuses on analyzing the link between ownership structure, corporate gover-
nance, and firm performance in the post-privatization period. Applying the method of two
stage least squares (2SLS) to control the endogeneity of ownership, I attempt to evaluate
the impact of different degree of ownership concentration on the post-privatization perfor-
mance of Vietnamese listed firms which were completely privatized between 2003 to 2013.
The estimated results show that fully-privatized SOEs with greater degree of ownership
concentration have performed better in terms of profitability and efficiency than those
with dispersed ownership structure in the post-privatization period of 2003-2015. I then
examine four Vietnamese listed firms which have different forms of ownership structure
after privatization to verify how their corporate governance and business operation have
improved after changing its ownership structure. I find that privatization which leads
to concentrated ownership structure has generated effective corporate governance, and
consequently superior firm performance.
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3.1 Introduction
The link between ownership structure and enterprise performance was early explored by
Berle and Means in 1932. Later, many scholars have been focusing on examining impact of
ownership structure on corporate governance which is considered as a necessary condition
for improving enterprise performance. The link has raised an important question whether
ownership concentration is appropriate structure for good corporate governance and per-
formance. The answer of such question is important to policy implication of privatization.
According to stylized facts of privatization, firms with concentrated ownership structure
relatively have more efficient performance than those with dispersed one. The study of
Berle and Means (1932) argues that dispersed ownership structure has negative impact
on enterprise performance. Most of empirical studies such as Morck et al.(1988), Shleifer
and Vishny(1986), Megginson et al.(1994) also confirm the view of Berle and Means, in
which ownership concentration is associated with more effective and transparent corporate
governance system.
The chapter aims to investigate two main hypotheses which are that ownership concen-
tration has positive impact on post-privatization firm performance in Vietnam; and that
privatized firms with concentrated ownership structure have restructured its corporate
governance and business operation to achieve superior performance after privatization.
To test the first hypothesis, I apply an instrument variable technique to Vietnamese listed
firms which were fully privatized between 2003 and 2013. The estimated results show that
the greater degree of ownership concentration, the better performance of enterprises after
fully privatization. Regarding the second hypothesis, I examine four Vietnamese priva-
tized SOEs which are randomly selected on stock market websites based on their ownership
structures. In this step, I check whether the ownership structures have influenced their
governance efficiency and financial performance. I also look at the improvement of their
production process and business activities during and after their all state-owned shares
are sold to private investors. I then try to compare performance of those firms during
post-privatization period by analysing the link between their ownership structure and
corporate governance. The comparative analysis suggests that SOEs should be privatized
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to generate concentrated ownership structure. In this way, firms have higher probability
of governance restructuring for better performance after privatization. The reason is that
privatized firms having greater degree of ownership concentration have strong motivation
to enhance its governance ability, to improve its production process, and to upgrade its
business activities.
The chapter includes five main parts. Following introduction is a conceptual framework
of the relationship between ownership structure, corporate governance, and enterprise
performance. The third part shows the estimated results of the impact of ownership
concentration on privatized firm performance by using the method of 2SLS. The next
part presents a comparative analysis of four privatized SOEs by analysing the relationship
between ownership structure, corporate governance, business operation, and performance
before and after privatization programs. The last part is conclusion.
3.2 Conceptual framework
Privatization is expected to improve firm performance, consequently accelerating economic
growth. In fact, transferring ownership from public to private sectors is not sufficient to
improve SOEs performance after privatization. The success of privatization significantly
depends on corporate governance improvement and institutional reforms, which is re-
sulting from ownership structure in post-privatization period. Corporate governance, in
which incentives for managers are better, effectiveness of ownership control is improvi-
dent, and control mechanisms for firm management are more effective; is an important
determinant of performance improvement. Institutional reforms including improvement
of legal frameworks, better enforcement of regulations, hardened budget constraints, and
new industry entrants.
A conventional wisdom is that privatized firms can achieve better performance as a
result of effective structure of corporate governance. However, privatization by itself does
not generate efficiency benefits. It partly depends on which form of ownership structure
is created after privatization. Therefore, this part presents a discussion of how ownership
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Figure 3.1: Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance
Source: Author
structure affect on corporate governance and firm performance as a conceptual analysis
framework of the chapter (See Figure 3.1).
The Principal- Agent theory suggests the separation of ownership of owners (the prin-
cipals) and control of managers (agents) for better firm performance result from effective
governance improvement. In this view, ownership structure could be considered as an
endogenous outcome which is able to adjust firm decision-making structure and environ-
ment. In other words, ownership structure is a factor determining corporate governance
mechanism which have strong influence on economic performance of firms. However, we
do not know whether ownership concentration or dispersion is more conducive to efficient
corporate governance and better firm performance. According to the theory of corpo-
rate governance, good corporate governance is associated with ownership concentration
in post-privatization period. This statement is also pointed out in almost all literatures
(e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) on the link between ownership structure and corporate
governance. The assumption is that ownership concentration can mitigate more risk of
agency problems compared with dispersed ownership structure, and consequently lead to
superior firm performance. Therefore, the question is why privatized firms with concen-
trated ownership structure could perform better than those with mass private owners and
without major shareholders.
One rational explanation is that ownership concentration induces higher probability
of firm’s restructuring compared with dispersed ownership structure in the early stage
of privatization program. Conceptually, the greater proportion of ownership, the higher
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degree of firm’s control rights. Large owners strongly push restructuring process on the
basis of their satisfaction of corporate governance and firm performance after privatiza-
tion. Obviously, they tend to optimally restructure the firm with the aim of raising their
investment returns and benefits. Many studies, such as Barberis et al. (1996), Earle and
Estrin (1996), Pohl et al. (1997), Earle (1999), Djankov and Claessens (1999), find that
concentrated ownership structure with efficient corporate governance could lead to better
full-privatized firm performance in transition economies. However, after partial privati-
zation programs, if the state has remained a dominant or even a significant proportion of
privatized firms’ ownership, these firms are less likely to push for restructuring process and
employment reduction (Claessen et al. (1997)). They could be also strongly influenced
by political interests and driven by non-profit maximizing objectives; and consequently,
could not improve its market valuation and performance.
Second, ownership concentration provides more incentives and benefits to create an
efficient corporate governance mechanism. Without major shareholders, it is difficult for
privatized firms to force major adjustment of managerial characteristics for better perfor-
mance. Major owners normally have strong motivation and incentives to increase their
monitoring and investments with the aim of maximizing their firm profit and efficiency.
Many scholars believe that privatized firms could improve its performance by creating
an effective corporate governance scheme, which is normally resulting from concentrated
ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Morck et al. (1988), and Megginson et
al. (1994)). Moreover, ownership concentration may alleviate agency problems for better
corporate governance. Therefore, methods of privatization which lead to concentrated
ownership structure might be rationally recommended for developing countries where are
lack of necessary conditions for privatization to be successful.
Third, ownership concentration is usually associated with higher level of transparent
corporate structure, and consequently provides more incentives to shareholders to increase
their investments based on freely observing their cash flows. In other words, concentrated
ownership structure could improve post-privatization firm performance by reducing the
agency costs of managerial discretion. By contrast with ownership concentration, firms
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with dispersed ownership structure are likely to face with a divergence between financial
performance and corporate governance or between firm’s ownership and control. Stiglitz
(1999) argues that monitoring of management in firms having dispersed ownership struc-
ture is a public good and, in turn, is under-supplied. In fact, all small shareholders have
a little managerial control as well as limited ownership rights to monitoring managers to
pursue profit maximization. This problem may not be a serious issue if monitoring own-
ership rights are protected by an effective legislation, but this such protection is absent
in most developing countries.
However, one problem is that ownership concentration is more likely to induce greater
managerial initiatives, which may negatively affect firm performance. In other words,
the greater degree of ownership concentration, the stronger managerial initiatives, and
hence less improvement of firm performance. The studies of Aghion and Tirole (1997),
and Burkart et al., (1997) document that large shareholders may impose tight control
on managerial incentives and initiatives, which could induce a reduction in the owners’
risk tolerance, especially under uncertain environmental uncertainty (Demsetz and Lehn
(1985)).
In short, methods of privatization that lead to concentrated ownership structure sig-
nificantly improve firm performance. As mentioned above, ownership concentration could
induce higher probability of firm’s restructuring, effective corporate governance system,
and transparent corporate structure. In other words, ownership concentration is an ef-
fective way to ensure better post-privatization firm performance, especially in transition
economies with weak legal protection of minority shareholder rights and undeveloped
market institutions. A mumber of empirical evidences presented in the next section also
assert that private ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on post-
privatization firm performance.
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3.3 Evidences from Vietnamese listed firms during
post-privatization period
3.3.1 Background
The link between ownership structure and firm performance has received considerable
attention in empirical literatures. The impact of ownership concentration on firm per-
formance can be positive, negative, or ambiguous. Based on the theory of corporate
governance, many scholars (Berle and Means (1932), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Claessens and Djankov (1999b), etc.) believe that a privatized firm
having concentrated ownership structure has more incentives to restructure its governance
scheme for better performance. Other scholars such as Cremer (1995), Aghion and Tirole
(1997), and La Porta et al. (1998a), argue that concentrated ownership structure may
be harmful for firm performance. The reason behind their argument is that providing
more powerful incentives to control firm’s management may reduce managerial initiatives
to acquire information. This may thus turn out to induce inefficient monitoring system.
La Porta et al. (1998a) emphasize the risk of minority shareholders’ expropriation is the
main problem of corporate governance in most of countries rather than managers’ mon-
itoring. The problem may not be serious to countries which have effective legislations
for protection of monitoring ownership rights. As the same point of view, Burkart et al.
(1997) point out that dispersed ownership may positively affect firm performance when
shareholders do not control and intervene excessively in its management system. Several
theories and literatures (such as Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Bevan et
al., (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)) show the ambiguity of ownership concen-
tration impact on firm performance. In other words, there is non-significant relationship
between ownership structure and enterprise performance. They claim that dispersed
ownership structure is able to induce effective monitoring if analyst reports on firms are
available and public. Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) find a U-shaped relationship between
ownership concentration and firm performance in Poland. Firms with relatively dispersed
ownership in which shareholders have less than 20 percent of voting shares and with rela-
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tively ownership concentration in which shareholders have more than 50 percent of voting
shares have higher productivity growth than firms with level of ownership concentration
from 20 to 50 percent of total voting shares.
Most of empirical studies confirm that improvement in privatized SOE performance
is associated with greater degree of ownership concentration. For example, using a cross-
country sample for the period of 1980-2001, Boubakri et al. (2005a) find a significant
and positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance. Privatized firms with
concentrated ownership structure, mainly through share issued privatizations, have im-
proved its performance in developed and developing countries. The studies of Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), and Marcincin and Wijnbergen (1995) document similar findings for tran-
sition countries. Their findings suggest that concentrated ownership is usually associated
with more transparent scheme of corporate governance and related to higher probability
of restructuring. The evidence from the largest European firms (McConnell and Servaes
(1990)) also shows that profitability of firms and market-to-book value of equity are posi-
tively connected with ownership concentration. Additionally, other empirical studies such
as Weiss and Nikitin (1998), Claessens and Djankov (1999b), Claessens et al. (1997), and
Hanousek et al. (2007), on privatized firms in the Czech Republic state that the greater
degree of ownership concentration, the higher profitability and labor productivity of firms
in post-privatization period. They also suggest that firms privatized to strategic investors,
especially foreign owners, tend to be associated with superior performance. Furthermore,
there is a positive significant relationship between concentration and performance for pri-
vatized firms in Romania, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, and Egypt, which is found by Earle
and Telegdy (2002), Barberis et al. (1996), De Miguel et al. (2004), Pivovarsky (2001),
and Omran (2009), respectively. Pivovarsky (2001), for instance, indicates that Ukrainian
SOEs could improve its labor productivity and total factor productivity by being priva-
tized to foreign investors and banks.
A widespread belief is that improvement in enterprise performance is a result of ef-
fective governance scheme after privatization. The studies of Earle and Estrin (1996),
Barberis et al. (1996), Pohl et al. (1997), and Djankov and Claessens (1999) confirm
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that concentrated ownership significantly lead to higher probability of restructuring in
post-privatization period. Basically, privatization is a process to transfer public owner-
ship to private investors who have appropriate incentives to create an effective corporate
governance scheme. Consequently, privatized firms have improved not only performance
but also market valuation.
As discussed above, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm perfor-
mance are controversial. The reason is that scholars use different data set and could not
deal with the natural endogeneity of ownership structure due to limitation information of
corporate governance. Most of empirical studies suggest a positive significant relationship
between concentrated ownership structure and firm performance (such as Claessens and
Djankov (1999), Pivovarsky (2001), Boubakri et al. (2005a), and Hanousek et al. (2007)).
A very few previous studies do control the endogeneity of ownership concentration when
they evaluate the effect of ownership structure on post-privatization firm performance.
Notably, by applying the method of 2SLS for a sample of 52 newly privatized firms in
Egypt over the period of 1995-2005, Omran (2009) concludes that post-privatization own-
ership concentration has a positive effect on firm performance. For instance, all account-
ing performance, measured by ROS, ROA, and ROE, is statistically significant correlated
with concentrated ownership structure. He emphasizes that ownership concentration is
influenced by timing and method of privatization, sales growth, firm size, and industry
affiliation in pre-privatization period. The recently study of Laura and Silvia (2011) also
applies 2SLS methodology with the aim of controlling endogeneity of ownership concen-
tration. The study deals with a sample of 44 Spanish firms which were partially or fully
privatized between 1985 and 2003. The estimated results prove that ownership concen-
tration has significantly positive effect on firm efficiency after 3-year privatization. The
authors suggest that the timing of privatization, firm size, solvency risk, industry sectors,
and the ideology of the government should be considered in determining post-privatization
ownership concentration.
In Vietnam, very scarce previous studies on the link between ownership structure and
firm performance are conducted due to limited access to information of ownership struc-
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ture and corporate governance. Do and Wu (2014) apply a multiple regression method
for examining the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. They use a sample
of 134 non-financial listed companies on the Hochiminh stock market over the period of
2009-2012 and find that firms with greater concentration of state ownership have had
better financial performance (measured by return on assets and return on equity). The
study of Phung and Mishra (2016) documents the same finding by using the panel data of
Vietnamese listed firms during the 2007-2012 period. They argue that firms with greater
degree of state ownership concentration appropriately benefit from political connections
and government support rather than itself improvements in efficiency of corporate gov-
ernance. However, these benefits will be reduced when the proportion of a firm’s stock
held by the state are less than 25 percent. In other words, the relation between state
ownership and firm performance is U-shape. The study also presents foreign ownership
has a convex relationship with firm performance.
There is no significant empirical study on impact of ownership concentration on Viet-
namese firm performance by controlling the endogeneity of ownership structure in post-
privatization period. Therefore, I attempt to contribute to the empirical literatures on the
link between ownership structure and firm performance. The study investigates a main
hypothesis that ownership concentration has a positive impact on post-privatization firm
performance in Vietnam.
3.3.2 Variables, sample selection, and methodology
Measures of ownership concentration
The concept of ownership concentration is not clearly defined in both theoretical and
empirical literatures. Ownership concentration could refer to significant amount of voting
shares or owners’ degree of control which provide large shareholders a relatively strong
monitoring power over a firm’s managerial decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other
words, a shareholder with the largest amount of voting shares has the highest degree of
firm’s control. According to Berle and Means (1932), an owner who holds at least 20
percent of firm’s shares has a management controlling role. Most corporate governance
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scholars define the cut-off level could range from 5 to 20 percent, even from 4 percent up
to 80 percent. However, using a threshold could not distinguish the different degree of
firm’s control among owners who hold voting shares above or below around the cut-off
levels. Therefore, ownership concentration can be measured by simple calculation based
on the values of major shareholders or by advance computation based on game theory.
The simplest measure found in most of empirical studies is the largest owner’s voting
shares (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Laura and Silvia (2011)). This measure
allows to use in different specifications, for instance squared terms used by De Miguel
et al. (2004), if the relation between firm performance and ownership concentration is
non-linear. The potential disadvantage of the measure is that it might not be a reasonable
proxy because the power of the largest shareholder’s control is also associated with voting
share weights of other major shareholders. In case other shareholders holding voting
shares which is quite closed to the largest owner’s voting shares, he might not be the
person who has the greatest power in the firm. For example, the control degree of an
owner holding 51 percent of total voting shares is not much different with the one holding
49 percent in a corresponding firm. It seems to be difficult to define how the gap of holding
shares among shareholders is big enough for the largest shareholder can win any voting
contest. Another simple measure is done in several literatures is cumulative voting shares
of the largest shareholders (Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), De Miguel Et al. (2004), and
Omran (2009)). Using the cumulative measure might still be problematic because of the
potential disagreement among the largest shareholders.
Instead of using a continuous variable, some corporate governance scholars use the ratio
of holding voting shares between shareholders as a proxy for ownership concentration. For
instance, Coony et al (2012) take the ratio of the first largest owner’s voting shares to
the second largest owner’s voting shares and the ratio of the first largest owner’s voting
shares to sum of the second to fourth largest shareholders’ voting shares. Measuring
ownership concentration by this way might be erroneous because of discretion of choosing
the number of largest shareholders to add in the denominators. Obviously, there is no
particular principal for this choice.
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The most appropriate measures of ownership concentration which consider the inter-
play among firm’s owners are the Herfindahl index and the Gini coefficient. The methods
of Herfindahl (1950) or Gini (1945) could include all shareholders of a firm in a single
measure of ownership concentration. The Herfindahl index is calculated by the sum of
the squared sums of all owners’ voting shares. The potential advantage of the Herfindahl
index is offering a feasible way to take into account the important property of all share-
holders, even a smallest one. The Herfindahl index is commonly calculated only for the
largest shareholders who have significant role of control over a firm’s managerial decisions
due to limitation of ownership data. Thus, several studies such as the studies of Cubbin
and Leech (1983), Leech and Leahy (1991), Goergen and Renneboog (2001), and Omran
(2009), apply the index as a proxy for ownership concentration. Concerning shareholder
distribution, a few scholars such as Mavruk (2010) and Lindblom et al. (2011), calculate
the Gini coefficient by using the total number of shareholders, the voting shares of each
shareholder, and the mean of ownership distribution. Although using the Gini coefficient
is quite relevant compared with other measures by capturing the ownership distribution,
the coefficient is not commonly used in empirical literatures because of limited data.
Additionally, Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) suggest the methods that
could be applied to compute advanced power indices of ownership based on game theory.
Generally, it is impossible to calculate the Banzhaf index or the Shapley-Shubik index in
practice because of limited capacity of computation.
Measuring ownership concentration are different across empirical literatures, which
depends on research objectives and availability of data. In this study, I use the Herfindahl
index of the three largest private shareholders who own at least 5 percent of total voting
shares as a main measure of ownership concentration because of the limited data and
its advantages as mentioned above. Additionally, the largest owner’s voting shares and
cumulative shares of the three largest shareholders are also applied for robustness checks.
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Instruments for estimating ownership concentration
The relation between ownership structure and firm performance may be formulated be-
cause of the agency problem deriving from the separation of ownership and control. The
situation is that ownership structure may affect firm performance and better firm perfor-
mance would lead to higher ownership concentration at the same time. Shareholders or
potential shareholders of successful firms tend to remain their control over these firms be-
cause of better returns on their investments. In other words, there is simultaneity between
ownership structure and firm performance. Many empirical studies, such as the studies
of Demsetz (1983), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Palia (2001), and Gugler and Weigand
(2003), confirm that this simultaneity is the main source of the endogeneity of ownership
structure to firms’ value. Therefore, using the method of instrumental variable estima-
tion is the best way to control the endogeneity of ownership structure. The following part
discusses several instrumental variables for estimating ownership concentration.
According to the empirical model specification proposed by Pistor et al. (2003) and
Klein et al. (2005), ownership concentration of firms can be generally determined by
corporate governance index, investment opportunities, degree of industry regulation, and
firm size. Regarding privatized firms, in the studies of Boubakri et al. (2005), Omran
(2009), and Laura and Silvia (2011), they present six determinants of ownership concen-
tration which are method of privatization, timing of privatization, government ideology,
sectoral affiliation, firm size, and firm risk in pre-privatization period. It is a crucial task
to choose which of these determinants could be a significant instrumental variable for
ownership concentration with the aim of addressing its natural endogeneity. The instru-
ment variables are not correlated with firm performance but have a significant influence
on ownership concentration.
In fact, most of empirical studies state that firm size and sectoral affiliation could
be correlated with both firm performance and ownership concentration. In addition,
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that firms operating in less risky environments tend to
have a greater degree of ownership concentration because large shareholders reluctantly
invest into riskier firms. In other words, riskier firms may be associated with lesser degree
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of ownership concentration. However, firms with less risk tolerance, on the one hand,
are able to attract investors to invest more in its, and on the other hand, could have an
inverse relation with firm performance. Thus, firm risk in pre-privatization period may
not be purely exogenous with firm performance. Futhermore, information of government
ideologies are difficult to collect and not available in all empirical studies and in my study.
The study, therefore, use privatization methods and timing as instrument variables
for ownership concentration. These both variables satisfy two fundamental conditions
of a valid instrument, which are highly correlation with ownership concentration and no
impact on firm performance. Generally, governments assign privatization methods and
decide what percentage of state-owned shares will be sold to private investors. Most of
empirical evidences such as Pivovarsky (2001), Boubakri et al. (2005a), and Omran (2009)
confirm that lesser degree of ownership concentration should stem from SIPs compared
to direct sales. In Vietnam, methods of privatization are determined exogenously with
firm performance, which is a fundamental condition of the validity of instrument variable.
According to the Decree No 187/2004/ND-CP and the revised versions (the Decree No
109/2007/ND-CP and the Decree No 59/2011/ND-CP) issued in 2004, 2007, and 2011,
respectively, a Steering Committee which is established to formulate a privatization pro-
gram decides the method of privatization based on the residual value of state ownership,
business sectors, business plans, and the size of charter capital after privatization. For
instance, SOEs are assigned to sell state-owned shares; and to issue and sell new shares at
the same time if they have a plan to increase its charter capital after privatization. If firms
have plans to open new business activities in the future, they might be privatized through
direct sales to potential investors. Or if the residual value of SOEs’ state ownership are
more than VND 10 billion, IPOs on stock exchange markets is required to attract more
private investors. In case of the total state-owned shares sold to private investors is less
than VND 10 billion, SOEs are privatized through direct sales or public offerings. The
method of privatization which is defined in my study is dummy variable, which takes 1
if a firm is fully privatized through being officially listed on the stock markets. In other
words, the selection of privatization methods is not influenced by pre-privatization firm
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performance on the basic of the regulations for privatization process in Vietnam.
Timing of privatization is another factor should be considerable in exogenously deter-
mining private ownership concentration in post-privatization period. Governments may be
more reluctant to divest program and not willing to relinquish their control over SOEs in
the early stage of privatization. They will be able to sell larger percentages of state-owned
shares when there is less political uncertainty and more investor confidence. Accordingly,
there will be lesser degree of ownership concentration in the first stage of privatization. In
the study of Omran (2009), he uses the median privatization date of the sample as a time-
cut to define early and late privatization. He argues whether governments are reluctant
or willing to relinquish their control, and whether private investors are attracted aggres-
sively at early stages of privatization. His results document that ownership structure of
Egyptian firms are more concentrated in the later stages of privatization. However, the
relation between ownership concentration and later privatization could be negative, which
is presented in the studies of Grosfeld and Hashi (2007), and Boubakri et al. (2005a).
Sample selection
The main data are collected from the stock market where I can find continuous financial
data and information of ownership structure for almost all listed firms. Furthermore, I
can check information of corporate governance from listed-firm’s annual reports. I select
40 listed-firms which were fully privatized or at least were not controlled by the state as
a dominant shareholder (or significant shareholder) between 2003 and 2013. Then, the
data have at least three years of post-privatization firm performance, which can reflect
the true medium and long-term impacts of ownership changes.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable name Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
The Herfindahl Index of three
largest private shareholders
Index 231 7.186 8.575 0 37
Percentage of shares held by
the largest private shareholder
% 231 19.278 13.811 3.60 60.56
Cumulative percentage of
shares held by the three
largest private shareholders
% 231 32.206 19.338 4.10 81.71
Tobin Q Index 231 1.076 0.581 0.338 6.917
ROA Ratio 231 0.072 0.084 -0.344 0.609
ROE Ratio 231 13.760 30.601 -364.425 127.876
Return per labor Mil.VND 231 0.506 1.482 -2.531 18.345
Proportion of outside directors Unit 230 0.367 0.265 0 1
Changing CEO Dummy 230 0.404 0.492 0 1
Log(Total assets) % 231 14.089 1.171 10.119 16.612
Firm year experiences Year 231 25.264 11.519 4 52
Foreign Dummy 231 0.190 0.394 0 1
Institute Dummy 231 0.247 0.432 0 1
Individual Dummy 231 0.563 0.497 0 1
Debt to Equity ratio Ratio 231 156.963 199.545 0.693 1667.054
Standard deviation of ROA Index 231 13.880 1.421 9.483 16.965
Log(Total sales) % 231 0.049 0.043 0.001 0.184
Privatization timing Dummy 231 0.333 0.472 0 1
Privatization method Dummy 231 0.654 0.477 0 1
Note: The data values are converted at constant prices using the GDP deflator of three major
industries including agriculture, industries, and services.
Research methodology
I apply an instrument variable regression to address the endogeneity of ownership struc-
ture. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression is as the following equations:
PERit = β0 + β1CONCit + β2CHAIRCEOit + β3OUTSit + β4CHNGCEOit +∑6
k δkXitk +
∑3
l OWNERitl + εt + uit
CONCit = α0 + α1METHODit + α2TIMEit + εt + uit
Where PERit is the performance for firm i at time t including return on assets (ROA),
return on equity (ROE), return per labor (RPL), and the market value of firm (Tobin’s
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Table 3.2: Measurement of variables
Variable Variable name Description
PER Firm performance - Tobin′sQ = (Share
′smarketprice)(Outstandingshares)+(Bookvalueofdebt)
Bookvalueoftotalassets
- Return on Assets (ROA)
- Return on Equity (ROE)
- Return per labor
CONC Ownership concen-
tration
- The Herfindahl index of the three largest private share-
holders
- The percentage of shares held by the largest private share-
holder
- The cumulative percentage of shares held by the three
largest private shareholders
CHAIRCEO Dummy variable which takes 1 if CEO and chairman are
not the same person of firm i in time t
OUTS The proportion of outside directors
CHNGCEO Dummy variable which takes 1 if firm i has new CEO in
time t
METHOD Method of Privati-
zation
Dummy variable which takes 1 if firm i is fully privatized
through being listed on the stock market (share issued pri-
vatization - SIPs)
TIME Privatization tim-
ing
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if firm I is privatized
after the median privatization date of the sample
OWNER Type of the - Individual investors
largest private - Foreign investors
shareholder - Domestic institutional investors
Xit Firm size Log (Total assets)
Sales growth Log (Total sales)
Financial leverage Debt to Equity ratio
Firm experiences Year i minus firm established year
Risk Standard deviation of ROA
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Q). Tobin’s Q is measured by dividing the market value to replacement value of assets
(Brainard and Tobin (1968), and Tobin (1969), Phung and Mishra (2016)). While ROA,
ROE, RPL are considered as the past and current firm performance, Tobin’s Q can cap-
ture the expectation of future firm performance (Omran, 2009). I use Tobin’s Q as an
appropriate measure of firm performance, especially for listed firms. CONCit stand for
ownership concentration for firm i at time t: The Herfindahl index of the three largest pri-
vate shareholders, the percentage of shares held by the largest private shareholder, and the
cumulative percentage of shares held by three largest private shareholders. METHODit
is the method of privatization that equals to one if the firm i is fully privatized through
being listed on the stock market (SIPs) at time t and zero otherwise. TIMEit is the pri-
vatization timing which equals one if the firm i is privatized after the median privatization
date of the sample. I include three measures of corporate governance: CHAIRCEOit is
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the board chairman and the chief execu-
tive officer (CEO) of firm i are not the same person at time t, OUTSit is the proportion
of outside directors for firm i at time t; CHNGCEOit stands for changing CEO, which
equals to one if firm i change its CEO at time t. Xit are other control variables including
firm size, financial leverage, and tolerance risk. OWNERit are dummy variables that are
defined as types of the largest private shareholder including individual investors, foreign
investors, and domestic institutional investors. εt are control year-fixed effects and uit is
the error term.
3.3.3 Empirical results
Determinants of post-privatization ownership concentration
The first-stage of 2SLS regression in Table 3.3.3 reveals that privatization method and
timing play an important role for determining private ownership concentration. The esti-
mated results show that privatization method and timing have highly significant effected
on ownership concentration of Vietnamese privatized firms. For instance, the coefficients
of privatization method is significantly negative related to concentrated ownership at the
1 percent level for both models, suggesting that lesser degree of ownership concentration
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results from sales issued privatization (SIPs) compared to private sales. The finding is
also confirmed by previous literatures such as Megginson et al. (2004) and Boubakri et
al. (2005a) for international privatized firms, Omran (2009) for Egypt, and Laura and
Silvia (2011) for Spain.
Table 3.3: The impact of ownership concentration on privatized SOEs performance (first-
stage results of 2SLS estimation)
Ownership concentration Tobin Q ROA ROE Return per labor
1. The Herfindahl index of the three largest private shareholders
Privatization timing 3.386*** 3.145*** 3.145*** 2.620**
(1.06) (0.95) (0.95) (1.11)
Privatization method -3.801*** -3.752*** -3.752*** -3.863***
(1.09) (1.12) (1.12) (1.10)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
2. The percentage of shares held by the largest private shareholder
Privatization timing 5.717*** 5.601*** 5.601*** 4.448**
(1.74) (1.65) (1.65) (1.80)
Privatization method -6.326*** -6.303*** -6.303*** -6.429***
(1.66) (1.70) (1.70) (1.69)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31
3. The cumulative percentage of shares held by the three largest private shareholders
Privatization timing 12.077*** 12.039*** 12.039*** 10.998***
(2.30) (2.34) (2.34) (2.38)
Privatization method -6.094** -6.086** -6.086** -6.181**
(2.56) (2.57) (2.57) (2.60)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted Rsquared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In addition, the coefficients of privatization timing is consistently positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level for the three models. This indicates that ownership
concentration are strongly determined by the timing of privatization. As the same argu-
ment of Bortolotti and Faccio (2006) and Omran (2009), the finding supports that the
government is reluctant to sell state-owned shares to private investors. On the other hand,
the government is not willing to relinquish its control on partially-privatized firms in the
early stages of privatization program.
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Ownership concentration and post-privatization firm performance
This section investigates to explore how ownership structure has affected post-privatization
firm performance and whether ownership concentration is appropriate for better perfor-
mance of privatized SOEs in Vietnam. With the aim of controlling the endogeneity of
ownership concentration, I apply the method of instrument variable regression to examine
the relation between ownership concentration and firm performance after privatization.
Table 3.4: The impact of ownership concentration on privatized SOEs performance
(second-stage results of 2SLS estimation)
Ownership concentration Tobin Q ROA ROE Return
per labor
The Herfindahl index of the three largest pri-
vate shareholders
0.031** 0.006* 2.564** 0.149**
(0.02) (0.00) (0.83) (0.05)
The Kleibergen–Paap F-test 12.22 10.35 10.34 12.25
P-value Hansen J test 0.20 0.11 0.66 0.16
The percentage of shares held by the largest
private shareholder
0.018* 0.003* 1.483** 0.089**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.51) (0.03)
The Kleibergen–Paap F-test 11.89 10.81 10.81 12.08
P-value Hansen J test 0.20 0.10 0.59 0.11
The cumulative percentage of shares held by
the three largest private shareholders
0.003 0.001 0.666* 0.039**
(0.01) (0.00) (0.37) (0.02)
The Kleibergen–Paap F-test 15.12 14.62 14.62 13.59
P-value Hansen J test 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02
Observations 230 230 230 230
Note: Instrument variables are method and timing of privatization. Controls include dummy of CEO
and chairman, proportion of outside directors, changing CEO, log of total assets, firm experience, Debt
to equity ratio, standard deviation of ROA, and types of the largest private shareholder. The Kleiber-
gen–Paap F-test are weak identification tests of instrument relevance. The Hansen J test are tests for
the overidentification with a null hypothesis: the endogenous regressor is orthogonal to the error term.
Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The estimated results of the Herfindahl index in Table 3.3.3 confirm that ownership
concentration has statistically significant and positive impact on post-privatization firm
performance in terms of TobinQ, ROA, ROE, and return per labor at least three years
after the change in ownership structure from public to private. In other words, the
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greater degree of ownership concentration, the better post-privatization performance of
Vietnamese privatized firms. This finding is relatively consistent with the estimated
results of other ownership concentration measures, for instance the percentage of shares
held by the largest private shareholder and the cumulative percentage of shares held by
the three largest shareholders. The finding is also consistent with the results of Claessens
and Dajnkov (1999) for Czech firms, Boubakri et al. (2005a) for international privatized
firms, Omran (2009) for newly privatized Egyptian firms, and Laura and Silvia (2011) for
Spain privatization after controlling the endogeneity of ownership concentration.
Regarding corporate governance, the theory suggests that the position of chairman and
CEO in joint stock company should be separately for an effective corporate governance.
My results tend to support this theoretical argument, in which privatized firms have
significantly improved its TobinQ in post-privatization period if CEO and chairman are
not the same person. Surprisingly, the relation between proportion of outside directors
and firm performance is ambiguous. The estimated results provide an evidence that listed
firm performance is not statistically effected by outside directors as similar the finding
of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for the US firms. One explanation is that outside
directors might not effect on effective corporate governance of listed firms, in which their
information is quite transparent. A second explanation is that board of directors would
reduce agency and information cost as well as increase quality of decision-making by
having more inside directors. With regard the change of CEO, although the coefficients
of CHNGCEO dummy are negative and significant (See Tables of Appendix), it is likely
bias to conclude that top management replacement has negatively influenced on post-
privatization performance of listed firms. There are two potential sources inducing this
argument. First, the change of CEO may be correlated with others control variables.
For instance, the greater degree of ownership concentration, the higher probability of
changing CEO if the largest shareholders do not satisfy with CEO performance, reflected
by the highly significant and positive coefficients of CHNGCEO dummy in the first stage
of IV regression. Second, there might be a causal relation between CEO changing and
firm performance. Changing CEO is resulting from not only privatization with greater
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ownership concentration but also their poor performance. In other words, firms are likely
to change its CEO if its performance are quite poor. This is the fact for Vietnamese
listed-firms. For instance, a firm with mass inside shareholders presented in the next
section regularly changes its CEO because of his poor performance or might be due to
expropriation of minority shareholders.
In summary, the study mainly focuses on examining the relation between ownership
concentration and post-privatization firm performance after controlling the endogeneity
of ownership structure. The empirical results document that privatized firms with greater
degree of ownership concentration are associated with better performance in Vietnam. As
mentioned earlier, the relation between ownership concentration and firm performance is
controversial. The relation could be ambiguos or negative in some countries such as Poland
(Grosfeld and Tressel, 2001), the United States (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), and
Belgium (Hamadi and Heinen, 2015). Notably, Kun Wang and Greg Shailer (2015) show
that ownership concentration has negatively affected on firm performance by applying
a technique of meta-analyst to integrate the diverse findings from 42 empirical studies
of listed firms in 18 emerging countries. In the case of Vietnam, I find that ownership
concentration has significantly positive effects on privatized firm performance in post-
privatization period. Therefore, privatizing SOEs with the aim of generating greater
degree of ownership concentration is recommended for developing countries like Vietnam
where is lack of protection of minority shareholder rights and insufficient legislations.
The next section explores the reason why privatized SOEs with concentrated ownership
structure have improved its performance in post-privatization period.
3.4 Case studies: A comparative analysis
This section aims to examine good corporate governance is associated with better perfor-
mance of privatized firms, which is as a result of converting to concentrated ownership
structure after privatization. In this sense, privatized firms with greater ownership con-
centration have higher probability of major restructuring for better corporate governance,
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and consequently for superior its performance in post-privatization period.
Based on the change of ownership structure right after full privatization, I randomly
select four privatized firms which are listed on the stock markets (see Table 3.5). I choose
these listed firms because they are quite successful and have transparent information
which are important for this comparative analysis. In fact, it is not easy to find priva-
tized SOEs which are listed on stock markets, operate in the same business sector, and
report sufficient information about its shareholders, governance schemes, and financial
performance. Although the listed firms are not the same in characteristics, comparative
observations on their performance during and after changing their ownership structure are
quite clear and informative. I believe that each case study can represent each ownership
structure and the message is expected to be consistent with the Principal-Agent theory,
the economic theory of the firm, and the findings of previous empirical studies.
Table 3.5: Summary of four case studies
Privatization
method
Success case Business
sector
Year of
privati-
zation
Listed
year
Year of
compari-
son
Total
assets
(Million
VND)
One domestic
dominant
shareholder
(Case A)
An Giang Fish-
eries Import Ex-
port JSC (AGF)
Food Manu-
facturing and
Processing
2001 2002 2010 126,223
One foreign
dominant
shareholder
(Case B)
Thanh Cong
Textile Garment
Investment
Trading JSC
(TCM)
Textile gar-
ment Prod-
ucts Manu-
facturing
2006 2007 2010 638,202
Mass outside
shareholders
(Case C)
Song Da Indus-
try Trade JSC
(STP)
Metal, non-
metallic,
mineral man-
ufacturing
2003 2006 2010 38,704
Mass Inside
shareholders
(Case D)
Thai Binh
Cement JSC
(TBX)
Metal, non-
metallic,
mineral man-
ufacturing
2001 2008 2008 31,566
Source: Author
In general, the four listed firms operate as the model of joint stock company under the
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Figure 3.2: Corporate governance model of Joint Stock Company
Vietnamese Enterprises Law and other related laws (as Figure 3.2). General shareholders
meeting is the highest decision-making body of a joint stock company. The meeting
includes all shareholders who have voting rights. Board of Directors (BOD) is selected
by voting at the general shareholders meeting. BOD is led by a chairman and in charge
of executing all its rights on behalf of the company. Board of Management (BOM) is
the body nominated by BOD. BOM takes responsibility for operating company business
activities and implementing all its assigned rights and duties. BOD keeps in line with
BOM to come up with appropriate policies and decisions based on decisions of general
shareholder’s meetings. Chief executive officer (CEO) is the highest leader of BOM and
should not serve as a chairman of the BOD for governance effectiveness. Inspection
Committee (IC) is in charge of supervising all business operation and management scheme
of company on behalf of shareholders. IC closely coordinates with BOD and BOM in the
spirit of cooperation to make sure that they are following the directions and plans of the
company which are proposed at the meetings. Importantly, IC is required to operate
independently with both BOD and BOM.
Although governance structures of privatized firms are the same, the effective gov-
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ernance and efficient business operation are relatively different in association with their
ownership structures. The following parts present in detail about the link among owner-
ship structures, corporate governance, production improvement, new business activities,
and financial performance of four case studies.
3.4.1 A case of one domestic dominant shareholder
Overview
An Giang Fisheries Import Export joint stock company (referred as AGIFISH) was priva-
tized in Jun 2001 and listed one year right after the privatization process. The company
has been known as one of the most successful companies operating in aquaculture prod-
ucts, especially products of Basa fish. Controlling quality of exported products is the
process that the company conducts frequently. Its products are approved to export to
EU market and US market, and also conferred the HALAL certificate to export to in-
ternational Islamic communities. The company also received award certificates issued by
Vietnamese government and Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers
(VASEP).
Although, it was privatized in 2001, the government still held a dominant ownership
shares of the company from 2001 to 2007. In 2008, a private company, namely Hung
Vuong joint stock company (Hung Vuong JSC), became its dominant shareholder. Hung
Vuong JSC is known as one of the most successful private companies operating in the
same business sectors of AGIFISH. Two years later, Hung Vuong JSC held more than 50
percent of AGF charter capital. Currently, the percent of its charter capital held by Hung
Vuong JSC is about 80 percent as shown in Table 3.6.
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance
AGIFISH started to restructure its governance after two years of being dominated by
a private company. Table 3.17 shows the governance structure of three main bodies
of the company. Before the ownership structure was turned to be dominated by one
domestic shareholder, the chairman has also served as the chief executive officer (CEO)
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Table 3.6: Ownership structure of a privatized SOE with one domestic dominant share-
holder
Year Shareholders structure Fraction
of Shares
2005 Largest Shareholder The state 20.00
Other major shareholder Wareham Group Limited 16.61
PXP Vietnam Fun Limited 9.82
Sacombank 5.45
Sub-total 31.88
Other shareholders Foreign 14.04
Domestic 34.08
Sub-total 48.12
Total 100.00
2008 Largest Shareholder Hung Vuong JSC 21.60
Other major shareholder The state 8.19
Vietnam Emerging Equity Fund Ltd 7.12
PXP Vietnam Fun Limited 7.07
Sub-total 22.38
Other shareholders Foreign 5.68
Domestic 50.34
Sub-total 56.02
Total 100.00
2010 Largest Shareholder Hung Vuong JSC 51.08
Other major shareholder The state 8.19
Other shareholders Foreign 4.31
Domestic 36.42
Sub-total 40.73
Total 100.00
2015 Largest Shareholder Hung Vuong JSC 79.58
Other major shareholder The state 8.24
Other shareholders Foreign 0.00
Domestic 12.18
Sub-total 12.18
Total 100.00
Source: Author’s synthesis
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and nearly 80 percent of the BOD members were standing managers. In 2010, a new CEO
was appointed as a result of changing ownership structure. The CEO and the chairman
are not the same person until now. Moreover, the number of BOD members were also
reduced from 11 to 5 in this year. The IC body had 2 out of 3 external members. This
management structure has still been maintained. New divisions such as risk management
division and legislation department for better managerial performance were established
under the new governance scheme. However, it took almost two years to change the board
of management after full privatization.
In terms of decision-making, AGIFISH has had long-term development strategies and
annual operation plans since 2008 when it was controlled by a dominant domestic share-
holder. Particularly, the company, in 2008, documented the long-term direction for five
years with the aim of enhancing management capacity and human resources; investing
to enlarge production scope and diversify products; promoting the company’s trademark;
expanding business linkages; and building an effective governance structure. The com-
pany was forced to consolidate its management body for achieving better its performance
in the future.
As a consequence of restructuring management scheme, there are a number of new
investment and upgrading activities in its production and business operation since 2010.
For example, the company has invested in new equipment and technology for promoting
value-added products, diversifying exported products, and upgrading production tech-
niques and process. The company has operated new business areas and also joined with
other companies to open two new affiliates. In 2015, the company increased its charter
capital by nearly double from VND128 billion in 2010 up to VND281 billion. Additionally,
the company has paid its attention to enhance the linkage with fish farmers in order to
stabilize the quality and quantity of raw ingredients as well as to avoid imbalance between
processing and breeding. The new board members have focused on promoting services
and searching new potential markets, but not much invested in research and development
activities.
The company has relatively achieved higher profitability and better financial leverage
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after two years of its ownership structure becoming concentrated (see Table 3.19). For
instance, as a result of enhancing governance efficiency and improving business operations,
its annual sales growth slightly increases on average from 15.36 percent in the period
of 2005-2009 to 17.86 percent in the period 2010-20141. However, its profit margin,
measured by the ratio of gross/net profits before income tax to total revenue, was not
much different between the two periods. Its ROA and ROE ratios were less efficient in
the later period. The company’s financial leverages do not perform better than before
restructuring governance scheme, except long-term debt ratio.
3.4.2 A case of one foreign dominant shareholder
Overview
Thanh Cong Textile Garment Investment Trading Joint Stock Company (refered as
ThanhCong) is known as a successful case in textile and garment manufacturing sectors.
ThanhCong was one of the affiliates of Vietnam Textile and Garment Group (Vinatex)
and was selected to be privatized in July, 2006. After that, ThanhCong’s share has offi-
cially listed on Hochiminh Stock Exchange (HOSE) since October, 2007. The company
was completely privatized in 2013.
The government had gradually released its ownership shares of ThanhCong to pri-
vate investors. In 2008, Vinatex was the largest shareholder holding 26.46 percent of
ThanhCong’s charter capital. One year later, E-land Asia Holdings Pte.,Ltd, as a strate-
gic foreign investor, bought ThanhCong’s shares and became as the largest shareholder of
ThanhCong holding 37.67 percent of total its ownership shares. The percentage of state-
owned shares reduced from 11.71 percent in 2009 to zero percent in 2013. Currently,
E-land Asia Holdings is one of many famous companies in fashion and textile industry in
Korea, which holds 43.23 percent of ThanhCong’s shares.
1I do not use the 2015 value because the company has changed its fiscal year report in December to
September since 2015
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Table 3.7: Ownership structure of a privatized SOE with one foreign dominant shareholder
Year Shareholders structure Fraction
of Shares
2008 Largest Shareholder Vietnam Textitle and Garment Group 26.46
Other major shareholder
Other shareholders Foreign 7.68
Domestic 65.86
Sub-total 73.54
Total 100.00
2009 Largest Shareholder Eland Asia Holding Pte.ltd 37.67
Other major shareholder The state 11.71
Other shareholders Foreign 3.97
Domestic 46.65
Sub-total 50.62
Total 100.00
2015 Largest Shareholder Eland Asia Holding Pte.ltd 43.23
Other major shareholder
Other shareholders Foreign 5.76
Domestic 51.01
Sub-total 56.77
Total 100.00
Source: Author’s synthesis
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Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance
ThanhCong has improved its managerial performance right after the foreign investor, E-
land Asia Holdings, bought nearly 40 percent of total its ownership shares in 2009. The
largest shareholder’s representatives have been assigned as members of the company’s
BOD and BOM. As showing in Table 3.17, the three main bodies, BOD, BOM, and
IC were immediately changed when E-land Asia Holdings became as a dominant share-
holder of the company. These bodies were relatively stable within 5 years after changing
ownership structure.
As a common expectation, the company started to restructure its organization struc-
ture and management system in 2009. To simplify organization structure, the managers
rearranged or transferred employees based on their management skills and strong ability.
They have had more authority to be more proactive in handling their work and more
responsibility. To improve the management system, the company has used the Balanced
Scorecard (BSC)2 to manage its mission and plans. They have also applied the Enterprise
resource planning (ERP)3 system to increase the financial statement transparency, to en-
hance the management efficiency, and to control the production process. Furthermore,
the evaluation system and the reward policy were improved under the new management
scheme.
The company designed a comprehensive growth strategy in mid-term and long-term
after the year of transferring more than 37 percent of its ownership shares to the for-
eign institute. The strategy documents that the company, in the mid-term, will focus
on its current core business line which is garment and weaving manufacturing. In the
long-run, the company will entrant into fashion business which has higher value-added
products. In order to realize its objectives and development plans, upgrading research
and development capacity is a necessary condition to become a original design manufac-
turer. Furthermore, the company will run real estate projects when the market turns into
2BSC is a strategy performance management tool to identify and improve various internal functions
of a business and their resulting external outcomes. It is used to measure and provide feedback to
organizations.
3ERP is business process management software that allows an organization to use a system of in-
tegrated applications to manage the business and automate many back-up office functions related to
technology, services, and human resources
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a beneficial investment channel.
The company began connecting with domestic and foreign companies to develop its
technologies and methods of production after its governance scheme was restructured
in 2009. At the same time, the company has also invested in upgrading machineries
and factories, doing new business lines, joining to set up new affiliates. Currently, the
company has four subsidiaries and four affiliates. The company often searches for new
export markets, renews product items, and develops research and development activities.
The company also set up risk management division and R&D center.
As a result of ownership structure changing and corporate governance improvement,
the financial performance has significantly improved. Table 3.19 shows that, on average,
the profitability such as annual sales growth, net profit margin, ROA, and ROE increased
approximately by 0.74 percentage points, 2.33 percentage points, 3.64 percentage points,
and 6.89 percentage points, respectively. The level of operating efficiency has been rela-
tively improved, especially long-term debt ratio turned into the rank from 0.3 to 0.5 for
well-managed companies.
3.4.3 A case of mass outside shareholders
Overview
Song Da Industry Trade joint stock company (formerly Song Da Packaging Company), re-
ferred as SongDa, was a member of Vietnam Industry Construction Corporation (VNIC),
one of the leading corporations in construction fields. The company officially operated
as a joint stock company in April, 2003 and changed to the current name in 2007. The
company’s core-business is producing cement packages, PP woven fabric, and PP agri-
cultural bag. With the new business registration certificate issued in 2007, the company
started to diversify its business, including exploiting and processing minerals, investing
in construction and infrastructure, importing machineries, and trading services.
The SongDa’s share was officially listed on the stock market in 2006. However, the
ownership of SongDa has been dispersed to outsiders four year later (see Table 3.8). This
is a very important turning point for the company to create a flexible mechanism of
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decision-making. At the end of 2015, one of general deputy director holds about 7.35
percent of SongDa’s charter capital. Currently, the company is well-known not only in
packing products but also in the field of construction and infrastructure.
Table 3.8: Ownership structure of a privatized SOE with mass outside shareholders
Year Shareholders structure Fraction
of Shares
2006 Largest Shareholder The state 27.25
Other major shareholder
Other shareholders Foreign 0.00
Domestic 72.75
Sub-total 72.75
Total 100.00
2008 Largest Shareholder The state 5.23
Other major shareholder
Other shareholders Foreign 3.17
Domestic 91.60
Sub-total 94.77
Total 100.00
2010 Largest Shareholder Pham Hong Duong (outsider) 5.32
Other shareholders Foreign 1.70
Domestic 92.98
Sub-total 94.68
Treasury stocks 0.00
Total 100.00
2015 Largest Shareholder Nguyen Trong Loi 7.36
Other major shareholder
Other shareholders Foreign 2.90
Domestic 76.40
Sub-total 79.30
Treasury stocks 13.34
Total 100.00
Source: Author’s synthesis
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance
The company started to gradually improve its organization structure and management
scheme since the government relinquished its control over the company in 2010. New
divisions for effective governance were slowly created. The CEO was immediately changed
in this year. However, with mass outside shareholders, the chairman and the CEO were
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changed several times within five years. This is one of big challenges for enhancing
governance effectiveness, and consequently for implementing development plans of the
company. Furthermore, an internal management legislation for business operation and
governance has not conducted yet. A long-term strategy has not been documented yet
since the year of full privatization. Long-term development objectives documented in its
annual reports were not clearly specified.
Therefore, the production and business operation have not significantly improved,
although the company has frequently controlled product quality and designed annual
production plans. In addition, there is lack of investment in research and development
activities. Investments in upgrading and improving production technologies and/or pro-
cesses are not sufficient for the company to be success in a high-level market competition.
Unlike the two previous cases, SongDa started to operate in new business lines several
times without increasing its charter capital after being completely privatized, such as ex-
ploring and processing minerals, building civil infrastructure, and importing equipment
and machineries. These new business operation have not been successful and currently
one of its new subsidiaries has to be temporally closed due to nonprofitable performance.
By looking at its performance before and after turning into dispersed ownership struc-
ture, the company has relatively been less profitable. Notably, the annual growth rate
and the return on equity, on average, decreased by 9.3 percentage points and 12.46 per-
centage points, respectively, from the period 2009-2015 to the period 2006-2008 (see Table
3.19). Regarding financial leverages, its liquidity and debt to equity ratio were relatively
unchanged while the ratio of tangibility and liabilities to total assets were decreased.
3.4.4 A case of mass inside shareholders
Overview
ThaiBinh Cement joint stock company (refered as ThaiBinh), was established in 1979. It
began to operate as a joint stock company in 2001. The company operates in the field
of construction materials manufacturing, specifically cement. ThaiBinh is well known as
the only one producer of White Portland Cement in Vietnam. The products are used not
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only in civil construction but also in mastic manufacturing and painting. The company
also trades clinker and white Portland cement with other countries.
ThaiBinh is one of many SOEs that were privatized by management-employee buyouts
method, in which all its state-owned shares were sold to its insiders. After 2010, there
are some individuals who bought ThaiBinh’s shares and became as shareholders holding
less than 10 percent of total its ownership shares (see Table 3.9). The company had
no significant shareholders who have strong motivation to conduct restructuring process
after full privatization. By the end of 2015, one domestic individual bought more than
23 percent of its total ownership shares and became as a dominant shareholder of the
company. However, he were not as an executive member of the company during the
comparison period of 2006-2015.
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance
The top management bodies have been unchanged after the company’s state-owned shares
were sold to its managers and employees (see Table 3.17). After six years of full priva-
tization, the company first changed the CEO in 2014. However, the chairman has still
served as the role of CEO, which is not recommendable for well-management. As a result,
there was no investment in establishment of new divisions for improving effectiveness of
management until 2015. They also designed mid- and long-term development strategies
for the company. In fact, the strategies could not be realizable without active policy
implications and governance effectiveness. It is not surprising that technologies and pro-
cesses of production have not been upgraded or improved in the post-privatization period
of 2009-2015. With unchanged its charter capital, there has been no investment in doing
new business activities or setting new affiliates since 2008, even in doing research and
development activities.
As similar performance of the privatized firm having mass outside shareholders, the
company has performed less profitability after being fully privatized to its insiders. For
instance, annual sales growth and ROE in the 2009-2015 post-privatization period were
much worse off than those in the pre-privatization period of 2006-2008 (see Table 3.19).
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Table 3.9: Ownership structure of a privatized SOE with mass inside shareholders
Year Shareholders structure Fraction of Shares
2008 Major shareholders
Insider shareholders Board of Director 9.55
Board of Suppervisor 2.27
Employees 88.18
Total 100.00
2010 Major shareholders Nguyen Van Quan (outsider) 6.00
Dinh Thu Trang (outsider) 5.34
Sub-total 11.34
Other shareholders Foreign 0.00
Domestic 88.66
Sub-total 88.66
Total 100.00
2014 Major shareholders Nguyen Huu Ben 9.27
Dinh Thu Trang (outsider) 5.34
Sub-total 14.61
Other shareholders Foreign 0.00
Domestic 85.39
Sub-total 85.39
Total 100.00
2015 Major shareholders Vu Tien Nghia (outsider) 23.17
Nguyen Minh Thanh (outsider) 5.63
Sub-total 28.80
Other shareholders Foreign 0.00
Domestic 71.20
Sub-total 71.20
Total 100.00
Source: Author’s synthesis
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Financial leverages were likely unchanged compared with those in the 2006-2008 period
when the company’s ownership was converted to dispersed structure. Thus, ineffective
governance scheme resulting from dispersed ownership structure is considered as a main
reason for less, even worse off, improvement of the company’s performance after full-
privatization.
3.4.5 Discussion
In short, Section 3.4 looks at the linkage of ownership structure, corporate governance,
production and business operation, and financial performance of four Vietnamese priva-
tized SOEs before and after its ownership structure transition. These four case studies
confirm that privatized firms with greater degree of ownership concentration have per-
formed more profitable and productive in post-privatization period than those having
dispersed ownership structure. Generally, there are seven main characteristics observed
from the above comparative analysis as shown in Table 3.10.
First, privatized SOEs with greater degree of private ownership concentration are im-
mediately change its BOD and BOM right after full privatization compared with those
having dispersed ownership structure. Furthermore, the BOD and BOM are not changed
frequently and quite stable in medium-term while privatized firms owned by mass share-
holders change its BOD and BOM frequently or relatively late in post-privatization period.
Second, the speed of governance improvement is quickly in privatized firms having con-
centrated ownership structure, but is slowly in privatized firms with ownership dispersion.
Particularly, firms which have concentrated ownership strucure after completely privati-
zation programs gradually set up new divisions and quickly updates internal regulations,
evaluation system, and reward policies.
Third, fast decision-making is another advantage deriving from greater degree of own-
ership concentration. In other words, privatized SOEs are more likely to experience slug-
gish decision-making if its ownership structure is formed as dispersion after privatization.
Four, ownership concentration leads to better firm’s production improvement in post-
privatization period. Privatized firms with concentrated ownership structure frequently
121
Table 3.10: Summary of four privatized SOEs in post-privatization period
No Observations Ownership concentration Ownership dispersion
1 Speed of changing
BOD and BOM
Immediately and relatively
stable within 5 years
Slowly with mass inside
shareholders, but quickly
and frequently with mass
outside shareholders
2 Speed of enhancing
governance effective-
ness
Quick enhancement, for in-
stance gradually setting up
new divisions and quickly
updating internal regulations,
evaluation system, and reward
policies
Slow enhancement, even no
new division establishment
for effective governance
3 Speed of decision-
making
Fast decision-making Sluggish decision-making
4 Production improve-
ment
Quickly and frequently invest-
ment in equipment, machiner-
ies, technologies, and factories
Gradually improve pro-
duction processes, upgrate
technologies, and rarely
invest in new technogolies
and factories
5 Business activities Opening new business lines
and new affiliates which are
successful
Almost no investment on
doing new business lines
and setting new affiliates
6 Long-term develop-
ment strategy
The strategy is clear and real-
izable in line with its annual
action plans
Relatively general and
infeasible without action
plans
7 Financial performance Significant improvement in
post-privatization period
Worse off than before full
privatization
Source: Author
122
improve its production processes and gradually invest in new equipment, machineries,
technologies, and factories.
Five, privatized firms with great degree of ownership concentration are associated with
success of opening new business lines and affiliates.
Six, long-term development strategies of privatized SOEs with ownership concentration
are quite clear and realizable in line with its annual action plans. By contrast, privatized
SOEs with ownership dispersion normally formulate a general and infeasible strategy
without specified action plans.
Seven, financial performance has significantly improved in post-privatization period as
a result of effective corporate governance and production improvement which are partly
generated by concentrated ownership structure. Therefore, privatization which leads to
great degree of ownership concentration is recommended for archiving superior firm per-
formance in Vietnam and developing countries.
3.5 Conclusion
The chapter investigates the relation between ownership structure and firm performance
in the post-privatization period of 2003-2015 in Vietnam. Using the instrumental vari-
ables to control the endogeneity of ownership, the estimated results conclude that priva-
tized SOEs with greater degree of ownership concentration have significantly improved
its performance compared with those having mass private shareholders or without major
shareholders. The four case studies show that privatized firms could quickly conduct in-
ternal restructuring process for better governance scheme if they were privatized in the
form of concentrated ownership structure. The main reason is that privatized firms with
dispersed ownership structure could not conduct its governance restructuring, production
process, and business operation. Thus, privatization with the aim of generating greater
degree of ownership concentration is recommended for developing countries in general and
for Vietnam in particular. Additionally, privatization methods of MBO and MEBO which
commonly do not generate firm’s restructuring are also not recommended.
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Appendix 3
Table 3.11: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance
(Herfindahl index of the three largest private shareholders who own at least 5%)
Panel A: First stage of 2SLS
The Herfindahl index Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Privatization timing 3.386*** 3.145*** 3.145*** 2.620**
(1.060) (0.950) (0.950) (1.110)
Privatization method -3.801*** -3.752*** -3.752*** -3.863***
(1.090) (1.120) (1.120) (1.100)
CEO and chairman are not 2.947*** 2.934*** 2.934*** 3.148***
the same person (0.890) (0.890) (0.890) (0.920)
Proportion of outside directors -1.350 -1.170 -1.170 -0.840
(2.050) (1.920) (1.920) (2.070)
Changing CEO 5.046*** 4.842*** 4.842*** 4.711***
(0.970) (1.080) (1.080) (0.960)
Log(Total assets) -0.27 -0.36 -0.36 -0.15
(0.400) (0.420) (0.420) (0.420)
Foreign 2.058* 2.275* 2.275* 1.32
(1.140) (1.170) (1.170) (1.260)
Institute 4.237*** 4.228*** 4.228*** 3.937***
(1.360) (1.370) (1.370) (1.330)
Firm experience 0.198*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.207***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Debt to equity ratio 0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.010)
Sdv (ROA) -20.084*
(11.250)
Constant 2.880 3.950 3.950 2.310
(5.870) (5.860) (5.860) (6.030)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.12: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance
(Herfindahl index of the three largest private shareholders who own at least 5%)
Panel B: Second stage of 2SLS
The Herfindahl index Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Ownership Concentration 0.031** 0.006* 2.564** 0.149**
(0.016) (0.003) (1.064) (0.058)
CEO and chairman are not 0.249** 0.02 1.069 0.201
the same person (0.105) (0.018) (5.135) (0.280)
Proportion of outside directors -0.075 -0.028 -8.178 0.121
(0.148) (0.025) (7.843) (0.369)
Changing CEO -0.236* -0.066*** -16.459*** -1.310***
(0.126) (0.020) (5.477) (0.413)
Log(Total assets) 0.104*** 0.026*** 8.585*** 0.365***
(0.032) (0.007) (2.592) (0.130)
Foreign -0.202* -0.007 -15.498* -0.016
(0.119) (0.023) (8.361) (0.277)
Institute -0.353*** -0.032* -17.964** -0.684*
(0.134) (0.019) (8.311) (0.364)
Firm experience -0.006 0.000 -0.215 -0.040***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.221) (0.015)
Debt to equity ratio -0.000*** -0.081
0.000 (0.051)
Sdv (ROA) 15.526**
(5.985)
Constant -0.338 -0.268*** -91.060*** -4.913**
(0.418) (0.090) (29.934) (1.942)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R2 -0.086 -0.217 -0.112 -0.349
F statistic 12.216 10.35 10.34 12.25
(weak identification test)
Hansen J statistic 1.615 2.529 0.197 1.938
P-value 0.204 0.112 0.657 0.164
(overidentification test of all in-
struments)
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.13: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance (the
percentage of shares held by the largest private shareholder who owns at least 5%)
Panel A: First stage of 2SLS
The largest shareholder Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Privatization timing 5.717*** 5.601*** 5.601*** 4.448**
(1.736) (1.654) (1.654) (1.797)
Privatization method -6.326*** -6.303*** -6.303*** -6.429***
(1.662) (1.703) (1.703) (1.688)
CEO and chairman are not the
same person
4.278*** 4.272*** 4.272*** 4.612***
(1.542) (1.545) (1.545) (1.553)
Proportion of outside directors -4.259 -4.174 -4.174 -3.406
(3.369) (3.292) (3.292) (3.397)
Changing CEO 8.774*** 8.675*** 8.675*** 8.218***
(1.613) (1.782) (1.782) (1.619)
Log(Total assets) -0.369 -0.408 -0.408 -0.17
(0.703) (0.734) (0.734) (0.744)
Foreign 4.258** 4.363** 4.363** 3.042
(2.117) (2.168) (2.168) (2.259)
Institute 6.458*** 6.454*** 6.454*** 5.961***
(2.025) (2.034) (2.034) (1.988)
Firm experience 0.353*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.367***
(0.071) (0.067) (0.067) (0.073)
Debt to equity ratio 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Sdv (ROA) -33.259*
(19.249)
Constant 11.178 11.692 11.692 10.241
(10.362) (10.451) (10.451) (10.619)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.3 0.297 0.297 0.305
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.14: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance (the
percentage of shares held by the largest private shareholder who owns at least 5%)
Panel B: Second stage of 2SLS
The largest shareholder Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Ownership concentration 0.018* 0.003* 1.483** 0.089**
(0.009) (0.002) (0.628) (0.035)
CEO and chairman are not the
same person
0.262** 0.023 2.212 0.258
(0.108) (0.017) (5.116) (0.295)
Proportion of outside directors -0.039 -0.021 -5.119 0.297
(0.154) (0.027) (7.877) (0.401)
Changing CEO -0.240* -0.066*** -16.827*** -1.337***
(0.129) (0.021) (5.692) (0.432)
Log(Total assets) 0.102*** 0.025*** 8.307*** 0.357***
(0.032) (0.007) (2.592) (0.132)
Foreign -0.217* -0.008 -16.202* -0.088
(0.124) (0.023) (8.742) (0.302)
Institute -0.340*** -0.029 -16.746** -0.628*
(0.131) (0.018) (7.986) (0.356)
Firm experience -0.007 0 -0.243 -0.042**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.243) (0.016)
Debt to equity ratio -0.000*** -0.078
(0.000) (0.051)
Sdv (ROA) 15.526**
(6.049)
Constant -0.455 -0.286*** -98.827*** -5.485***
(0.441) (0.094) (32.156) (2.073)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R2 -0.077 -0.187 -0.095 -0.334
F statistic (weak identification
test)
11.89 10.81 10.81 12.08
Hansen J statistic 1.677 2.81 0.296 2.497
P-value 0.195 0.094 0.586 0.114
(overidentification test of all in-
struments)
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.15: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance (Cu-
mulative percentage shares of the three largest private shareholders who own at least
5%)
Panel A: First stage of 2SLS
Cumulative percentage shares Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Privatization timing 12.077*** 12.039*** 12.039*** 10.998***
(2.300) (2.337) (2.337) (2.381)
Privatization method -6.094** -6.086** -6.086** -6.181**
(2.563) (2.570) (2.570) (2.599)
CEO and chairman are not the
same person
2.267 2.265 2.265 2.551
(2.282) (2.292) (2.292) (2.341)
Proportion of outside directors 8.989** 9.016** 9.016** 9.714**
(4.510) (4.531) (4.531) (4.579)
Changing CEO 11.684*** 11.652*** 11.652*** 11.211***
(2.153) (2.335) (2.335) (2.167)
Log(Total assets) -0.987 -1.000 -1.000 -0.818
(1.081) (1.121) (1.121) (1.140)
Foreign 8.780*** 8.814** 8.814** 7.746**
(3.337) (3.480) (3.480) (3.468)
Institute 11.020*** 11.019*** 11.019*** 10.597***
(2.866) (2.873) (2.873) (2.827)
Firm experience 0.415*** 0.414*** 0.414*** 0.427***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
Debt to equity ratio 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Sdv (ROA) -28.286
(29.829)
Constant 21.988 22.156 22.156 21.192
(15.477) (15.924) (15.924) (15.804)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R-squared 0.351 0.348 0.348 0.351
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.16: The impact of ownership structure on fully-privatized SOE performance (Cu-
mulative percentage shares of the three largest private shareholders who own at least
5%)
Panel B: Second stage of 2SLS
Cumulative percentage shares Tobin Q ROA ROE Return labor
Ownership concentration 0.003 0.001 0.666* 0.039**
(0.005) (0.001) (0.367) (0.016)
CEO and chairman are not the
same person
0.332*** 0.035** 6.666 0.534*
(0.118) (0.015) (4.207) (0.289)
Proportion of outside directors -0.143 -0.042* -17.986* -0.455
(0.148) (0.025) (10.449) (0.332)
Changing CEO -0.13 -0.047*** -11.524*** -1.017***
(0.081) (0.013) (3.519) (0.309)
Log(Total assets) 0.102*** 0.025*** 8.632*** 0.385***
(0.028) (0.006) (2.803) (0.127)
Foreign -0.199* -0.005 -16.982* -0.169
(0.103) (0.020) (9.332) (0.277)
Institute -0.275*** -0.018 -15.390* -0.556*
(0.096) (0.013) (8.081) (0.321)
Firm experience -0.002 0.000 -0.014 -0.027**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.167) (0.011)
Debt to equity ratio -0.000*** -0.078
0.000 (0.054)
Sdv (ROA) 14.539**
(5.836)
Constant -0.394 -0.272*** -102.103*** -5.739***
(0.368) (0.088) (34.895) (1.997)
Observations 230 230 230 230
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.143 0.112 0.001
F statistic (weak identification
test)
15.12 14.62 14.62 13.59
Hansen J statistic 3.232 6.37 3.734 5.669
P-value 0.072 0.011 0.053 0.017
(overidentification test of all in-
struments)
Note: Robust normalized beta coefficients in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.3: The relation between Tobin’s Q and The Herfindahl index of the three largest
private shareholders
Source: Author
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Figure 3.4: The relation between Tobin’s Q and the percentage shares of the largest
private shareholder
Source: Author
Figure 3.5: The relation between Tobin’s Q and cumulative percentage shares of the three
largest private shareholders
Source: Author
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Chapter 4
Suggestions for Privatization
Strategy in Vietnam
Abstract
This chapter aims to suggest some guidelines on privatization plan, privatization imple-
mentation strategy, and a new privatization driver in Vietnam. These guidelines are
based on my empirical findings on different countries’ privatization experiences including
Vietnam. The first section presents some recommendation on what Vietnamese govern-
ment should consider regarding their formulation of rational privatization plans, such as
enforcing complete privatization programs, using methods of privatization which lead to
concentrated ownership structure, and attracting potential private investors. Further-
more, the government should pursue an appropriate implementation strategy in order to
effectively conduct privatization plans. For instance, a swift and comprehensive (Big-
Bang) strategy of privatization should be applied for SOEs and partially-privatized SOEs
which are operating in non-strategic sectors and have more or less than 50 percent of
state-owned shares; evolutionary strategy is suggested for downsizing state ownership of
SEGs and SGCs operating in non-natural monopoly sectors; and triggering strategy in line
with creating more diversified private owners is recommended for privatization of SOEs
operating in natural monopoly sectors. Creating a new privatization driver as presented
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in the last section is the most important factors in order to implement privatization plans
in more efficient ways.
4.1 Privatization plan
As documented in the previous three chapters, many countries including Vietnam have
benefited from privatization programs since the governments’ control over firms’ operation
has been relinquished. Notably, the findings of Chapter 2 confirm that the more state-
owned shares sold to private investors, the better post-privatization performance of Viet-
namese firms can be. In other words, fully-privatized SOEs with higher probability to be
restructured after privatization have performed much efficiently than partially-privatized
ones. Therefore, Vietnamese government should continue relinquishing its control over en-
terprises in non-strategic sectors. As documented in Chapter 1, privatization in Vietnam
has recently experienced many limitations which could not be completely addressed with-
out a comprehensive privatization strategy. The following directions should be seriously
considered by the government when they formulate privatization plans.
First, all SOEs which are operating in non-strategic sectors and partially-privatized
SOEs should be completely privatized. In fact, privatization of Vietnamese SOEs was
not successful in terms of the percent of state-owned shares sold to private investors. In
recent years, the government has still retained a significant ownership shares of partially-
privatized SOEs to maintain its influence on these firms. For instance, according to the
Vietnam Enterprise Census, about 30 percent of equitized SOEs had over 50 percent
of state-owned shares in 2014. Although the privatization plan of 20 state economic
groups and state general corporates (SGCs)1 was approved in 2015, the government set
to retain a dominant ownership in these enterprises. Obviously, these enterprises are
less likely to be restructured which is necessary to improve corporate governance scheme;
consequently, are less likely to achieve superior performance after partial privatization.
Thus, relinquishing state-owned shares of enterprises which are operating in non-strategic
1SGCs are defined as large-sized SOEs established in strategically important sectors either under the
Prime Minister or under other line ministries or provincial committees
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sectors should be continued in a more efficient way and downsizing state ownership of
SEGs and SGCs should be pushed.
Second, privatization with concentrated ownership structure should be applied. A con-
centrated ownership structure is recommended for privatized SOEs to push a major re-
structuring process, creating an efficient corporate governance scheme, and increasing
transparent business operation after privatization. As documented in Chapter 3, priva-
tized SOEs with greater ownership concentration have significantly improved its perfor-
mance, comparing with those with diversified public owners and without major share-
holders.
Third, privatization with the aim of attracting potential private investors who have
sufficient capital and prospective capacity for firm’s restructuring should be seriously con-
sidered. In fact, privatization in Vietnam have not attracted many prospective buyers
because of lacking regulatory framework, less percentage of state-owned shares of a firm
sold to private investors, poor corporate governance and performance, and less trans-
parency of privatization process. As a result, there is less possibility for improving its
governance and performance. In addition, some partially-privatized firms in which the
state still holds a dominant ownership, even SOEs, are treated as potential investors for
privatizing another SOE. This method does not lead to firm’s restructuring after priva-
tization. It simply transfers state ownership from one SOE to other partially-privatized
firms which have still been controlled by the state. Thus, partially-privatized SOEs in
which the state has still been as a dominant shareholder should not be considered as
potential buyers for privatizing other firms. This may be allowed only when they have
to serve public functions that do not attract private investors. Foreign investors and big
domestic companies can be potential private investors, especially foreign investors who
can offer more knowledge and technology transfers. The government is advised to attract
more potential private investors to privatization programs, who can pursue their commit-
ment on operating in the same core-business of firms and conduct firm’s restructuring for
better performance in post-privatization period.
Fourth, privatization plans should set clear measures and deadlines which need to
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be enforced by a driver of privatization. Setting clear deadlines and measures is very
important factors to push for privatization process swift and successful. In fact, the
speed of privatization process in Vietnam has recently been quite slow because many
privatization programs have already been delayed several times. It is necessary to set
clear deadlines and appropriate measures for privatization to achieve comprehensive.
Fifth, privatization plans should define a clear method of firms’ assets and liabilities
evaluation to set precise selling price of state stakes (which is referred as face value). In
fact, defining face value of state stakes is one of specific bottlenecks of privatization in
Vietnam. In many cases of privatization, face values have been defined at much lower than
market price, which induces less financial contribution to the state budget. Therefore, it
is very important to conduct a clear method to set face value before implementation of
privatization plans.
Sixth, privatization plans should have wide public supports on the basis of full infor-
mation disclosure. Lack of full information disclosure is a major hindrance to the public
or potential investors to involve in the privatization process. The government therefore
is advised to promulgate a strong regulation (such as Act or Law) for widely publicizing
privatization plans and outcomes.
4.2 Implementation strategy
As mentioned in Part 4 of Chapter 1, Vietnamese government started to implement priva-
tization programs very carefully with fear that these programs can lead to radical political
reform. Only 23 SOEs were privatized after 7-year implementation of privatization. With
the success of the pilot program, the government has expanded the programs since 1999
with the aim of successfully transferring to market economy. There were 4.430 SOEs that
had been privatized by the end of 2015. The government has applied a gradual strat-
egy to privatize these firms. At the first step, the government has still held a significant
percentage of ownership of privatized firms and later gradually sold its ownership to pri-
vate investors. The percentage of state-owned shares sold to private sectors was different
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across privatization programs and business sectors. In other words, SOEs were priva-
tized gradually. It seems that the government continued to apply the gradual strategy
to implement privatization plans. Although privatizing SOEs step by step could avoid
some risks resulting from relinquishing state’s control on them, the strategy recently has
induced some limitations. For instance, the speed of privatization process has been quite
low. Privatization programs have not attracted potential investors who are able to lead
firm’s restructuring process for improvements of post-privatization performance since the
government set to retain a significant percentage of ownership shares of many large sized
SOEs after privatization. Privatization has not significantly enhanced market compe-
tition which is one of important factors to boost economic growth. Basically, gradual
implementation strategy depends on personal decision that is based on their analysis of
privatization progress.
Therefore, this section aims to suggest how and when privatization plans should be
conducted in an efficient way. By referring four types of implementation strategy docu-
mented by Park Jin (2010), I suggest three types of implementation strategy as showed
in Table 4.1 for further efficient privatization in Vietnam. As my point of view, the types
of implementation strategy in Vietnam depend on whether firms are SOEs or partial-
privatized SOEs, and which industries of firms are operating.
As for SOEs and partial-privatized SOEs operating in non-strategic sectors with more
or less than 50 percent of state-owned shares, swift and comprehensive (Big-Bang) pri-
vatization is a rational implementation strategy. This strategy requires integration of
ministries and line ministries. By conducting privatization programs for these firms im-
mediately and at the same time, an effective market competition will be created.
As for SEGs and SGCs operating in non-natural monopoly sectors, evolutionary strat-
egy should be applied for the government to gradually relinquish its controls over these
firms. In the first stage of privatization plans, they should privatize its member firms
which operate in its non-core businesses, then privatize in its core functions. In case,
its core functions are public functions which should remain as SOEs, privatizing function
by function should be applied for their affiliations. At the same time, diversification in
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non-core business sectors of SEGs and SGCs should be prohibited, unless these sectors
serve public functions which do not attract private investors.
As for SOEs operating in natural monopoly sectors, privatization all at one time would
lead to private monopoly power. Thus, triggering strategy in line with creating more di-
versify private owners is recommended to avoid the risk of a private monopoly. SOEs in
the same natural monopoly sectors should be quickly and fully privatizes one by one. In
other words, full-privatized SOEs and SOEs in the same natural monopoly sectors will
operate simultaneously in the market at the first stage of privatization plan. As conse-
quently, the privatized SOE has no chance to become a private monopoly. Furthermore,
SOEs in the same natural monopoly sectors should be privatized to some potential private
investors who have less probability to take-over other privatized SOEs and later become
a monopoly.
Table 4.1: Recommended types of implementation strategy for SOEs privatization in
Vietnam
Comprehensive Piece-meal
Quickly Big-Bang strategy for partially-
privatized SOEs and SOEs in non-
strategic sectors
Triggering strategy for
SOEs in natural monopoly
sectors
Step by step Evolutionary strategy for SEGs and
SGCs in non-natural monopoly sectors
Gradual strategy
Source: Author’s suggestions (referring four types of implementation strategy suggested by Park Jin
(2010))
Additionally, to attract potential private investors, corporate governance improvement
and information disclosure before privatization programs are the key to effective privati-
zation. Concerning corporate governance improvement, the government should follow the
OECD competitive neutrality guideline to ensure a level playing field for both public and
private enterprises. The competitive neutrality guidelines are conducted by the OECD
(2012) and designed how to streamline the operational form of government business, to
identify the direct costs of any given function, to achieve a commercial rate of return, to
account for public service obligations, and to obtain tax neutrality, regulatory neutrality,
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debt neutrality and outright subsidies, public procurement. Good corporate governance of
enterprises is an effective way to enhance their valuation and performance; consequently,
to make them more attractive to potential private investors. It is an important pre-
requisite for successful privatizing enterprises. As for attracting foreign investment, the
government may consider to increase the percent of state-owned shares of a firm sold to
a foreign investor to above 49 percent. Regarding information disclosure, the government
is advised to promulgate a strong regulation (such as Act or Law) on privatization as a
powerful tool to inspect and supervise the governance of SOEs. The Korean Act on the
Managerial Structure Improvement and Privatization of Public Enterprises in 1997 and
the revised version of the Act in 2008 are valuable examples to create a public disclosure
system.
4.3 Establishing a privatization driver
Establishing a privatization driver is extremely important for implementing privatization
strategy in the right way. The most important issue has been that privatization plans
should be implemented by whom. By referring the guideline of Park (2010)2 to establish
a reform leading organization and looking at the current situation of privatization in
Vietnam, a privatization driver must have the following features:
First, the privatization driver should have more incentives to push for privatization
process quickly. The reason behind is that the more incentives resulting from privatization,
the more efforts to push for privatization process quickly. Ministries and line ministries
are obviously not willing to relinquish its controls over their firms which give them many
benefits. On the other hand, the representatives of state ownership of SOEs, even of
partial-privatized SOEs, do not want to lose their benefits from these firms, unless they
have big benefits resulting from selling state-owned shares to the public. Thus, they may
2Park Jin (2010) suggests seven important features for establishing a reform driver which are: (1) It
should be a permanent body; (2) The reform should be a core function of the reform driver; (3) The
reform driver is directly under the President, the head of administration; (4) The reform driver should
have a diverse composition of staff comprised of both career civil servants and non-government sector
workers; (5) The reform-leading organization must have a flexible organizational structure; (6) The reform
driver should have a wide spectrum of responsibility, but without specifically being assigned a task; (7)
The reform driver should have a built-in consensus-building process.
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delay the speed of privatization process, even disclose privatization information due to
group interests.
Second, the privatization driver should not induce any conflict of group interests among
ministries and line ministries. This is a crucial feature for privatization to be successful.
In fact, enforcing privatization may cause many conflicts of interest within ministries
and line ministries. They could not address all potential their conflicts of interest by
themselves. As a result, they may conduct privatization in an inefficient way which
contribute less to the state budget.
Third, the privatization driver should be established as a temporary body within a
permanent organization. With the aim of quickly implementing privatization strategy,
the privatization driver will exit after complete privatization programs. If the government
creates a new privatization driver which is considered as permanent organization, its staffs
are not willing to put their efforts on completing all privatization programs. They may
delay the process to maintain their jobs and benefits. The privatization driver thus should
be considered as a temporary body, which belongs to a permanent organization. After
completing privatization process, the body’s staffs will go back their previous jobs, and
consequently have less incentives to delay the process.
Fourth, the privatization driver should comprise government officers, governmental
and non-governmental experts who have experience and knowledgeable on privatization.
Government contract-based officers must come from the home organization of the priva-
tization driver. Qualified experts in privatization field work at governmental and non-
governmental research institutes, and at independent consultant organizations. This type
of diverse organization will enhance the capacity of privatization implementation in the
right way.
Fifth, the privatization driver should have a flexible organizational structure. Privati-
zation programs naturally are different across industries and characteristics of firms that
need to be privatized. Based on specification of privatization programs, privatization
teams will be created and work together in a short time to complete programs. Members
of each privatization team have different recruitment requirements to conduct privatiza-
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tion programs.
Sixth, the privatization driver should control corruption of privatization implementa-
tion. Corruption and group interests have been concerned as one of the big of problems
of privatization process in developing countries where are lack of a comprehensive legis-
lations and developed markets for privatization to be successful. Therefore, establishing
a privatization driver should consider how to minimize corruption, especially to control
group interests.
Table 4.2: Comparisons of potential privatization drivers for Vietnam
Criteria NSCERD SCIC New perma-
nent entity
The body
under De-
partment of
State Budget
(MOF)
More incentives/ motiva-
tions
No Yes Yes Yes
Less conflict of interest Yes Yes No Partly Yes
Temporary body within a
permanent organization
Yes No No Yes
Diverse staffs No No Yes Yes
Flexible organizational
structure
No No No Yes
Minimizing corruption No No Partly Yes Yes
Source: Author’s comparison
In Vietnam, ministries, line ministries, provincial governments, the State Capital In-
vestment Corporation (SCIC), and the Debt and Assets Trading Corporation (DATC) are
currently main drivers to implement privatization plans. As mentioned above, ministries,
line ministries, and provincial governments can not be a good privatization driver. They
should be assigned to take the role of business operation rather than business management
and shareholder, which occurs in many countries such as South Korea. DATC under the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and SCIC under the Prime Minister were established in 2003
and in 2005, respectively, to enhance the privatization process of SOEs (see Part 4 of
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Chapter 1). These two organizations should not be considered as rational privatization
driver because of two main reasons. First, they themselves can also be classified as SOEs,
especially SCIC as a state general corporation under the Prime Minister. Obviously, an
SOE could not be a rational driver to privatize other SOEs in an efficient way. Second,
complex ownership structures could be generated in case they take the role of privatization
driver. The reason behind is that they have authorizes to buy state-owned shares of SOEs
or partially-privatized SOEs which should fully transfer its state ownership to private sec-
tors. As a result, SOEs are not actually privatized referring the concept of privatization
in Vietnam. Furthermore, lack of full disclosure related to privatization could be another
reason why the two organizations are not good as privatization drivers. Additionally, the
National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development (NSCERD), under
the Government Office, was established in 2011 with the aim of inspecting and super-
vising the implementation of SOEs reforms including privatization of SOEs. Members
of the Committee board come from the central government, the communist party, min-
istries, line ministries, and the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, which may lead
to potential conflicts of interest if the Committee is designed as a privatization driver.
The government has currently requested the Ministry of Planning and Investment
(MPI) to formulate a proposal for establishing a new entity as a representative of state
ownership in enterprises. According to the draft proposal submitted by MPI in February,
2017, the proposal suggests to establish the Committee for managing and supervising state
capital and assets in enterprises. The Committee, under the Prime Minister, is responsible
not only for management and supervision of state capital and assets in enterprises but
also for state capital investment and restructuring SOEs. The Committee should have a
special operation scheme in order to enhance effectiveness of state capital management. In
this sense, all SOEs, SEGs, and SGCs which belongs to ministries and line ministries will
be managed and supervised by the Committee. It means that privatization programs will
be partly taken by the Committee. In other word, the Committee will become as another
privatization driver in Vietnam. By referring the above mentioned features, this type
of entity is not recommended to be a driver of privatization process. The government
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should clearly define the responsibilities of the Committee without implementation of
privatization. The Committee should be assigned to manage and supervise state capital
and assets in enterprises operating in business sectors which need to be operated by the
state (such as sectors related national security) or which serve public functions (such as
sectors do not attract private investors).
Indeed, a temporary body under the Department of State Budget, the Ministry of
Finance, can be a rational privatization driver. The body satisfies almost all criteria as
shown in Table 4.2. First, the body has much more incentives to push privatization process
with the aim of balancing the state budget. Second, without recruiting staffs from other
ministries and line ministries, the body is less likely to induce interest conflicts. The body
can recruit staffs from other departments of MOF, such as Department of Public Asset
Management and Department of Corporate Finance which are related to evaluate the
value of firms for privatization. Third, the body staffs will go back to their original jobs
right after complement of privatization programs. The fourth and fifth features are easily
satisfied when the body establishment is in the right track. The body can minimizing
corruption through disclosure information and recruiting experts or consultants who work
independently of privatization programs. The government also should provide the body a
strong power and capacity to take a responsibility of implementing privatization programs
without representatives of ministries and line ministries, and to make all final decision.
In addition, the roles of SCIC and DATC should be reassigned after the establish-
ment of privatization driver. These both organization will take a role as privatization
supporters rather than privatization drivers. Particularly, SCIC, as a representative of
the state shareholder, should take only responsibility for state capital investment in en-
terprises which serve public functions. Its privatization function should transfer to the
new privatization driver. Furthermore, the role of SCIC should be considered to expend
and strengthen management of state capital of SEGs and SGCs as suggested by Nam
Il-Chong (2009)3; or could be reassigned in line with the establishment of the Committee
3Nam Il-Chong (2009), “On the governance of State owned economic groups in Vietnam”, Supporting
the Establishment of Vietnam’s 2011-2020 Socio-economic Development Strategy, Korean Knowledge
Sharing Program with Vietnam
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for managing and supervising state capital and assets in enterprises suggested by MPI.
DATC should not be assigned to conduct privatization programs. It should be considered
as a supporter for the body to privatize firms which have less potential to be successful.
DATC will corporate with privatization teams to address bad debts before implementation
of privatization programs.
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